The Lebanese parliamentary elections were organized abroad and on Lebanese soil on May 6 and 7, 2022, and May 15, respectively, and led to a parliament in which no political alliance has a clear parliamentary majority, even though Hezbollah and its allies are the largest bloc. ;
What necessitates the organization of new coalitions in light of a sharp division between the various blocs over different addresses, and an economic and financial collapse that intensified after the results appeared and as a result of the decline in the Central Bank of Lebanon’s intervention in the money market.
That is because the dollar exchange rate rose rapidly after the end of the election day in the middle of this month (May 15), and crossed the threshold of thirty thousand pounds for the dollar (it was a little more than twenty thousand) after the Banque du Liban tried, at the behest of the political authority, to maintain stability in the exchange rate.
This paper discusses the outcome of the Lebanese parliamentary elections that ended on May 15, 2022, the societal and political transformations that they revealed, and then the scenarios related to the upcoming elections.
elections and transformations
The greatest focus in reading the results of the Lebanese elections was on the relationship of the impact of its outcome on the parliamentary majority of "Hezbollah" and its allies. In the last parliament (2018) they formed a bloc of 71 seats in which the party, the Amal movement, the "Free Patriotic Movement" and forces and figures allied with it, but The number has decreased to about 62 seats in the current parliament, with the registration of the election of a wide group of those who count themselves on the October 17, 2019 uprising, and an increase in the number of the "Lebanese Forces" bloc led by Samir Geagea.
And the last variable, despite the ongoing debate over whether or not the “forces” owns the largest Christian bloc, has opened the door to a greater role for Saudi Arabia in Lebanese politics, especially with the entry of Sunni figures close to it to Parliament, and the departure of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri from it and the political arena.
In practice, however, the current parliament is considered without a clear majority, and it is suspended pending the formation of new coalitions to choose a new parliament speaker as well as a government and a president, and then a president of the republic as well, which turns all these processes into difficult entitlements that will drag on negotiations to reach deals.
The results of the elections can be characterized between the circumstantial vote associated with the fact that independent candidates affiliated with the “October 17 Intifada” obtained a relatively high percentage of the vote, as a result of the punitive vote of the power parties, and the permanent and continuous transformation taking place in Lebanese society and its political representation, on the other hand.
Punitive vote:
Independent candidates received a high percentage of votes in various constituencies and won 13 seats, 12 of them were elected for the first time, although some of them had previously run in the elections and were unlucky.
What is remarkable about these nominations is that they are not only for new MPs, most of whom are young people, but also that they do not belong to active parties in the political scene, but rather to emerging and small groups that were participating in the uprising.
This vote for independents does not necessarily mean its continuation in the future or the continuation of this political trend, unless they establish organizations capable of forming an electoral lever in the upcoming elections.
This result came as a result of a retaliatory vote by the voters to punish the political parties in power over four years that witnessed financial and economic collapse, wholesale corruption scandals, and an explosion in the port of Beirut that left destruction and dozens of victims and wounded without any transparent investigation that ends up punishing any political, security and military official for his negligence.
The circumstantial situation that allowed a penetration of this size, which is about 11 percent of Parliament, is linked to the withdrawal of one of the main political poles in the country, the former Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, the leader of the "Future Movement", which often reaps the majority of Sunni representation.
Hariri had decided to boycott the elections and asked his entire movement to do so. No, rather, he urged his representatives and their supporters in Lebanon to boycott the voting process.
This opened the way for multiple forces to be represented in Sunni-majority districts, such as Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon.
Such breakthroughs would not have been possible on this scale had Hariri been a candidate, and not a boycott of the polling process.
It is noteworthy that the "punitive vote" took place at the level of all constituencies and reached for the first time the third southern constituency, with two penetrations in the Druze and Orthodox seats, after Hezbollah and its allies managed in the 2018 elections to raise the electoral quotient and prevent any penetration.
The "revenge" vote was not absent from the speeches of the winning candidates, whether in terms of electoral propaganda with scenes from the Beirut explosion, or to warn people against voting for the same politicians to avoid financial, economic and humanitarian disasters.
This reality reflects the nature of independent nominations to Parliament, which are often individual media, cultural, and academic figures, and activists gathered on unified lists as a result of the current proportional law that combines lists and preferential votes for each of the candidates on one list.
Since the winning independent forces did not fight the battle as a single bloc with a clear program at the level of the whole country, but rather decided to compete at the local level, they are of course dispersed and do not reflect a single case.
political shifts:
Some of the variables in these elections are related to and related to societal political transformations: First: the percentage of voter turnout continues to decrease nationwide, albeit slightly this year;
It reached 41 percent in the preliminary figures of the Ministry of the Interior, although it rose later in other estimates, but below the percentage of the last elections.
The participation rate in the Lebanese elections was 49.20% in the 2018 elections, a decrease of 4.8% compared to the 2009 elections, when it registered 54%.
This decline is linked to several factors, the first of which is: the decline in the rate of participation in political life among young people in the region in particular and the world in general, for reasons including education, attention to pressing social affairs and loss of confidence in politicians, as well as interest in service issues that did not receive much discussion and illumination in election campaigns that focused on revenge From the political class and to a general political discourse.
The second striking feature in the parliamentary elections was the weakness of the ability to deliver services to followers and devotees at the same level that it was many years ago.
The rentier system in its previous form, i.e. providing thousands of jobs and government services to followers in exchange for their loyalty and votes, collapsed as a result of the financial and economic collapse since 2019;
As the government salary is barely enough for days, not to mention the high cost of transportation between regions.
As a result of this development, vote-buying was remarkable with the increase in the fortunes of businessmen of their financial ability, and amid a rise in the price of appearing on the Lebanese media.
The third feature is the high share of the Lebanese Forces in Christian representation, which has happened in every election in which it has participated since 2005, that is, in four elections in a row.
In 2005, the Lebanese Forces won six seats, and eight in 2009, increasing their share with the change of the electoral law towards proportional in the 2018 elections to 14 deputies, and then to twenty in the last elections.
Thus, we are faced with an increasing representation of this organization that arose during the Lebanese civil war (in which the strongest was Christian), and for the first reasons was to present itself on the basis of the ability to protect Christians from the growing dangers, specifically "Hezbollah" in light of the latter's military capabilities.
These capabilities reinforce fears in light of the numerical predominance of Muslims, make the system of parity less durable, and necessitate a transition to some form of decentralization.
In fact, decentralization was mentioned in the programs and discourses of the two main Christian forces, ie the Lebanese Forces and their rival, the Free Patriotic Movement, allied with Hezbollah.
Consequently, decentralization has become a comprehensive Christian demand that addresses two sources of concern: the first: the need to protect Christian privacy from the ongoing and growing demographic shift, and the second: development by maintaining taxes in light of the prevailing belief that Christian regions are subject to levying more broadly than Muslim ones.
The increase in the Lebanese Forces’ share of Christian representation, which has happened in every election they have participated in since 2005.
The growing Christian vote for this option and the consideration of decentralization as a necessary protectionist means, has emerged more prominently in the recent election campaigns, and it must be reflected in the political discourse in the subsequent period with the increasing impact of the financial and economic crisis.
scenarios
In drawing up future scenarios, and in the absence of a parliamentary majority for any particular group or alliance, internal developments depend largely on the regional situation and the possibility of a Saudi-Iranian understanding that would allow cooperation between Hezbollah and its allies, on the one hand, and the Lebanese Forces, on the other. .
Such a scenario, if it occurs, will be accompanied by a dialogue table under international (possibly French) sponsorship to produce a parallel understanding.
Even in the event of going in this direction, it is expected that negotiations between the various forces to form a government will take time, especially as it will be linked to a later election, which is the presidential elections.
The second scenario is that "Hezbollah" proceeds to form a government with independents, or perhaps the "Democratic Gathering" bloc, away from the "forces" and other blocs that reject the organization's weapons, but this is without obstacles.
First:
The Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, had allied himself with the "Lebanese Forces" and restored his relationship with Riyadh, and therefore it is difficult for him to enter into a coalition without coordination.
This is because the next government will have one of the tasks of passing not insignificant reforms in order to approve an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, which will be costly to the political forces participating in it.
However, the most appropriate option for these forces participating in the government is to obtain Gulf aid in the context of a regional agreement, instead of going through costly reforms.
Second:
It is difficult for independent personalities to join the government quickly without causing divisions in their ranks, in light of political heterogeneity except in opposition to the poles of power.
The opposition arena has also previously witnessed a sorting of independents on the basis of an alliance with the Kataeb Party or not, and therefore the next stage may witness a sorting on this basis, or about bearing the largest part of the burdens of the collapse of Lebanese banks, and not on depositors or the state through the sale of its assets.
These MPs came on board of a punitive vote and not as a result of party rules and disguised programs, and therefore they may work to strengthen their position by accumulating political action with the opposition or entering the government after a coalition with some power forces.
Such sorting on the basis of political positions needs some time to mature.
The last scenario mixes the void in the upcoming constitutional elections, starting with the formation of a new government, and perhaps ending with the presidential elections, with security tension, pending the maturity of a regional settlement.
In fact, the government vacuum and dependence on caretaker governments has become an inherent feature of the political process in Lebanon, where negotiations take months.
This also happened with the elections of the President of the Republic after the end of the two terms of president, Emile Lahoud in 2007 and Michel Suleiman in 2014. After the elections in 2009 and 2018, the formation of the Saad Hariri government took four and eight months, respectively, while the formation of the Tammam Salam government, in 2014, took 11 months. Therefore, postponement has become an inherent feature of every political entitlement, regardless of the extent of the financial, economic and even security crisis.
In the absence of a settlement and escalation between the two parties, "Hezbollah" and its allies on the one hand, and the "Lebanese Forces" and its allies on the other hand, will argue accusations regarding responsibility for the disruption and the effects on the social and economic situation, with the possibility of tension moving to a security escalation resembling Saddam. Tayouneh” was sectarian in nature in October last year (2021).
In fact, the refusal of large blocs, including the Free Patriotic Movement, an ally of Hezbollah, to elect Nabih Berri for a seventh term to head the parliament is evidence of the course of things during the coming period.
As he may win the fewest number of votes since he was first chosen in Parliament in 1992, and this has repercussions on the path of forming the government and electing a new president as well.
But it is also clear that it is difficult to bring the views closer in light of the sharp divisions in the positions, whether regarding the necessity of discussing the weapons of "Hezbollah" or condemning the previous national unity governments as being responsible for the current crisis.
Even the calls for calm, cooperation and partnership by Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah in his speech after the parliamentary elections carried hidden messages.
Nasrallah called for calm, cooperation and political partnership, speaking of "the extent of the crises in the country: financial, monetary, economic and life" so that "no group alone can remedy them even if it obtains the majority."
But in the context of his talk about "abandoning responsibility" and degrading "opposition and theorizing", he warned against "a betrayal of people's hopes, a betrayal of trust, and a failure to fulfill the promises made during the electoral campaigns."
This speech classified the blocs among those concerned with "pacifying the country politically and in the media."
However, these elections and the resulting parliament open the door to delays and delays with the aim of obtaining political gains in government shares or in the presidential elections, or waiting for a regional deal in the next stage.
The previous failure to agree on governments, and the lengthening of their formation for months, was to reopen the debate about the nature of the Lebanese system and the need for serious constitutional amendments towards expanded decentralization or a new electoral law.
It is expected that this discussion will return to the fore in the event of the failure to form a government and the intensification of the living crisis as a result of the collapse of the local currency;
As there has become a political and popular conviction that there is a structural defect that transcends political divisions and tensions, and requires research into Hezbollah’s weapons and role in the coming period, as well as the nature of the system and the electoral law.
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This report is from Al Jazeera Center for Studies.