New York Times article: Two scenarios for ending the conflict in Ukraine both carry great risks

American political analyst Ross Douthat says that Russia's celebration on the ninth of this May, Victory Day, commemorating the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany in World War II, went without President Vladimir Putin announcing any change in his war strategy on Ukraine, which removes A bit of the fog of war there.

in The New York Times,

Douthat adds that this means the continuation of the grinding war in southern and eastern Ukraine, with the consequent abandonment of the goal of overthrowing the regime in Ukraine and replacing it with the need to own lands that might be annexed in Ukraine.

Ultimately to the Russian Federation.

Putin will not risk a higher escalation

The writer says that Putin certainly does not like the flow of Western weapons towards Ukraine, but he seems ready to go to war according to these circumstances, rather than betting on more existential risks.

He adds that what he considers a success for the West will result in new strategic dilemmas, and that there are two scenarios looming on the horizon in the next six months.

first perception

The first scenario is that Russia and Ukraine will exchange small areas of land, which will make the war gradually subside into a "frozen conflict" similar to the pattern familiar to other wars in Russia's neighboring countries.

Under such circumstances, any lasting peace agreement would require Russia to cede some of the territories it had conquered in Crimea and the Donbas region.

This, according to the writer, would give Moscow "a clear reward for its aggression, regardless of all that it lost on its way to invade Ukraine."

He said, "The matter depends on the size of the lands that will be ceded, which may make Ukraine an amputated, distorted and weak state, despite its military successes."

He stresses that such an agreement may not appear acceptable in Kyiv or Washington, however, the alternative is the continuation of the stalemate, "which will also make Ukraine weak and dependent on flows of money and military equipment from the West, and less able to rebuild what the war destroyed." , according to him.

second perception

The second scenario is in which the Ukrainian army claims that it is close to victory, because thanks to military aid and Western equipment, it will be able to turn its modest counter-attacks into large ones and drive the Russians not only beyond the pre-war lines, but perhaps outside the Ukrainian lands. whole.

It is clear that this is the future that the United States wants - according to the author - except for the very important reservation that also relates to the future in which the Russian nuclear escalation suddenly becomes more likely than it is now.

Douthat notes that the West is aware that the Russian military doctrine envisages the use of defensive tactical nuclear weapons in order to turn the tide of matters in a losing war;

The West should assume that Putin and those around him will view any crushing defeat in Ukraine as a scenario that threatens Russia's regime.

Combining these facts with a world in which the Russians are suddenly defeated, and the gains they made on the ground are lost, “we will be facing a military situation surrounded by the danger of nuclear war that has not happened since the naval blockade imposed by the United States on Cuba in 1962,” he said. his expression.