The decision to dismiss the head of the Libyan Oil Corporation, Mustafa Sanalla, and appoint Farhat bin Qadara as his successor, carries with it more than a strategic significance that would rearrange the existing political and security alliances between the east and west of the country.

One of the most important indicators of the beginning of the change of these alliances is the end of the parties affiliated with Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the forces of the east of Libya, the closure of the oil fields and ports as soon as bin Qadara was appointed head of the Oil Corporation, although its main demand was to hand over power to the head of the unity government, Abdel Hamid al-Dabaiba, to Fathi Bashagha, the appointed head of the government. From the House of Representatives in Tobruk.

It is known that Bin Qadara, who is affiliated with the eastern camp, can only be appointed with an agreement between Dabaiba and Haftar, as they are the ones who have de facto authority.


possible agreement

No party announced the existence of an agreement between Dabaiba and Haftar, but Libyan activists are widely circulating a deal that Saddam Haftar reached with a representative of Dabaiba to overthrow Mustafa Sanalla from the presidency of the NOC, and open the oil fields and ports that were closed about 3 months ago, despite Dabaiba's denial. conclude any deal.

But the Italian agency "Nova" alluded to this agreement when it pointed out that "the only technically possible agreement, at the present time, is between Dabaiba and Haftar, as Haftar is chronically looking for funds to finance his war machine."

And it is not only money that Haftar is looking for, but the demonstrations that erupted in various Libyan cities on the first of this July demanded the departure of all current political figures, for many reasons, including long hours of power outages, one of which was the closure of oil facilities.

Haftar realizes that he cannot shut down oil for long periods of time, because that would explode in his face in the form of popular anger and international pressure, so he rushed to agree with the Dabaiba government to open the oil facilities, in exchange for appointing one of his loyalists to head the oil establishment.

The details of these understandings have not yet been revealed, with the exception of the appointment of Bin Qadara, the governor of the Central Bank during the era of Muammar Gaddafi, who is currently affiliated with Haftar's camp, but it will not differ much from the understandings that took place in the summer of 2020 between Saddam Haftar and the then Vice President of the Presidential Council, Ahmed Maiteeq.

Haftar wants to guarantee a share of the oil revenues, and he cannot withstand more public and international pressure, led by the United States, which wants the flow of Libyan oil and gas to Europe, to mitigate the repercussions of Western sanctions on Russian hydrocarbons and the inflammation of global energy prices.

On the other hand, Dabaiba realizes that not resolving the electricity crisis quickly, or at least reducing the hours of power outages, would popularly topple his government.

An agreement with Haftar to open oil would restore the flow of gas to electricity production plants, which would help alleviate the crisis of long interruptions.


Will the Bashagha Communion be?

After Dabaiba's dismissal of the Electricity Company's board of directors at the end of last June, it was Mustafa Sanalla's turn at the Oil Corporation, but Bashagha may be the third sacrifice to silence the anger of the Libyan street, which demands the departure of all faces of the political class.

The agreement of Dabaiba and Haftar to appoint a new director of the Oil Corporation in return for opening the tap for production and export means that Bashagha and his government no longer have an important role in the next stage, and it is an implicit recognition of the unity government, which imposed the implementation of its decision to change the NOC’s board of directors, despite the opposition of Sanalla, the House of Representatives and the state.

In Haftar's eyes, Pashaga was unable to enter Tripoli, as he promised more than once, and his adherence to peace and not using force to remove the Dabaiba government does not serve the goals of the eastern forces commander to weaken the forces of the western region and divide the brigades of the city of Misurata, the main force that thwarted his attempt to storm Tripoli between 2019 and 2020.

The existence of popular demands for the departure of both Dabaiba and Bashagha means that Bashagha has become popularly rejected, as well as the inability of his government to exercise its functions from the capital since last March, and its stability in the city of Sirte and the lack of any budget from the Central Bank to implement its program.

In the event that Dabaiba and Haftar agree to confront popular discontent, then Bashagha will have only two options, either to surrender to the fait accompli and announce his resignation and end his government, or to try to change this reality by taking control of Tripoli by armed force, and renegotiating with Haftar, and this is a suicidal option that he will have. Serious repercussions on the security of the country.

Bashagha expressed his belief that there is no strong opposition to his entering the capital, Tripoli (Anatolia).

refused to storm Tripoli

Bashagha is well aware that he will only rule Libya from Tripoli, and entering the capital may cost him a lot of blood, so he is trying to bet on convincing the leaders of the battalions in Tripoli to change their loyalty, to avoid the bloody and catastrophic scenario even if he wins.

After the failure of 3 attempts to enter or stabilize his government in Tripoli, the last of which caused the death of one of his men, Bashagha decided to make Sirte the temporary capital of his government, but he returned on the ninth of July to announce that he would begin his duties from Tripoli in the coming days.

Bashagha justified his change of position on not entering Tripoli by saying, "The forces that were opposition have changed their positions, and they want us to enter the capital, and we will."

As for the possibility of armed confrontations with the battalions supporting the unity government, Bashagha said, "There is no strong opposition, there is opposition from some forces to which the previous government paid money."

This statement reflects the beginning of Bashagha's impatience, and that he is preparing to confront the battalions supporting the Dabaiba government.

Therefore, a number of leaders of the security and military battalions in the western region rushed to warn that they are determined to "confront anyone who tries to cause chaos inside Tripoli", in reference to Bashagha's threats.

Activists in the civil movement also issued a statement expressing their refusal to storm the capital, and to enter into transitional stages, in reference to the Bashagha government.

In the face of this security, military and popular rejection, regardless of its size, Pashagha's mission will not be easy, especially since the residents of Tripoli have not yet forgotten the tragedies and wounds caused by Haftar's attack on their city.


Other players

So far, the agreement between Dabaiba and Haftar has not gone beyond the issue of oil, and no consensus has yet been reached regarding Dabaiba's recognition of the unity government, and the removal of the rug from under the Bashagha government.

Dabaiba and Haftar are not alone in deciding the fate of the country. There are other actors who can turn the tables on everyone, such as the House of Representatives and the State, which may agree on a new government, headed by neither Dabaiba nor Bashagha.

This is without ignoring the role of the Presidential Council, which may resort to imposing a state of emergency, bringing down the two chambers of Parliament, as well as the two conflicting governments, and reshaping the political scene again.

Also, Russia, which will not be pleased with the return of Libyan oil to the international market, may move the Wagner mercenaries, its security arm in the country, to pressure the Libyan parties to achieve certain interests.

In this regard, the (local) Panorama channel quoted a security source as saying that "Wagner's mercenaries carried out a tactical exercise with live ammunition in the vicinity of the Al-Jufra air base (center) towards Sirte, with the intensive participation of MiG-29s, and without the participation of Haftar's militias."

Everyone at this stage is awaiting any step taken by the other, especially with the multiplicity of political and military players in Libya, and international actors as well, not ruling out the change of alliances, the fall of cards, and the rise of the shares of people who were not taken into account.