Since its establishment, the Arab countries have seen in Israel a hostile situation that cannot be coexisted with in the region, but this vision was gradually violated through secret relations and contacts, and then the fundamental transformation came through the peace agreement signed at Camp David with Egypt in 1978, and then the Wadi Araba agreement with Jordan in 1994, preceded by the Oslo Agreement between the occupation and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993, which was completed in the Oslo Agreement 2 (Taba Agreement) in 1995. In 2002, Saudi Arabia presented the “Arab Peace Initiative” and the Arab countries adopted it at the summit meeting held in Beirut, Which stipulates the recognition of the State of "Israel" by Arab countries and the normalization of relations with it in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, the solution of the refugee problem and the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Syrian Golan.
During the administration of former US President Donald Trump, Arab-Israeli relations entered a new stage, as the feeling of internal instability among many regimes in the region as a result of the repercussions of the Arab Spring revolutions, in addition to the growing “Iranian threat” led to the marketing of relations with “Israel” from The angle of joint security and economic benefits, and not from the angle of the "Palestinian cause."
This appeared in the "Abraham agreements" with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, which were based on US security, diplomatic and economic incentives for the printing countries without linking the normalization process to the Palestinian cause.
On the part of Washington and Tel Aviv, these agreements come as part of efforts to build a new regional security system in which "Israel" plays the leadership role by virtue of its technological superiority, and to fill the void of the decline in the US commitment to the region.
From cold peace to regional integration
Due to the Israeli occupation state’s loss of strategic depth, and the concentration of most of its citizens and industrial centers in a narrow area on the coastal plain overlooking the Mediterranean, Tel Aviv has attached great importance to geography, as it fears the ability of missiles launched by its opponents to disrupt daily life and inflict severe damage. Israel’s vital installations and assets, as well as obstructing the process of mobilizing reserve forces in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.
Hence, the normalization of relations with Arab countries on the pattern established by the “Abraham Accords” contributes to the inauguration of security cooperation that contributes to securing the Israeli interior by integrating it into its regional environment, expanding the scope of Israel’s early warning capabilities, and strengthening the siege of opponents of Tel Aviv, in addition to creating Strategic economic ties that make "stability" a mutual interest between "Israel" and its Arab neighbors.
The Trump administration’s January 2021 move of Israel to the US Central Command’s (Middle East) operational realm instead of the US European Command helped encourage military interoperability and military exercises between Israel and Washington’s Arab allies, which began in November November 2021 with a joint military exercise in the Red Sea that brought together naval forces from the United States, the Israeli occupation, the UAE and Bahrain.
In January 2022, "Israel" signed a memorandum of security cooperation with Bahrain, which included conducting joint exercises and appointing a liaison officer in Manama to also work as an Israeli military attache close to Iran.
Israel also agreed with Morocco in November 2021 to enhance bilateral military cooperation, and to establish a joint military committee.
After the Houthis launched attacks on the UAE early this year, as well as their repeated attacks inside Saudi Arabia;
The exchange of intelligence information simultaneously between "Israel" and the Gulf states regarding the threats of drones and missiles, as well as a discussion of the establishment of a regional missile defense system that includes "Israel" and the Gulf states.
This project, which has been promoted since the government of "Netanyahu", aims for "Israel" to play a fundamental security role in the region by exporting its defense systems to the Gulf. Despite the challenges facing this project, the deployment of Israeli Patriot batteries in countries in the region - including the UAE and Bahrain - Enhances the growing security role of the occupation.
After security and geopolitical concerns that bothered Cairo following the signing of the "Abraham Accords", Egypt is now trying to avoid falling behind in Israel's growing regional integration. Agreement to link the Israeli Leviathan field with the two gas liquefaction units in Damietta and Idku;
This strengthened Cairo and Tel Aviv's strategic sharing of a major gas export infrastructure in the region, and developed the relationship between the two countries to an unprecedented level of partnership.
For its part, Saudi Arabia has maintained - so far - its refusal to sign a peace agreement with "Israel" separate from the solution of the Palestinian issue, but the pace of security cooperation between the two sides has accelerated over the past few years, due to Israel's investment in Saudi Arabia's concerns about Iranian influence in the region.
Therefore, taking into account the military contacts within the framework of the US Central Command, and the opening of Saudi airspace to Israeli civilian aircraft, Riyadh has thus become enjoying a kind of official dealing with Israel, regardless of official normalization.
In light of Turkey's efforts to contain external tensions and normalize its relations with its regional rivals, the stalemate in Israeli-Turkish relations eased during 2022 with the visit of Israeli President "Herzog" to Turkey, in preparation for strengthening cooperation in the energy and gas file in the eastern Mediterranean.
It was also noticeable that the security coordination has grown again between the two sides against the impact of Iranian attempts to target "Israelis" on Turkish soil, and this penetration culminated recently in the two countries' agreement to exchange ambassadors.
For its part, the US administration is showing its commitment to support efforts to expand the "Abraham Accords", but it is unlikely that "Biden" will prioritize this agenda to the extent of exerting pressure on the countries of the region similar to the Trump administration, which was evident during his visit to the region, where He avoided raising the file of the regional defense alliance, which includes "Israel", at the summit that he gathered with the leaders of 9 Arab countries in Saudi Arabia, and contented himself with encouraging some of them to cooperate more with "Israel" during his bilateral meetings with them on the sidelines of the summit.
Has Israel become safer?
In light of the accelerating processes of normalization that have gone beyond the usual concept of "normalization" to a level of unprecedented partnership, "Israel" no longer faces an opponent consisting of an alliance of Arab nation-states that poses a threat by waging regular wars, but rather faces a different kind of unconventional threats.
In contrast to the traditional threat posed by Iran, its nuclear program, and its growing regional influence, the sub-state organizations, such as the "Hamas" movement, the Lebanese "Hezbollah", the Iraqi factions loyal to Iran, and the Houthis in Yemen, are emerging.
In addition, the operations of individual popular resistance inside occupied Palestine have become confusing the Israeli security services in light of the difficulty of detecting and thwarting them before they occur, and the expansion of their map to include Jerusalem, the West Bank and the territories of 1948.
On the Palestinian side, the Israeli occupation army used assassinations, arrests and confiscation of funds against Palestinian factions, as well as collective punishment of residents in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as demolishing the homes of the perpetrators of attacks against settlers.
Despite this, Palestinian attacks continued;
What led to the fall of about 20 Israeli deaths during the first third of 2022, which is a large number when compared to its likes in previous years.
With regard to the conflict with Gaza, each new round of fighting intensifies, and the range of rockets launched from Gaza has reached Tel Aviv and Haifa, and the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" has established its presence in the Palestinian arena as the most prominent defender of Jerusalem in parallel with the strengthening of its strength and infrastructure in Gaza.
In the West Bank, the position of the Palestinian Authority, which is facing the unknown, is deteriorating with the approach of the post-President Mahmoud Abbas era.
Despite the security coordination, Jenin and Nablus have turned into strongholds of the resistance, and the "Hamas" movement has recorded remarkable indications of its presence in the West Bank through student and union elections.
Within the 48 territories, Palestinian protests during the Battle of the Sword of Jerusalem in 2021 resulted in the killing of 3 Israelis (Jews) and the injury of 450 others in mixed cities between Arabs and Jews, which raised Israel's fears about the stability of the home front.
Tensions with the Bedouins of the Negev also continued against the backdrop of settlement and displacement policies, and thus the Gaza front was no longer the only hot spot, but the matter extended to the whole of the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the 48 territories.
The situation indicates that betting on normalization, while ignoring the main issue represented in the occupation, the issues of Jerusalem, refugees and settlements, etc., is not expected to enhance the security of the occupation as aspired by his government.
In addition, the occupation government is still unable to contain the demographic threat, with the number of Palestinians in the lands between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River expected to reach 13 million in 2050, compared to 10.6 million Jews.
Since the first decade of the twenty-first century, the percentage of Jews in “East Jerusalem” has been declining, reaching 46% in 1996, and recording 39% in 2020. While the occupation authorities aimed to reduce the proportion of the Arab population in Jerusalem to 20% by 2020, the percentage of Jews in Jerusalem has been reduced to 20% by 2020. The proportion of the Arab population in Jerusalem is about 40%.
By examining the data in the period from 2015-2020, the Arab population growth rate in Jerusalem ranged between 2.4% and 2.7%, while the Jewish population growth rate ranged between 1.5% and 2.2%.
The decline in the population growth of Jews in Jerusalem comes despite the high fertility rate among Jewish women, reaching 4.4 compared to 3.
1 among Arab women;
As a result of recording negative net immigration among Jews, it amounted to negative 6 thousand in 2018, who moved to live in settlements or other cities such as Tel Aviv.
These conditions indicate that betting on normalization while ignoring the main issue represented in the occupation, the Jerusalem files, refugees and settlements...etc, is not expected to enhance the security of the occupation as its government aspires, in addition to the Palestinian resistance’s contribution in its various forms to deepening political divisions among the Israelis and further eroding trust towards Government institutions against the backdrop of different views on managing the relationship with the Palestinians, which is compounded by the absence of unanimous veteran Israeli politicians;
This led to the recurrence of the Knesset elections 5 times in the last two years.
Iranian threat
Tel Aviv places the Iranian threat at the forefront of the threats it fears, especially the nuclear project that will change the balance in the region if Tehran manages to acquire a nuclear bomb.
In addition, the Iranian threat has escalated in light of Iran’s persistent efforts to deepen its influence in areas close to “Israel” by supporting various organizations and groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Gaza, and by providing them with precision missiles, drones and weapons that allow opening several simultaneous fronts against “Israel.” .
In the face of this, Israel is waging what it calls a “campaign between wars” to deter opponents and undermine their capabilities, which includes launching preemptive strikes based on high-quality intelligence inside Iran targeting missile and drone manufacturing facilities, and nuclear scientists, as well as the continuous targeting of the Iranian presence. The Iranian regime in Syria, the transfer of advanced weapons from Iran to Hezbollah in Syria and Iraq, and finally the massive strikes during the rounds of fighting with Gaza to limit the development of the capabilities of the Palestinian resistance.
With Tel Aviv sensing the possibility of the “campaign between wars” deteriorating into a broad military conflict, the Israeli army launched in May 2022 a large-scale military maneuver for four weeks aimed at simulating fighting on several fronts simultaneously, specifically with Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Iran, as well as About facing unrest within the 48 lands.
Despite these efforts, the Iranian nuclear project is moving forward, the accuracy of Iranian missiles is increasing despite the embargo, Iranian influence has become entrenched in Syria, and Hezbollah’s armament is developing to the point that it recently acquired anti-ship missiles with a range of 1,000 km, and the steady improvement in the capabilities of the factions The resistance in Gaza and its ability to threaten the internal security of the occupation is no longer in doubt.
Fragile stability and major power struggles
The Russian Ministry of Justice asked the Russian judiciary to close the branch of the "Jewish Agency for Migration to Israel", a move that the occupation government warned would affect the relationship of the two countries.
(Reuters)
In contrast to the system of threats surrounding the occupation state, the political situation in the region is characterized by fragility and the possibility of a sudden collapse at any moment, as many Arab regimes whose conditions affect "Israel" face major internal challenges.
Otherwise, Tel Aviv fears that the global economic crisis resulting from the repercussions of the spread of the Corona virus and the Russian war in Ukraine will push towards the scenario of economic collapse that leads to social unrest that will result in political changes in the neighboring Arab countries.
Therefore, the strategic report for Israel issued by the Herzliya Center in 2022 recommends the necessity of keeping the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan under the umbrella of US support, given that protecting these regimes is a guarantee of regional stability as perceived by "Israel".
In addition, Washington's change of priorities from combating terrorism curbed the Chinese rise to shift the American focus from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific region, and then came the ignition of the Russian-Western conflict in the Ukraine file to push for the involvement of "Israel" in the conflicts of major countries, and limit its ability on closer relations with adversaries of the United States, and obstruction of joint economic projects and operations of military cooperation with China and Russia.
Washington is pressuring Tel Aviv to take more advanced positions towards supporting Ukraine with certain weapons, which Tel Aviv has rejected so far and is content with political support for fear that Moscow will respond by activating the Russian air defense systems in Syria;
This limits the ability of the Israeli Air Force to operate in Syria.
But recently, things escalated between the two sides, as the Russian Ministry of Justice asked the Russian judiciary to close the branch of the "Jewish Agency for Migration to Israel", a move that the occupation government warned that it would affect the relationship of the two countries, and the Minister of Defense of the occupation, "Benny Gantz" acknowledged Russia's activation of the "S" system. -300" against Israeli planes for the first time, while carrying out attacks in Syria last May.
Washington is also pressuring Tel Aviv to limit China's involvement in the Israeli economy, and the US Navy has reconsidered the regular docking of its ships at the Haifa naval base, after a Chinese company won a 25-year contract to operate the port.
Simultaneously, Washington is practically vetoing Israeli arms sales to China, which impedes the deepening of Sino-Israeli relations.
The dilemma of the American retreat
(Anadolu Agency)
This American preoccupation with China and Russia reduces Washington's interest in Middle East issues.
The chaotic withdrawal of the US army and its allies from Afghanistan and the reduction of the US presence in Iraq and Syria contributed to this;
In strengthening the feeling of Washington's Arab allies that it is diminishing its commitment to protecting their security.
With the global preoccupation with issues such as the spread of Corona, the Ukraine war, climate change, the food crisis and price inflation...etc;
The countries of the region have become empowered to confront internal and external challenges on their own, as regional powers have gained increasing influence that has allowed them to influence the course of events more than ever before, and they have a wider margin to act according to their own interests, regardless of US goals and priorities.
There is no doubt that "Israel" finds in this case a favorable opportunity to exploit it to break the collar of isolation and expand its influence in order to enhance its security, by presenting itself as a security partner for the Gulf states and Egypt, especially in the files that concern the security of these regimes, such as the Iranian file and the file of Islamists.
Israel presents itself as a stabilizing factor whose special position in Washington can be used to become the arrowhead of the regional alliance that is being formed to fill the void left by the decline in the US military deployment in the region, which was evident in its hosting of the Negev Summit in the presence of the foreign ministers of the United States, Egypt, the UAE, Morocco and Bahrain. Which resulted in a forum for relations bringing together these countries, focusing mainly on issues of economic and trade cooperation, as reflected in the promotion of the regional alliance project in which "Israel" will play the leadership role due to its military superiority.
On the other hand, the decline in the US commitment to the region puts all regional powers in front of an opportunity to exercise greater influence, not only "Israel", but also Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
Iran stands in the category of open hostility with "Israel", and the efforts of Washington and regional countries to weaken it seem insufficient to contain Tehran's rise as a regional power.
As for Turkey, its position as a regional power is no longer in doubt, especially after its consolidation over the past few years, and is likely to be further strengthened by the impact of international changes related to the Ukraine war.
On the strategic level, Turkey and Iran represent a challenge to the efforts to build a regional order dominated by "Israel".
In the Arab world, despite the decline in the Egyptian role and the limits of Saudi power, the two countries are not likely to accept an equation of regional dependence on Israel, and they will work in the long term to limit Israeli influence in the Arab sphere;
If not for reasons related to the traditional definition of "Israel" as a threat, it will be for geopolitical reasons that consider Israeli influence, such as Turkey and Iran, as a competitor to the two countries' position and role in the Arab world.
On the other hand, the American position also stimulates an opposite trend to the efforts of the growing Israeli role in the region. While fears of the Iranian role are one of the justifications for relations with “Israel”, the direction of the United States to negotiate with Iran and its assurance to its allies that it is still committed to reaching a nuclear agreement, did not lead Only to try to achieve a balance through security cooperation with "Israel", but in return he also pushed the countries of the region to adopt a conciliatory approach with Iran and try to reach bilateral understandings with it, which is evident in the Emirati and Saudi position, as well as Egypt's permanent adoption of a policy based on Not to turn the dispute with Iran into a regional confrontation.
If Tehran and the Western powers reach a nuclear agreement, the chances that it will lead to more understanding between the countries of the region and Iran seem more likely than the possibilities that it will lead to strengthening the alliance of the countries of the region with "Israel" in the face of Iran.
The relations of "Israel" and its Arab surroundings are going through an unprecedented progress, redefining the relationship from mere normalization and secret relations, to the "alliance" and economic and security relations of a strategic nature.
(Anadolu Agency)
More importantly, Israel is not militarily qualified to fill every void left by Washington.
The Gulf states are waiting for the United States to continue its commitments towards protecting them militarily from external threats, a task that Israel cannot undertake.
In fact, Tel Aviv aims to strengthen security alliances with the countries of the region to enhance the security of "Israel" itself, and not to play Washington's role towards these countries.
In light of the intensification of international competition between Washington on the one hand, and Beijing and Moscow on the other, it does not seem that the United States is about to abandon this role in the first place, which is what Biden aimed to emphasize during his visit to the region in mid-July.
Redefining
In conclusion, the relations of "Israel" and its Arab surroundings are going through an unprecedented progress, redefining the relationship from mere normalization and secret relations, to the "alliance" and economic and security relations of a strategic nature.
This may open the way for Israel to play a pivotal regional role based on the nature of the support it receives from the United States, which guarantees it military superiority in the region, in addition to its technological superiority and security expertise that some countries in the region hope to benefit from.
On the other hand, this pivotal role will be faced with the influence of other regional powers, especially Turkey and Iran, in addition to the keenness of the main Arab powers - especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia - not to discount the growing Israeli role in the Arab sphere from their traditional influence.
(Anadolu Agency)
But the continued resistance of the Palestinians to the imposition of a fait accompli without a satisfactory settlement, especially with the consolidation of the apartheid model in the occupied territories, which feeds the motives of popular resistance even within the “Green Line”, the exacerbation of conflicts between the major players in the international arena, and the continuation of the Iranian expansion project despite the pressures it is exposed to Israel, the fragile regional stability, as well as the exacerbation of political, ideological and ethnic divisions within the occupying entity... All these matters create a state of uncertainty about the future of the Israeli presence in the region, and indicate that the Israeli rise carries within it chronic factors of weakness.
Also, the plans of the United States to reach a deal with Iran, and the regression of the priority of its Middle East region, leaves the regional allies with a larger margin to defend themselves and shape regional policy according to their own interests.
These countries will continue to follow a two-track approach to contain the Iranian threat. On the one hand, they will continue to cooperate with "Israel" as an effective regional military and security force in efforts to contain Iran, and on the other hand, these countries seek to reach bilateral understandings with Iran, which may limit over time. From the pace and extent of dependence on "Israel", especially since the latter cannot provide the same defensive cover that the United States provides to its Arab allies.
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