The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine confirms a shift in Turkish foreign policy that began last year.

Because the longer the war in Ukraine lasts, the more Turkey thinks about its roots in the West.

The leadership in Ankara does not follow public opinion.

In a survey conducted in March by the independent polling institute Metropoll, only 34 percent of respondents blamed Russia for the war in Ukraine, while 48 percent blamed the United States and NATO.

The survey reflected latent anti-Americanism in Turkish society and the fantasies of nationalist circles who see the country's future in a Eurasian bloc.

Rainer Herman

Editor in Politics.

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A few days ago, however, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's foreign policy adviser, Ibrahim Kalin, sent a short message on Twitter, encouraging Turkey to adapt its foreign policy to the new realities.

The crisis in Ukraine will deepen and a new phase of the Cold War has begun, Kalin wrote.

She will shape the world for decades.

There will be new geopolitical dynamics and new regional alliances will emerge.

Kalin qualified that Turkey will continue to take a "balanced position".

So she will not follow the West on all points in foreign policy.

Relations with America better again

Shortly before that, he had met with US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland in Ankara.

Relations between Washington and Ankara have been strained since President Joe Biden took office, but are now improving.

Washington has given up its opposition to the delivery of the F16 multirole fighter jet to Turkey, citing the move as serving American security interests.

As part of a new strategic mechanism, there will be another meeting of foreign ministers this year, the statement at the end of Nuland's visit said.

Apparently, both sides are looking for a solution to Ankara's strategic mistake of acquiring the Russian S400 air defense system.

It was delivered to Turkey but is not used there.

In Ankara it is said that the S400 should be stored under American supervision.

Turkey's commitment to NATO will be put to the test if a vote is taken on Sweden's and Finland's application for membership, and Moscow could then threaten Ankara with consequences.

Turkish commentators interpret Kalin's tweet as a rejection of a Eurasian perspective, but also as a willingness to adhere to a policy of active neutrality.

On the one hand, it shows itself in the efforts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine.

Only Russian President Putin can end the war, so someone has to talk to him, Akif Cagatay Kilic, chairman of the Turkish parliament's foreign affairs committee, explains this policy.

To agree on a truce, both sides would have to come together around a table.

On the other hand, the policy of active neutrality is expressed in the fact that Turkey does not join the Western sanctions against Russia.

However, the West expects Ankara not to actively violate the sanctions, which apparently is not the case.

Turkey is more dependent on Russia than other countries.

A year before important presidential and parliamentary elections, the Turkish government does not want to risk a further deterioration in the economic situation.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who is ailing domestically, uses his mediation skillfully to play a role on the world stage that is appreciated positively and allows his provocations to be forgotten, especially in the eastern Mediterranean.

However, Turkey has been readjusting its foreign and security policy for a year now.

After years of trying to expand its influence in the region with an aggressive policy, it is now normalizing its relations with numerous countries.

Ankara is thus returning to the "zero problems" policy with its neighbors formulated by Erdogan's former adviser, foreign minister and prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

The Turkish leadership initiated this turnaround for three reasons: Turkey is too weak to take on Russia alone;

the Erdogan government is partially compensating for the failures of its unorthodox monetary policy by normalizing relations with key economic partners;

moreover, investors and tourists, which the country urgently needs, are being deterred by geopolitical tensions in the region.

Two long-term geopolitical shifts favor this recalibration.

First, China ties Iran more closely to itself, creating the need to build a pro-Western axis against it, which includes Turkey alongside the Gulf States, Egypt and Israel.

Second, the US' gradual withdrawal from the Middle East means that the region's pro-Western states must do more for their own security.

An advantage for Turkey's partners is that Ankara has recently proven to be a strong and reliable security partner.

In return, Turkey needs strong business partners.

Turkey has been self-confident internationally for years.

Government circles are therefore expecting Europe not only to remember Turkey when a crisis breaks out and Ankara is needed.