It went well again.
Imagine if the factions in the Bundestag had grappled with two non-binding motions for arms deliveries, while desperate calls for ammunition and relief were being made from the pocket in Mariupol.
A small-minded parliament would have joined the procrastinating chancellor and the divided coalition.
But as it is, with the joint application by the Union and the traffic light groups, there is at least the appearance of orientation.
The motion, in which the delivery of heavy weapons and "ring exchanges" are welcomed and called for, had already fulfilled its task from the point of view of the Union before it was passed.
Of course, it wasn't just the opposition that persuaded the chancellor to finally speed up the delivery of tanks and other heavy equipment to Ukraine.
But pressure from the Union helped remind Scholz of what action is.
Not in the sense of Ukraine
The cheetahs came faster than the Bundestag.
The Panzerwende is one of many in German Ukraine policy that only comes about when there is no other option.
For Scholz, the method has the disadvantage of being seen as a procrastinator, but the advantage of being able to present the reluctant SPD faction with a fait accompli.
In the sense of Ukraine this is not.
Because it is a method that is suspected of having been based on the fact that those who were attacked would not be able to defend themselves for long anyway.
Therein lies a weakness of this proposal.
Only in one passage is the aim vaguely envisaged that Russian forces would have to withdraw from “the entire territory” of Ukraine.
Apparently, this is understood as a maximum demand that hardly any politician in Berlin believes in.
Had it been otherwise, Scholz shouldn't have been scaremongering nuclear war while the final obstacle to a land corridor between Russia and Crimea falls in Mariupol.
The stigma of being late will stick with Germany.