“Coincidence of Interests”: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to China on the Development of Partnership Relations between Moscow and Beijing

— Andrei Ivanovich, in 1997 you took part in the creation of a joint Russian-Chinese declaration.

Please tell us about the work on this document and your impressions of this political process.

 — 25 years have passed since the signing of that same declaration — this, of course, is a long time, but nevertheless, a lot is memorable.

At that time I was working in Beijing, I was the embassy's envoy-counsellor, and I was here, as they say, on the farm, since Ambassador Igor Alekseevich Rogachev left for Moscow to participate in the visit of the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin.

Therefore, my colleagues and I watched the signing of the declaration from Beijing.

I would like to point out one such feature: after all, these were the 1990s, the first half and middle of which passed in very specific conditions for our diplomatic service - for well-known historical reasons, our diplomatic activity then sank.

Therefore, the first thing that comes to mind is that we missed such serious conceptual work, the drafting and adoption at the highest level of serious documents of such rich content and promising orientation.

• Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov, Beijing, 2021

• Gettyimages.ru

• © VCG/VCG

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 — The end of the 1990s was the time of laying the foundations and forming our foreign policy line, which took shape after the 2000s.

And it is directly connected with the name of Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov.

His coming to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was a major milestone in the country's foreign policy.

And the very declaration that we are talking about is to a large extent a product of the new foreign policy thinking that began to take hold with the arrival of Yevgeny Maksimovich.

Under him, many interesting developments took place in our diplomatic service and in our foreign policy activities.

The idea of ​​a multipolar world was Yevgeny Maksimovich’s conceptual setting, his foreign policy ideology, which was largely based on the idea of ​​multipolarity, on a departure not only from the unipolarity that reigned after 1991, but also from the bipolarity that existed before.

Then, in 1996-1997, for the first time we managed to agree with our Chinese partners on the transition to that same strategic partnership - I remember this very well, since I took an active part in this.

Strategic interaction and comprehensive partnership — this is how our relations are now formulated, and then this wording sounded like “partnership relations of a strategic nature”.

This idea was most directly connected with Yevgeny Maksimovich.

It was he who pushed her.

And together with our Chinese partners, we were able to find acceptable formulations in a short time.

— How do you evaluate this document from today's position?

 - When you look back, a completely opposite example is seen especially prominently against this background.

After all, at the same time, in 1997, interstate agreements were signed both on partnership with Ukraine and on partnership with NATO.

Both of these have simply fallen into disrepair today, and by now these agreements have actually been destroyed thanks to the actions and efforts of our partners.

And what was done in the Chinese direction then, starting with the declaration, not only retains its relevance: as Karl Marx said, “the eternally young tree of life is green” - this is what is happening.       

• Letter to the UN on the adoption of a joint Russian-Chinese declaration "on a multipolar world and the formation of a new world order"

• © United Nations

What do you think is the peculiarity of the Russian-Chinese declaration on multipolarity? 

 - I can say for sure: in our relations with China, this is such a comprehensive document on key issues of the world order - this is how our declaration can be defined - it, of course, was adopted by us for the first time.

Before that, in various kinds of communiqués, we argued for a long time what to call our documents following the visit: a declaration or a statement.

We wanted it to be a declaration, more solemn, and the Chinese partners said: "No, let's make a statement."

Do you know how the dispute was resolved?

It turned out that both are called the same word in Chinese.

As a result, we decided that our Chinese partners call their document “shaymin” in Chinese, and we call it the way we want to translate it.

And so the word "declaration" was born, and not only in this case, but also in a number of others.        

— What was taken as a basis in the process of creating the declaration?

- This document laid down the fundamental thesis (and, as far as I understand, it was on our initiative) - the thesis of the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the bipolar world system.

That's what was said there.

We declared this based on our experience in the 1990s, and our Chinese colleagues did not argue with us then, as far as I remember.

Now, of course, this seems to some extent naive, but, on the other hand, we are materialists and evaluate the course of the historical process in line with the law of the transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones.

Yes, the thesis about the end of the Cold War in the light of today's events sounds very specific.

But the disappearance of the bipolar system of the world is rather the end of the confrontation between the two blocs, and to a large extent ideological, if we mean the Soviet system.

And she really disappeared. 

— What difficulties have arisen in the implementation of the concept of multipolarity?

“Now our international opponents are just twisting our arms.

And China, first of all.

They impose that same bipolarity, trying to present the contradictions that exist between such major powers as China and the United States as some kind of ideological contradictions, contradictions between democracy and authoritarianism.

This authoritarianism is like a kind of label attached to China, and at the same time we are also being pulled here.

And it turns out, as they say, the division of the world into two parts.

• AP

• © Alexei Druzhinin

We strongly object to this.

Our Chinese partners also object to this.

If you carefully read their fundamental statements, the statements of Chinese leaders and, above all, President Xi Jinping, they constantly say quite reasonably and deeply that there is no division of the world along ideological lines, that there is not and cannot be a repetition of the Cold War in the form in which it existed in previous years.

The world is changing, but the question “Is multipolarity left or not?”

not worth it.

She, of course, remained, and it cannot be otherwise.

There cannot be one pole, not because no one wants it, but our American partners really want it and are trying to impose it on the world in every possible way, but they no longer pull, they can’t.

And the American conceptualists themselves in the field of foreign policy thought openly admit this.

Therefore, the idea of ​​multipolarity is certainly alive, and, of course, this is the prospect for the development of the world composition.

It simply changes, because it is very mobile in itself.

What countries, in your opinion, can be at the center of this multipolarity?

- Look: there is China, which in terms of GDP in terms of currencies has already practically approached the United States, and has already surpassed it in terms of purchasing power parity.

There is India, which has already surpassed China in population growth, although until recently it seemed impossible, and in terms of its GDP it is also approaching the world leaders.

Finally, the European Union exists as a kind of pole.

Another thing is that the European Union chose for itself a subordinate position in relation to its American ally, but, as they say, God will judge him - this is his choice.

But economically, it remains an impressive force, and this, of course, is also a pole.

Even Africa, which is now perceived as a kind of integral player or actor, is also becoming a pole.

This is no longer an object, but a subject that plays its own independent role in the system of international relations.

So now talking about

— What place is given to Russia in the multipolar world order?

- In this world, our side, Russia, has its own “shelf”.

For example, the European Union is an association that is ahead of us economically.

But there are many other factors on our side.

And it's not even about the territory and not so much about our defense potential, but primarily about the availability of natural resources, including fuel energy.

And, as it suddenly turned out in recent years, there is a powerful production base for the development of agriculture, and, accordingly, for food production, which will be more and more in demand by the world.

Just recently, about three or four years ago, I was literally arguing with our large grain producing companies, who said that it would take a little time for us to come out on the second place in trade with China after the oil and gas bloc.

Then I just dismissed it, but now we are actually approaching these indicators.

And if the growth of our activity had not been restrained by trade and political methods, methods of closing markets, we would have established ourselves as a supplier of agricultural products even faster - and not only to the Chinese market.

That is, the situation is very mobile, very rapidly changing, but the general vector is clearly being built in the direction of dynamic multipolarity.

— Why did Russia and China start cooperation at that particular time, in the mid-1990s?

 - We are two large countries with our own rather clearly defined national interests - this is the first.

Secondly, we are not allies, we do not have, as they say, obligations to each other by definition, that is, we have not signed any relevant documents, as is the case in military-political blocs, which we believe are becoming obsolete, in the same NATO bloc.

No, we do not have this with China, so we are free from obligations towards each other.

And what's left?

What remains is the coincidence of interests in the international arena.

- What is this coincidence of interests of Russia and China?

“Both China and we stand for the preservation of the universal principles of international law, for the preservation of the coordinating role of the UN and the UN Security Council, for the codification and recognition by the widest circle of participants in international communication of certain legal norms, for which, in fact, the UN operates.

Both China and we object to such fashionable language as the rules-based order, that is, "an order based on the rules."

But we object for one simple reason: we ask you to name, and what, in fact, are these rules?

And the second, which may be more important: who prescribed, codified, and advanced these rules?

And that's what they can't explain to us.

Because it turns out that Kosovo is one set of rules, while the republics of the North Caucasus or the South Caucasus are different rules.

Or Iraq, Libya, Syria and Afghanistan - these are the same rules,

and our actions are other rules.

These are the things that China doesn't like and we don't like.

• Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Denisov at the art exhibition of the SCO countries, 2021

• Gettyimages.ru

• © Zhao Jun/China News Service

China, for objective reasons, is even more concerned than we are with the problems of equality of economic opportunities in working in the foreign market.

Because our export is mainly hydrocarbons, we have a specific segment of world trade.

And China trades in finished products, and there is fierce competition in this area, so a lot of what is being done in relation to China is political methods in order to achieve the economic benefits of partners.

This was especially evident during the Trump presidency.

Everyone expected that with the advent of the Democrats, with whom China has always had more balanced relations, including in the economic field, something will change, but nothing has changed.

Moreover, the Democratic American administration, firstly, further tightened China's trade containment, and secondly, used all sorts of political factors to contain it.

To do this, all sorts of artificial arguments are invented, sometimes even cynical arguments, in order to restrain economic expansion in the good sense of the word, the expansion of China's economic opportunities.

At the same time, I want to say again: in the UN Security Council, for example, we vote in eight cases out of ten equally, not because we owe each other something or we agree, but because our interests simply really coincide.

Here's what our Chinese partners love: 背靠背 (bèikàobèi), back to back.

Because we, in the face of China, and China in our face, feel precisely the rear covered.

We are neighbors, we have a border with China of 4209 km - one of the longest in the world and the second longest for our country.

The first is with Kazakhstan, there are 7513 km.

So, I would say that we are simply doomed to build relations with China on a partnership basis, because we are neighboring countries, but we cannot, like America, hide across the ocean.

No, we're here, we're close.