Reform of the EU: Scholz draws the wrong lesson from the war

As one of the lessons to be learned from the Ukraine war, the Chancellor once again proposed in a keynote speech in Prague that unanimity in the EU's foreign policy should be abolished.

Actually, this is not a new demand, but the affirmation of an old German point of view.

Even before Putin's attack, he was to be found on most speaking slips in Berlin.

It is classically integrationist: the EU is considered stronger when the national governments have less power and the Brussels institutions more.

Every generation of German European politicians has internalized this dogma.

It is not said, however, that it also applies to the demanding field of foreign policy.

In the EU Council of Ministers, which is the subject of this debate, majority voting has been taking place in most policy areas for years.

That makes sense when it comes to foreign trade or agricultural policy, for example, where the competences lie largely in Brussels.

The "common foreign and security policy", as it is officially called, is not communitized.

The member states have retained the most important instruments, from the diplomatic service to the military.

There is an EU foreign service, but it can't even issue visas.

There is no such thing as a European army.

Everyone has to bear the consequences

Contrary to what is often portrayed in the German debate, this is not traditional adherence to national obstinacy, but a sensible regulation.

In no other area of ​​politics is the stakes as high as in foreign policy.

Ultimately, this is about war and peace, as can be seen again in the Ukraine.

The idea that one could simply overrule the government of one or more member states on issues of such magnitude is strange.

Everyone must bear the consequences of an EU decision.

This also applies to the sanctions policy, which Scholz would like to transfer to majority decision-making as a first step.

For example, if the EU were to stop trading with a third country with a majority, then the member states that were against it would also have to stop doing business.

Retaliation would in turn hit all 27 EU countries.

In a scenario that is no longer so extreme, it is conceivable that a country like Russia would also react militarily to European sanctions.

Can the EU really take such risks without all governments agreeing?

And where will this end?

Should military operations also be decided by majority one day?

There is no such thing in NATO for good reason.

decision not implemented

What can happen in such acute situations is known from the EU's interior and justice policy.

There is no unanimity there.

In 2015, the Council of Ministers decided by a majority to distribute refugees across the EU.

Although it was a legally binding decision, several Eastern European countries successfully refused to implement it.

That may have been forgotten in Berlin, but it would also be a likely consequence of a strong dissent in the Council in foreign policy.

The damage would certainly be greater than the sometimes unsatisfactory compromises that have to be made in Brussels today.

Germany could also be outvoted.

However, the majority rules in the Council favor the large member states because they take the number of inhabitants into account.

Scholz (and Macron) are ultimately concerned with taking away the veto right from smaller EU countries.

The chancellor expressly justifies his proposal with future expansions to the east, even if nobody knows whether they will take place in the foreseeable future.

That is exactly the wrong lesson to be drawn from the many wrong political decisions that were made in Europe before the war.

It was not because of the voting rules that the EU repeatedly accepted Putin's revisionism and that Europe became fatally dependent on Russian gas.

It was because Germany pushed through its supposed economic interests with an iron fist, against the will of the eastern EU members in particular.

The lesson from this should not be that these states should be outvoted in the future, but that their arguments should be taken seriously and their concerns taken into account – no matter how difficult that may be, because countries like Poland and Hungary remain difficult partners.

If Germany wants to be a leading power, as SPD chairman Klingbeil says, then in future that will only be possible in a cooperative manner, and not just when dealing with Eastern Europe.

It is sobering that, after seventy years of European unification, this still cannot be taken for granted.