The Kremlin is not expected to change the hostile nature of its foreign policy or seek a breakthrough with the West

The Russian war in Ukraine affects the balance of power in Europe

• Putin got himself in trouble.

  Reuters

• Russian conventional weapons will enter an arms race that is hard to win.

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• Russian nuclear weapons are a candidate for further proliferation and development.

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In light of the current deterioration of the situation between Russia and the West with the continuation of the war in Ukraine, questions remain, most notably where will relations between the two sides go, and what impact will this have on the balance of power in Europe?

“It is unlikely that the Kremlin will change the aggressive nature of Russian foreign policy or seek a detente with the West in response to the current circumstances,” Richard Sokolsky, a nonresident senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program, said in a report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to underestimate the amount of economic pain that President Vladimir Putin's regime can tolerate, or inflict on the Russian people.

Russia's assertive foreign behavior and risk-taking has not been curbed by economic headwinds and sanctions stemming from the 2014 annexation of Crimea.

military spending

Sokolsky, whose research focuses on US policy toward Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, adds that "if we assume that (NATO) allies fulfill their recent pledges to boost defense spending and military capabilities, the traditional military balance in the European theater will turn against Russia's interest."

In the absence of the CFE and INF treaties, NATO members would be free to deploy weapons that Russia (and the former Soviet Union) had long found threatening by virtue of their ability to keep key targets at risk in the heart of Russia. .

This prospect may be troubling to the Kremlin, just as the concept of a "classical quick global strike" has been deeply troubling to the Russian national security community, even though the United States has yet to deploy any of these systems.

Expiry of the START Treaty

Sokolsky says that “the expiration of the New START treaty in 2026, which limits the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, will leave the two countries without an agreed framework for managing their strategic nuclear balance.

It seems highly unlikely that there will be another successor treaty between the United States and Russia by then.

China's expansion of its strategic nuclear arsenal may also prompt the United States to modernize its program to modernize its strategic power, which is likely to motivate the Kremlin to act on these changes.

A new arms race

In short, over the next few years, the Kremlin will almost certainly have to deal with a new and major arms race, both in conventional and nuclear weapons.

Moreover, Russia will also face technological disruption from the West, with uncertain prospects that China will be able to provide critical components, or ease the economic pressures facing the Putin regime.

Such a turn of events, according to Sokolsky, could produce two radically different results: the first could be an attempt at détente and reform, led by a successor to Putin, for example, which could prove to be just as destabilizing in Russia, as the reforms of former President Mikhail Gorbachev were For the Soviet Union.

The second result could be a more aggressive and insecure regime, a North Korea the size of Russia.

Neither of these results is reassuring.

The threat environment in Russia is expected to become more challenging as a result of what has been described as the rebirth of NATO and the European Union.

In addition, Russia's invasion of Ukraine led to a significant change in attitudes toward NATO membership in Finland and Sweden.

Officials in both countries have expressed growing concern about Russian intentions in northern Europe and on the eastern flank of the alliance, and recent public opinion polls in both countries now show majorities in favor of joining NATO.

The Kremlin almost certainly views this possibility with deep concern.

Finland and Sweden's membership would increase Russian perceptions of vulnerability on Europe's northern flank.

The main dilemma facing NATO in the coming years will be to manage the trade-off between creating a strong defense of “every inch” of (NATO) territory, preventing the conflict from spreading in Ukraine, and avoiding military escalation with Russia.

Moreover, the consensus in Europe to impose sanctions on Russia and help Ukraine is likely due to the fact that Ukraine is not a member of NATO, and that manifestations of solidarity with it do not entail defensive obligations through Article 5 of the NATO Charter. Atlantic.

And in the event of a Russian attack against a NATO member, the specter of all-out war with Russia might prompt some allies to show less resolve and more caution and hesitation.

Finally, the risk of unintended escalation could increase dramatically if Russia relies more on its non-strategic nuclear forces.

To mitigate these risks, the United States and NATO will need to restore and modernize military communications and deconfliction procedures with the Russian military, and resume dialogue on stabilizing arms control and confidence-building measures as soon as possible.

In the midst of all this uncertainty, one thing is certain: NATO cannot afford to be trapped by institutional stalemate, path-dependent options, or the assumption that a weak Russia will remain in Putin's hands.

On the contrary, Putin is likely to double down on his reckless gamble in Ukraine rather than back down.

• If we assume that the "NATO" allies fulfill their recent pledges to enhance defense spending and military capabilities, then the traditional military balance in the European theater will turn against Russia's interest.

• The expiry of the New START Treaty in 2026, which sets a maximum limit for the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia, will leave the two countries without an agreed framework for managing their strategic nuclear balance.

• China's expansion of its strategic nuclear arsenal may also prompt the United States to modernize its program to modernize its strategic power, which is likely to motivate the Kremlin to act on these changes.

• Over the next few years, the Kremlin will have to deal with a new and major arms race, both at the level of conventional and nuclear weapons.

Russia will also face technological disruption from the West, with uncertain prospects that China will be able to provide critical components, or ease the economic pressures facing the Putin regime.

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