Introduction to translation
With Russia starting its war on Ukraine weeks ago, the liberal West appeared to be unprecedentedly united, and succeeded in showing a decisive response to Russian efforts, in a way that Moscow itself might not have expected.
Instead of the war being a new nail in the coffin of the liberal order, as many preached before it, it seems that what is happening is exactly the opposite.
In this Foreign Affairs article, Alexander Cooley and Daniel Hickson discuss whether the Ukraine war gave Western liberalism a kiss of life and forced its forces to regroup.
translation text
Few analysts expected that Russian President Vladimir Putin would carry out his threat of a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Fewer expected that the United States, the European Union, and their key democratic partners would respond to such a decision with the decisive response we have seen.
Let us now consider the power of a fully armed, active liberal democratic society.
This society, with astonishing speed, dismantled the previous entanglement between itself and the Russian economy, and achieved it to a great extent, and then Russia was deprived of the advantages of the liberal economic system, and the yachts of some of the rich and corrupt Russian political elite were seized, and they were threatened with chasing their fortunes abroad.
Likewise, the West effectively and powerfully aborted the Russian disinformation campaign by preemptively, and chased out the Russian media and propaganda platforms.
Not only did Germany align itself with its NATO allies in providing Ukraine with military aid, but it also committed to increasing defense spending to more than 2% of German GDP.
In the aftermath of the invasion, too, the question of whether Finland and Sweden would strengthen their military relations with NATO and the United States was no longer under consideration, but in fact became a foregone conclusion.
Putin has moved into the grip of authoritarianism, imposing limits on freedom of expression and civil society in a way not seen in Russia since the Soviet era, and then tens of thousands of Russians have fled the country.
At the same time, the Ukrainian government did not fall hostage to internal divisions, as the Kremlin expected.
As for the Russian army, it suffered from a large number of procedural and practical problems in its performance, significantly and significantly, which fell short of expectations.
In the face of mounting military, economic, and diplomatic pressures, Putin has moved into the grip of authoritarianism, imposing limits on freedom of expression and civil society in a way not seen in Russia since the Soviet era, and tens of thousands of Russians have fled the country since the start of the invasion.
The fact is that the conservative authoritarians and the pro-Putin populists in Europe and North America have received a severe blow that has made them lose a great asset, at least for the moment.
Beijing remotely monitors the hardships of the Russian army on the ground, the severity of Western sanctions and the flow of military aid to Ukraine.
This is no small matter.
A few weeks ago, the United States, Japan, and their democratic partners seemed either unwilling or unable to stem the global "anti-liberal tide," and commentators were quick to notice the irony.
As Michael Buckley and Hal Brands wrote, Putin offered the United States and its allies a “historic opportunity to rebuild a world order that seemed to be on its way to fragmentation and collapse.”
As we discussed in the January/February issue of Foreign Affairs, the disintegration of the liberal world order is only "one manifestation of a crisis far broader than liberalism itself."
This crisis developed after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since the early 1990s, the major democratic powers have adopted a radically open version of the liberal order, especially with regard to neoliberal economic policies such as the unlimited free movement of capital, policies that initially spread market democracy, but soon began The successive changes in the world order during the first decade of this century were supported by “a variety of illiberal forces, including authoritarian states, such as China, who reject liberal democracy as well as populists and conservative authoritarians who position themselves as the protectors of so-called traditional values and national cultures; They are gradually destroying democratic institutions and the rule of law,” as we wrote earlier.
It is still too early to know whether Russia's invasion of Ukraine will revive the liberal project or not, but there are already signs of unreasonable over-optimism on the part of some among American and European observers, which may cause confusion in the judgment of the current moment. Especially if the decision-makers misread it as a harbinger of the end of the crisis of the liberal order and the restoration of Western global hegemony.
ghost collapse
Washington, even at the height of American power after the Cold War (the so-called "unipolar moment"), was not the single giant who carried the world order on its shoulders.
The liberal order that was born in the 1990s was combined and maintained by a large cabal of states and international institutions, and is in fact more of an informal confederation than a traditional agreement between a number of great powers.
The main pillar of this league was the United States, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Group of Seven, and NATO, with a wide range of bilateral alliances and strategic partnerships.
In fact, the economic and military hegemony of this liberal democratic pact was never to last.
This is for two reasons, first, that the share of the seven countries has already been declining in terms of global economic output since the mid-1990s, and secondly, that liberal democratic dominance has been based on acquiescence - if not cooperation - on the part of authoritarian states and illiberal superpowers with the existing system.
Given these gaps, the emergence of China and the resurgence of Russian power should have prompted closer strategic cooperation among the members of the liberal-democratic coalition.
But that hasn't worked out for most of the past two decades: that coalition fractured in the aftermath of the 9/11 attack on the United States, quickly clearing heated controversies over US "enhanced interrogations" (which included human rights abuses with terrorism suspects)* and “extraordinary returns” (forcibly repatriated suspects to their home countries)*, as well as about the Iraq war and the Bush administration’s “pre-emptive strike doctrine” and divergent strategies for dealing with Russia and China.
Rather than cementing the bonds of liberal democracy, this relative decline undermined the foundations of the liberal order.
The Western response to Putin's war in Ukraine tells us what liberal democracies can achieve when they act in concert with one another.
Consider, for example, one of the most surprising developments in this regard: the sanctions against the Russian Central Bank imposed by the United States, the European Union and Japan. This unique step - which historian Adam Toze calls the "nuclear option" of economic sanctions - requires exceptional coordination Among the centers of Western financial power.
Within 24 hours, the Russian Central Bank lost access to $338 billion, an estimated 60 percent of its $643 billion in reserves.
Under the weight of the impending collapse of the Russian ruble, the Russian government has been forced to restrict capital movement and foreign currency withdrawals, forcing Russian companies to sell foreign currency.
Such displays of power can also create their own problems.
Liberal democratic governments may mistakenly conclude that they can reclaim the leadership power they had two decades ago.
We should never be in any doubt that liberal democracies, when joined together in action;
It establishes the most powerful political community on the planet.
But there is no doubt that these democracies lost ground since the 1990s and early 2000s.
And China's transformation into a great power is likely complementary to this.
The fact that Western military analysts have exaggerated Russia's military power does not mean that Russia is just a "gas station disguised as a state," as the late Senator John McCain wrote.
Many Americans tend to delude American power, especially when it comes to its military capabilities, and also to underestimate this power on the other hand when it is in a liberal democratic coalition.
We can see this tendency in talking about the United States as the "inextricable nation" during the Clinton administration, and in the Bush administration's willingness to deliberately damage the coalition of the liberal-democratic community.
Likewise, the American success in the Ukrainian crisis may ultimately result in charging the American arrogance that is based on the slogan "America First" accustomed to supporters of reactionary populism.
There is another path that could lead us towards a US foreign policy based on the principle of "America First", and more sensibly.
Stephen Walt argues that “the war in Ukraine shows that Europe’s greater responsibility to protect itself is not only desirable, but possible,” which means that the success of liberal democratic collective action in the face of Russian aggression proves that a transatlantic community can reduce The dependence of its members on each other security and political.
It is certain that redrawing the scales in the liberal democratic society in a way that gives Europe a greater voice and responsibility will contribute to the long-term well-being of this society.
However, leaving Europe alone in this regard would weaken and even destroy the liberal democratic coalition, at the moment when it faces its greatest challenge since the Cold War.
The next war on bad money
The corrupt political elite has been known to exploit the vulnerabilities of the liberal political and economic order.
Russia, with the enthusiastic assistance of wealth managers, corporations, and Western governments, has become a major player in globalized political corruption, as Russian oligarchs seamlessly transferred their money through shell companies, obtained residency and citizenship for their families and families under the slogan "golden residency" for investment programs in Western countries, and invested in real estate. Luxury, a sector that is practically devoid of any significant oversight.
All the time they whitewash their reputations by funding prominent cultural institutions, donating to universities, providing aid and support to politicians and political interest groups, in addition to owning companies specialized in improving their reputations, and they intimidate journalists and researchers who threaten to publish about the past of their corrupt clients.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine prompted democratic governments to finally deal seriously with Russia's corrupt elite.
And steps have already been taken far beyond what the anti-corrupt elites hoped for: the United States, the European Union and Britain have imposed property confiscation orders, asset freezes and travel bans on a wide range of Kremlin-linked oligarchs, and countries in the European Union have confiscated the yachts of a number of wealthy Russians and influential people with whom Including Alisher Usmanov, Putin's close friend Igor Sechin, Britain imposed sanctions on Roman Abramovich, the wealthy owner of Chelsea Football Club, and the United States announced the formation of "KleptoCapture" (meaning the pursuit of corrupt elites), an intelligence agency designed Specifically to detect and target hidden assets owned by Ross.
Alisher Usmanov (right) and Putin
Of course, Russia is not the only country where corrupt political elites are exploiting and undermining the liberal order. American businessmen, Western politicians, Chinese billionaires, and Saudi princes all benefit from those same loopholes.
In an ideal world, the reaction against the Russian oligarchy would become the basis for a broader public campaign against companies that profit from international tax evasion, and whitewash corruption and their wealth.
This will require a national and international multilateral commitment in order to counter the rise of the global oligarchy, of which Russia may have been the main source.
Such a massive mobilization against all kinds of oligarchs globally seems unlikely at the moment, as it collides with many entrenched interests, but the invasion of Ukraine and the resulting crackdown on the Russian oligarchy show us how corrupt transnational political elites operate and undermine States and a threat to the national security of democratic countries.
Stigmatizing Russian oligarchs can strengthen the hand of anti-corruption campaigners as they seek to expose beneficial owners who own or control businesses and their savings, expose passport and golden residency programs, and investigate suspicious assets of irrational fortunes.
In this respect, campaigns of disinformation, distortion, and dark money present a challenge even more complex than outright money laundering for corrupt political elites.
Many democracies have shut down Russian media platforms, but Western media often play a larger role when it comes to undermining institutional trust, social cohesion, and democratic values.
For example, the American channel “Russia Today” announced that it would stop broadcasting its operation in the United States after it was deleted from the list of television broadcasts and American platforms, but “Tucker Carlson” of “Fox News” continues to promote deceptions and pro-Kremlin propaganda to a much wider audience and segment. .
Tucker Carlson
Local media platforms deserve to protect freedom of expression, regardless of how hostile they are to liberalism in its perspective.
But at the same time, it is time to take constitutionally sound measures to rein in foreign governments' ability to influence American politics, particularly authoritarian governments.
Responsible media platforms could take more coordinated action with one another to curb the deliberate spread of authoritarian propaganda, since cable providers are not required to play a role, and activists could step up their efforts to boycott the funders who sponsor those networks.
Putinism is an important model of corrupt government and authoritarian rule, but it must be understood as part of a corrupt anti-liberal elitist movement worldwide. Political disinformation and corrupt money are the main pillars through which authoritarian regimes undermine the global liberal order, and they are also major tools among It is used by authoritarians and populists within democratic countries to undermine liberal democracy from within.
Addressing their deadly impact will require more comprehensive information sharing and sustained coordination among anti-corruption agencies and officials in a democratic society.
The poles of the liberal system
Despite the reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is a clear division between the core of the liberal democratic axis - Europe and the United States, allies such as Japan, South Korea and Australia - and many others that are part of the global south.
And it seems that there is a split in the ranks of this last group, and ambiguous positions as well regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Consider the UN resolution condemning the Russian invasion, in which 141 countries voted in favor, five countries opposed, and 35 abstained (and 12 countries chose to abstain, including Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Venezuela).
However, among those countries that abstained, five countries representing half of humanity combined were China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and South Africa.
China's abstention should come as no surprise to anyone.
On the one hand, Chinese policymakers are eager to avoid expanding any support for Russia that could bring them Western sanctions.
For example, the Asian Infrastructure Bank, a development bank established by China in 2016, has suspended its activities related to Russia and Belarus, and China has announced that it will not supply Moscow with spare parts for aviation.
However, Beijing has no interest in backing the West against its strategic partner. On the contrary, official Chinese news agencies have reiterated and repeated Russia's basic arguments blaming the United States, NATO and the European Union for starting the war, and amplified Russia's disinformation about biological weapons. American.
As for India, the apparent neutrality of its policy toward the Russian invasion reflects the firm belief in New Delhi that it can maintain strategic partnerships with both Russia and the United States of America at the same time.
India remains one of the main buyers of Russian arms, and it recently bought three million barrels of discounted Russian oil.
Among the other undecided, all the former Soviet states abstained from voting, or did not register a vote at all, to whom were added 16 African countries that have a trade and military relationship with Russia.
Some of these countries fear Russian pressure on them, while others aim to hedge their strategic bets, as they oppose sanctions out of principle and self-interest, and seek to maintain their capabilities to woo Russia as a sponsor and partner.
Even those countries that supported the UN resolution do not intend to impose sanctions on Russia.
For example, the UAE has established itself as an important safe haven for the exodus of Russian capital outside its country, and the tax laws in Israel will also allow Russian oligarchs to launder their money.
As for Turkey, despite its membership in NATO and its support for the Ukrainian army, it seems ready to allow the re-registration of Russian companies under Turkish slogans, and for Turkish banks to become an intermediary for Russian companies.
and accordingly;
The United States, the European Union, and other members of the sanctions regime will face a difficult choice: Will they punish their strategic partners or allow their partners to subvert their sanctions?
Most important of all, the rise in the prices of energy, food, and soft goods will increase financial insecurity throughout the world. Inflation and high energy prices can lead to global social unrest and create resentment against the West's arming of the global economy.
As it did in the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis, anti-liberalism thrives and grows in times of financial crisis and economic turmoil.
The silent giant
Paradoxically, the Russian invasion of Ukraine may make clear that one of the dangers to the liberal order remains latent in the liberal democratic states themselves.
Nowhere is the danger greater than the United States itself.
Efforts to defend and reform the liberal order will remain in jeopardy as long as anti-democratic alliances are allowed to infiltrate the Republican Party.
Not only did these alliances, during the Trump era, support American-style anti-democracy or Putinism, their approach of publicly assaulting institutional pacts and demonizing independent media, but also ended up supporting Putin himself.
Trump's first impeachment illustrates this danger.
When faced with overwhelming evidence that the president had tried to blackmail the Ukrainian government into transferring US defense weapons, the Republican Party lined up to oppose the trial in the House of Representatives and sought acquittal in the Senate.
In doing so, the Republican Party has distorted foreign policy officials and amplified Russian propaganda against Ukraine, and even more alarmingly, Trump himself has told advisers that he plans to withdraw the United States from NATO during his second term.
Now the center-right of the Republican Party has had an opportunity to repudiate these tendencies.
Perhaps Putin's war to abort a nascent democracy will cause the Republican Party to rediscover the value of liberal democracy, and may make party members reconsider their campaign to undermine democratic institutions in the United States;
These efforts are being made more at the state level at present.
But if Trump, or someone else like him, is elected president in 2024, all those bets will be off.
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Translation: Karim Traboulsi
This report has been translated from Foreign Affairs and does not necessarily reflect the website of Meydan.