Nearly four years after the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Ankara, in which 26 Saudi defendants have been tried in absentia since July 2020, responded to Saudi Arabia's request to hand over the cases of these defendants to Riyadh, and announced on the seventh of this April. He transferred the case to Saudi Arabia, saying that there was no point in pursuing a trial in absentia on its soil.

This decision was not surprising, as Ankara, which is seeking to repair relations with Riyadh and its allies, and before the date of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to the Saudi capital, decided to take a step that would serve the path of calming the atmosphere and improving relations between the two economically heaviest countries in the Middle East.

Since October 2020, efforts to reduce tension between Ankara and Riyadh have continued, as Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Saudi Arabia in May 2021. In conjunction with the visit, Turkish President Erdogan made a call to Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz, while The two countries announced that they agreed to work together in order to ensure stability, peace and prosperity in the region, after which the exchange of visits continued between Saudi and Turkish officials to reform political relations and deepen trade relations.

But the fastest and most prominent transformation in the Turkish-Gulf relations so far has been for the Emirates, as Abu Dhabi celebrated the Turkish president’s visit to its lands in mid-February, and not only lit the Turkish flag on its buildings, but also welcomed Erdogan in his country’s pavilion at the exhibition. Expo Dubai 2020" was set to the tunes of Turkish music, while Erdogan praised the UAE for being the first Arab country to host this international exhibition.

closeness after estrangement

After a decade that witnessed the most severe differences in the history of Turkish-Gulf relations, the Turkish president surprised the world with his visit to the UAE, and the visit came after another visit preceded by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to Ankara, during which he pledged 10 billion dollars in investments in Turkey.

Without hesitation, Erdogan announced during his visit the beginning of a new page with the UAE, saying that there is "a strong will to develop trade relations and increase investments." The visit witnessed the signing of 13 cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding, in addition to a letter of intent on cooperation in the defense industries, and other areas such as Health, technology, climate action, crisis and disaster management.

Signs of an improvement in the relationship between the two countries began last year, as the first tangible step came immediately after the Arab Quartet officially decided to restore full relations with Qatar during the Al-Ula summit.

The Gulf reconciliation coincided with Ankara's desire to take practical steps to reset its foreign policy and resolve problems with its main Arab competitors.

Motives mix between political and economic.

No sooner had Turkey's diplomacy taken its first steps towards reconciliation with the Gulf than the outbreak of the Ukrainian-Russian war, which gave Ankara more incentives to zero in on its problems and work to reinstate itself as a player at the negotiating table and international mediation.

Apparently, Ankara has realized that the path back to good and solid relations with the United States is difficult under the administration of US President Joe Biden, who does not seem determined to restore the alliance between the two countries to its former glory.

Ankara suffered from the scattering of its accounts immediately after the outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011, as it entered into hostility with the Gulf countries, which returned those revolutions and their supporters, and viewed Ankara as one of the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, and its relations with Washington were strained due to sharp differences over the Kurdish file in Syria. Which opened wide during the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and the emergence of the Islamic State, which prompted it to deepen its military cooperation with Russia, which intensified its differences with Washington.

Khashoggi's murder in October 2018 was the straw that broke the camel's back and brought Turkish-Gulf relations to an all-time low.

At some points, matters in the region have reached the point where the opposing parties engage in military confrontations with each other indirectly in several countries, as Ankara and the Gulf states (Riyadh and Abu Dhabi) stood against each other in Libya and Egypt, and even in Syria, where they returned The Gulf states considered the policy of supporting the Syrian revolution and considered the matter of pragmatic openness to the Assad regime, in return for Turkey's adherence to supporting the factions opposed to it, all the way to Somalia, where Abu Dhabi sided with "Somaliland" in exchange for Turkey's support for the government in Mogadishu.

Then came the Gulf crisis in 2017, after which Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt cut ties with Qatar, while the strength of Ankara's alliance with Doha increased, including the strengthening of the military presence on its soil.

Finally, the killing of Khashoggi in October 2018 was the straw that broke the camel’s back and brought Turkish-Gulf relations to their lowest levels, politically and economically.

atmosphere of reconciliation

The years of regional conflicts burdened Turkey and the Gulf states together, given their great economic weight in the region, and put before them several challenges, with a common desire, perhaps, to return to the old rules of the game before 2011. Then, the signs of throwing those hot and volatile years quickly appeared behind everyone’s back. And the trend towards a policy of rapprochement driven by pragmatic interests, which allows Turkey to devote itself to confronting the real strategic risks posed to it by Greece in the eastern Mediterranean and by the Kurdish factions. It also gives the two largest Gulf capitals the opportunity to confront the repercussions of the increasing Iranian influence and the prospects of returning the nuclear agreement with the West.

Simultaneously, the two sides desire to find new regional economic outlets away from the usual economic relations with the West, which no one wants to be confined to, neither in politics nor in economics as well.

In turn, before the upcoming elections in 2023, Turkey needs more foreign investments that the Gulf can inject, especially after the oil prices (and thus Gulf financial liquidity) jumped.

The Turkish lira reached record levels of decline, while the inflation rate rose to 50%, after the “Corona” pandemic had its repercussions on the Turkish economy, as well as the cold relations with the United States and the government’s policies regarding the interest rate.

Therefore, Ankara's interest in the luxury of engaging in distant geopolitical conflicts has declined, and resolving the economic crisis has become a top priority for the government seeking to maintain its ruling position after 2023.

As a result, it was not surprising that the acceleration of economic cooperation was the most prominent feature of the Turkish-Emirati rapprochement, with the launch of huge investment projects.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has economic components that are no less attractive to Turkey, foremost of which is allowing Turkish construction companies to invest in development projects of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, which means that Turkey will reap economic incentives that give it the ability to face inflation.

Turkey has had a privileged position on the Gulf investment agenda since 2002, but recent crises have made Qatar the most important Gulf player in the Turkish economy, and although this fact is unlikely to change anytime soon, the significant difference that the entry of the UAE can make cannot be ignored. And Saudi Arabia to the investment scene inside Turkey.

Saudi Arabia also wants behind investing in Turkey to diversify its economy outside the oil sector and diversify its investment destinations around the world.

Opening the door to Gulf-Turkish political relations now is a great opportunity that enhances Ankara's weight in settling other hot files that it does not have to resolve on its own.

On the political and military fronts, the attrition of Ankara in the conflicts in which it was directly or indirectly involved led to its desire to stop the political and military escalation, especially since it has achieved notable achievements, most notably in Libya, Somalia and the Caucasus. Now is a great opportunity to enhance Ankara's weight in settling other hot files that it does not have to resolve on its own, as well as returning the Turkish decision-maker to the policy of "zero problems", which has had greater success in expanding the margin of the Turkish role in the region.

For example, restoring relations with Riyadh would cause a deviation in the Kingdom’s pro-Greece position since the diplomatic dispute with Turkey began, while Saudi Arabia could obtain Ankara’s support for its position on the Yemeni file in light of the Houthi group’s escalations, whether it was military support by providing it with drones. Effective, or diplomatic support by mobilizing Turkey to classify the Houthis as a terrorist group, and pressure Iran to make concessions on the Yemen file.

Add to this the balance caused by attracting the Turkish economy to intertwined with the Gulf, with Iran's expected return to the regional and global economy if it succeeds in reaching an agreement with the West over its nuclear program, a matter that worries Gulf capitals.

Possible obstructions

Despite all these benefits, the path towards improving Turkish-Gulf relations is not paved with roses. There are real obstacles in the way, foremost of which is the failure to ensure the continuity of the set of internal and external factors that pushed towards the recent rapprochement. It exposes relations to new turmoil, especially since the reasons for wanting to return to zeroing in on problems lie in the two parties’ desire to pay attention to files they deem more dangerous, or to reduce political and economic tension and its burdens, and not yet related to the existence of a real strategic interest on which a long-term partnership between the two parties.

Then there is another factor related to Turkish military influence in the region. Although the Gulf-Qatari reconciliation showed Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to have abandoned their previous demands to close the Turkish military base in Qatar, it is still difficult to ignore the fact that the two Gulf capitals have not yet accepted Turkish influence in the region in its image. At the head of which is Ankara's possession of military bases in Arab countries, the expansion of its influence in the Horn of Africa, and the strengthening of its presence in the Red Sea, and even in the Gulf region itself.

Therefore, these files remain frozen in the short term, but are vulnerable to explosion in the long term, which makes the continuation of the current rapprochement dependent on the regional and international situation.

At a time when Qatar is adding real strategic depth to the Turkish presence in the region due to its Gulf location and its political and economic role, the belief of some in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that strengthening relations with Turkey may partially draw the latter away from its unique relations with Qatar may not bear easy fruit in the long run, even if These Gulf countries have already made huge investments, as Turkey does not seem willing to barter the strategic locations that it has succeeded in obtaining just to obtain investments, no matter how vital these investments seem to Ankara at the moment.

In the end, it can be said that in light of the mutual need to transcend the pages of the dispute between Turkey and the Gulf states, it seems that the current path will be viable in the foreseeable future to ease the burdens that the two sides have borne too much due to the post-Arab Spring conflicts, and the retreat of the United States' commitments to the security of Region.

However, there are challenges facing the continuation of this reconciliation in the long term as long as the regional and international circumstances that created the reasons for the strategic dissonance between the Gulf and Turkey continue in the first place.

The two sides realize that the region and the world are going through major transformations imposed by events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the possible return of Iran to the international scene, the fluctuations of US policy and economic challenges, and that these transformations require them to recalibrate their policies at the present time, but this does not mean that either side is ready to change its position strategy anytime soon.