Al Jazeera Net dismantles with analysts the transformations of the lists and the map of alliances in the Lebanese electoral scene

Beirut -

A few weeks separate Lebanon from the parliamentary elections scheduled for May 15, 2022, while the lists registered in 15 electoral districts drew the map of alliances and the battle that preserved some constants and established many transformations, and may push the country towards a new pivotal crossing.

At the beginning of this week, the Lebanese Ministry of Interior and Municipalities closed the door for registration of electoral lists, and it officially reached 103 lists, an increase of 36 lists over the 2018 elections, when the battle was limited to 77 lists.

Paradoxically, most of the regulations carried slogans of change, in a country mired in one of the 3 worst crises in the world, according to World Bank estimates.

Although the Future Movement was absent for the first time from the electoral process, as were the first-ranking leaders of the Sunni community, the Sunni-dominated districts recorded a noticeable density in the formation of lists.

Also, for the first time, the opposition forces emanating from the "Movement of October 17, 2019" are contesting the elections with a large number of lists.

The battle is intensified in the circles in which the Christian political forces are present, while it appears more disciplined in the circles in which the two parties are present, Hezbollah and the Amal movement.

In a preliminary reading of the Lebanese electoral scene, by dismantling and explaining the nature of the regulations, Al Jazeera Net posed a set of questions to the academic and public policy researcher Antoine Haddad, and researchers and experts in the electoral affairs, Rabih Al-Haber and Kamal Feghali.

From the right, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, Lebanese President Michel Aoun, and Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri (European)

What are the most prominent political features of the 2022 election regulations?

Antoine Haddad describes the scene of the competing lists, with a triangle, as it is divided into 3 basic groups:

• Regulations that reflect the alliance of the dual Hezbollah-Amal Movement and the Free Patriotic Movement (led by Gebran Bassil) with their allies.

• Lists of the traditional opposition forces to Hezbollah, which were affiliated with the "March 14 Brigade", which are the lists formed by the Progressive Socialist Party (headed by Walid Jumblatt), the Lebanese Forces Party (headed by Samir Geagea), the lists supported by former Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, as well as the list of Minister Former Justice Major General Ashraf Rifi.

• Lists of opposition forces, most of which emerged from October 17 and did not have representation in the 2018 elections, or those that were part of the traditional authority, and currently define themselves as opposition forces such as the Lebanese Phalange Party.

Rabih al-Habr finds that the most prominent political indicator is the entry of new opposition forces to the scene in return for their inability to agree and unite in a cross-circuit coalition.

He said, "There are newly emerging regulations, and they came out of necessity, because their members could not find a place on the lists of other groups."

While Kamal Feghali indicates that about 60% of the lists belong to the new forces for change, and there is an average of 4 lists in each district, which, in his opinion, will lead to the dispersal of opposition voices.

He explained that the circles in which the Future Movement was absent, the lists abounded, because some personalities and forces found an exceptional opportunity to advance with an empty space that was wrapped in front of them, after his sudden withdrawal.

What is fixed and what is changed in the regulations at the level of alliances?

The most important variable in the composition of the regulations, according to Antoine Haddad, is the absence of the Future Movement, which previously won the largest parliamentary blocs.

The question, in his opinion, is "Who will fill the void?"

Haddad considers that there is a difficulty in evaluating the ability of the forces emerging from the "future" mantle to attract voters.

The only constant, according to the public policy researcher, is the stability of the hard core that Hezbollah formed around it in the 2018 elections, and its continuity with a high degree of homogeneity, especially after the party provided facilities for its allies, even the antagonists, to wage battle with it, with the exception of its inability to gather its allies the National Movement Al-Hur and the Marada Movement (headed by Suleiman Franjieh) in the third northern district, which summarizes the battle of the competing forces for the presidency, and it was difficult to reconcile them with one list.

Here, Rabih al-Habr adds that despite the alliance of Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement, they did not unite in the Sidon-Jezzine district, and are fighting the battle with two opposing lists.

But Antoine Haddad includes some of the separations with two or more lists, in the field of tactical goals, to gain the largest number of seats.

For example, in Beirut's second district, the Association of Islamic Projects (Al-Ahbash) formed a separate list from Hezbollah, "in order to enhance their chances of inheriting the largest number of Sunni seats that were from the future quota."

The most prominent change for Habr is the breakdown of the March 14 forces contract, after the departure of the Future Movement, the separation of the Forces Alliance and the Kataeb Party, in addition to the transfer of some figures allied to the Free Patriotic Movement to the opposition front, such as MPs Michel Moawad, Nima Frem and Michel Daher.

The March 14 alliance, according to Haddad, was only embodied by one list that brought together the Forces and the Progressive Socialist Party in the Chouf-Aley region (the Fourth District of Mount Lebanon).

Kamal Feghali mentions that President Siniora's support for one of the lists in Beirut's second district, without allying with the main pillars of March 14, is faced by a counter list from a businessman in alliance with the Islamic Group, and this enjoys indirect support from some of the poles of the "Future Movement", with the aim of blocking the road Siniora to attract Sunni voices in favor of the future.

Vote counting in the Lebanese parliamentary elections in 2018 (Reuters)

Do these regulations change the electoral landscape compared to the results of the 2018 elections?

Antoine Haddad finds that the changes in the scene are related to what the opposition forces' regulations may achieve after they imposed themselves with a multiple and antagonistic presence in all circles.

He believes that its lack of unification does not mean its inability to record important violations in Parliament.

And the coming days, in his opinion, will determine the level of its ability to attract voters.

According to Haddad, there are two main factors that may hinder the change of scene, namely the great frustration of the voters, and the logistical obstacles that constitute an excuse for not going to the polls, most notably the high cost of traveling to the districts of their birthplace.

Among the indications of the change in the electoral scene, Rabih Al-Habr mentioned that the Lebanese Forces Party formed for the first time in most districts anti-Hezbollah lists.

But the repercussions of the absence of the "future" will be, in his opinion, the most prominent surprise in the polls.

For his part, Kamal Feghali believes that Lebanon is on the verge of a parliamentary scene similar to what emerged from the 2018 elections, expecting a single change, which is Hezbollah's ability to obtain a "charter" majority this time, if it succeeds in including a prominent Sunni bloc in its seats.

Who are the winners and losers from the composition of the 2022 election regulations?

Rabi’ al-Habr believes that the large number of opposition lists will benefit the lists of the traditional power forces, because it will make it easier for them to battle, being united with their alliances amid lists fighting against each other.

Kamal Feghali expects that Hezbollah will be the biggest winner with its allies.

As for the losers, he divides them into two categories;

The opposition forces first, followed by the March 14 forces due to their political disintegration, specifically in the Sunni-majority constituencies, as it turned into poles' constituencies running against each other and using the same tools and slogans opposing Hezbollah.

For his part, Antoine Haddad finds that the composition of the regulations made each party register certain gains:

• First, Hezbollah and its allies have dedicated their ability to manage the pre-formation phase of the lists by dissolving their differences, looking to maintain the parliamentary majority.

• Second, some of the March 14 leaders managed to partially restore their political front, through the nucleus of Siniora, Geagea and Jumblatt, even if they did not live up to their experience in the 2005 and 2009 elections.

  But its alliances are now better than they were in the 2018 elections, because the Future Movement at the time made an electoral alliance with all its political opponents at the expense of the March 14 allies.

• Third, contrary to all expectations, these elections are fraught with unknowns, given the loss of the options of the broad popular segment, which previously expressed its resentment of the pillars of power.