With the draft for what is now the sixth package of sanctions against Russia, which is now available in Brussels, the EU is attacking Putin's most important source of income for the first time.
For the Russian state budget, oil exports are more important than gas, which is the subject of so much debate in Germany.
The previous packages of sanctions were already large calibers, from which the Russian economy will suffer.
But with this move, Europe is beginning to sever key economic ties with Russia.
Geopolitically, this is increasingly leading to the isolation of the country, and a new Iron Curtain is emerging.
When the war began two and a half months ago, such drastic measures seemed a long way off.
The flexibility of the oil market makes it easier for the federal government in particular to free itself quickly from its (self-inflicted) dependence on Russian raw materials;
only with the gas it looks different as we all know.
Transitional periods are reasonable
Von der Leyen's guideline that the collateral damage for the EU and its partners should be as little as possible is reasonable, which is why the planned transition periods until the end of the year are justifiable.
The other Member States should respond to the reservations that still exist in Hungary, provided they are of a technical nature.
Only Putin has anything to do with differences in the EU.
The tanks still don't stop immediately, Russia has large (military) reserves.
In the case of oil, which is not so pipeline-bound, there are also alternatives to customers in Asia and other regions of the world.
Above all, the Western sanctions are increasing the pressure in Putin's political cauldron at home.
In the best-case scenario, that will make him give in, maybe it will cause him to fall, but he will probably build up counter-pressure elsewhere.
Winning the war in Ukraine, as von der Leyen would like, is an ambitious goal that cannot be achieved with sanctions alone.