After 12 years of estrangement, the plane of Israeli President Isaac Herzog landed in Ankara at the invitation of his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose country is heading towards restoring relations with Tel Aviv and reviving joint cooperation in a number of files in the region, especially the energy file east The Mediterranean Sea.
Although Israel seemed somewhat reticent in responding to the positive signals sent by Ankara, the latter preceded the visit and followed it with a number of statements that indicated the desire to cooperate in the energy file, and that Turkey is still the best option for transferring Israeli gas for export towards Europe, according to more than one statement. President Erdogan in January and February (1).
This effort was confirmed by other statements quoted by Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu about arranging two visits for him and the Minister of Energy to Israel in early April, with the aim of reappointing ambassadors and discussing the East Mediterranean gas file (2).
Historical background
Relations between the two countries have gone through several stages of tension since the estrangement that followed Israel’s killing of ten Turkish activists on the Mavi Marmara ship in May 2010. Despite the normalization of relations in 2016, the Israeli attack on the return marches in 2018, led to the expulsion of Ankara to the Israeli ambassador, Tel Aviv will respond in kind, and the situation remains as it is to this day.
The past periods were not only characterized by diplomatic and political estrangement, but also witnessed many sharp statements between the two parties, in addition to the cessation of intelligence and security coordination between them after they had a long history of strategic partnership (3).
This divergence has reinforced the severe polarization in the region, and its division on three issues: the position on the Palestinian cause, the position on the Arab revolutions, in addition to the Gulf crisis, so that the two sides find themselves on opposite sides in the three issues.
This contradiction between the two countries coincided with the successive discoveries of natural gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean since 2010, which were estimated at approximately 122.4 trillion cubic feet (4), the majority of which are located within a complex geography and disputed water areas.
As it is known, gas producing companies and consuming countries will not want to invest in disputed fields or in a region that lacks stability.
This tempted a group of Mediterranean countries to unite under the umbrella of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum project, in 2018, with the aim of searching for opportunities to benefit from gas by circumventing disputes rather than resolving them, concluding bilateral delimitation deals for maritime borders, and searching for international doors for financing and support.
The forum includes in its membership Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, Jordan, Palestine in addition to France and Italy (5), with the exclusion of Turkey, which has the longest beach overlooking the Mediterranean, and the absence of Syria and Lebanon.
3rd East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF)
Since its establishment, the Forum has adopted the "EastMed" pipeline project, which aims to export Mediterranean gas to Europe with a distance of about 1900 km, from the Israeli shores towards the Republic of Cyprus and then to the Greek island of Crete towards Italy, with an initial transportation capacity of 10 billion cubic meters / year Scalable, with an estimated cost ranging between 7-12 billion dollars (6).
Ankara did not hide its dissatisfaction with the project, as the proposed route passes through the waters that Turkey and the Republic of Northern Cyprus consider their own water rights, and if completed, it would make it easier for Greece and Cyprus to exploit disputed gas fields through a fait accompli.
The European Commission has included "EastMed" in the list of "projects of common interest" (7) that receive a large share of its budget.
However, a number of challenges and financing difficulties have faced the project since its adoption, and a letter sent by the United States to Athens on January 10, informing it of its lack of enthusiasm for the EastMed pipeline (8), added to the obstacles in front of it.
Turkey quickly picked up on the US position;
It found in it a window through which it could break the wall of isolation and the fait accompli that EastMed wanted to impose on it, so it proceeded to send an official invitation to the Israeli president to visit it, and the gas file is a top priority.
Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu pose for a photo before signing a deal to build the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline to transport natural gas from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe
timing indication
Although the withdrawal of American support for the "EastMed" project was the direct motive behind the Turkish invitation, a number of local, regional and international variables had ripened the idea of reviving relations with Israel, and entering from it towards an attempt to break the isolation in the eastern Mediterranean.
Internally, the country is witnessing an economic crisis, the first in its severity since the Justice and Development Party took power, during which the Turkish lira lost more than half of its value and inflation rates reached 54% (9).
The country is also awaiting decisive elections a year later, and Ankara believes that rapprochement with Tel Aviv and announcing the strengthening of its position regarding Mediterranean gas will send positive signals that will help the economy on the one hand, and strengthen the position of the ruling party on the other.
Traditionally, Ankara views the relationship with Israel as a reasonable entry point for rapprochement with the US administration, especially in light of the relative decline in the relationship with the Joe Biden administration.
Regionally, the rapprochement comes in light of a review of Turkish foreign policy, which, over the past year, resulted in dialogues and reciprocal visits with the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
It was remarkable that Ankara tried more than once to entice the Egyptian side to coordinate with it in the eastern Mediterranean by putting forward visions for demarcating borders between the two countries, and although Turkey offered Cairo a more generous deal than the latter signed with Athens, in 2020 (10), Cairo She has not yet shown any desire for compromise.
Cairo had strongly condemned the Libyan-Turkish border demarcation agreement signed in November 2019(11), while Tel Aviv remained silent about it, in an attempt to leave the door open for the possibility of understanding with Ankara within a comprehensive deal to re-normalize relations. Such a deal after Netanyahu's repeated failure to form an Israeli government;
Turkey has on more than one occasion blamed the Netanyahu government for failing to restore relations (12).
As for the relationship with Greece, it is noted that the two parties have since the beginning of 2021 decided to reduce escalation and freeze unilateral gas exploration steps (13) in addition to the Greek Prime Minister’s meeting Erdogan’s invitation to meet on the sidelines of the Diplomatic Forum in Antalya on March 12 (14).
Internationally, Turkey, like other countries, was affected by the rise in energy prices due to the increase in general demand in Asian markets, and the rise in demand globally after the lifting of the closures of Corona, and the Russian war on Ukraine came on February 24 last to increase prices to unprecedented levels since 2008 (15) With it, European fears of dependence on Russian gas and the urgent need to diversify energy sources were renewed.
All of the above made the immediate moment the most appropriate timing for an Israeli/Turkish rapprochement through which Ankara hopes not only to reopen embassies, but also includes comprehensive strategic coordination, including an attempt to influence the balances of the eastern Mediterranean, in a way that ensures that gas does not remain trapped for years in the sea.
An Israeli/Turkish alliance in the eastern Mediterranean?
The Turkish vision of cooperation with Israel in the Mediterranean gas file includes two directions:
The first direction:
is to establish an offshore pipeline that transports Israeli gas from the Leviathan field to the Turkish mainland, so that Turkey buys a share of it for local use, and exports another share to Europe, taking advantage of the already existing Trans-Anatolian gas pipelines.
This idea does not seem entirely new;
It was on the table between Turkey and Israel in 2013, when the "Zorlu" Holding Company, which is close to the Turkish government, fought months of negotiations with the Israeli government to build a pipeline at a cost of 2-2.5 billion dollars, with a transportation capacity of 8-10 billion cubic meters. Annually, and with a length of 130 km, it extends from the Leviathan field off the shores of Tel Aviv to the Turkish port of Ceyhan (16), where it connects with the TANAP pipeline that transports Azerbaijani gas to Europe, which was proposed on paper at the time, and was commissioned in 2019.
Since the Azerbaijan State Oil Company, which is a strategic ally of Turkey, owns 58% of TANAP shares while the Turkish State Petroleum Pipelines Company owns approximately 30% of it, in addition to having a surplus in operating capacity that Azerbaijan does not seem to be able to exploit in the foreseeable future, Ankara It pushes for the use of TANAP to transport Israeli gas to Europe without the need for additional infrastructure (17);
This makes this path more economically viable than EastMed.
TANAP-Europe Connection Opening Ceremony
The second trend:
Turkey is betting that a project to consume and export Israeli gas through its lands will strengthen its position on the dispute over gas, and will not leave it alone outside a political and security alliance that is forming in the eastern Mediterranean in isolation from it, as the decision maker hopes that this will affect Cairo’s position that ignores the Turkish desire By signing a bilateral agreement to demarcate maritime borders.
But the most important thing here is that building a pipeline linking the Israeli fields to the Turkish mainland will necessarily mean obtaining the approval of the Republic of Cyprus;
Article 79(3) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea states that pipelines must obtain the consent of the countries that pass through their exclusive economic zone (18), an approval that, if granted, would mean the readiness of the Cypriot side and its Greek successor to consider the Turkish demands , and this is precisely as it may be - to some extent - a guarantee of settling the outstanding differences between the two sides, but it may also be the detonator that destroys any possibility of turning the Turkish-Israeli project into reality.
The Israeli vision
In contrast to the Turkish vision, we find that Israel has different premises for dealing with the gas file in general, and cooperation with Ankara in particular.
Since its establishment, Israel has relied on importing energy from Russia and the former Soviet Union, and most recently Egypt, which has fed it with natural gas (19).
This dependency constituted a dilemma for the decision-maker, who saw in it a political and economic constraint in a hostile neighborhood. This was reflected in the energy policies adopted by Israel since its discovery of gas at the beginning of this century, which can be summarized as follows:
First:
Self-sufficiency first and export second: Israel has placed many restrictions on the export process, and made it a priority to meet the needs of the local market.
Since the discovery of the “Mari-B” field, in 2000, it has turned exclusively to internal production, and has continued its exploration and development operations in pursuit of self-sufficiency in gas.
After the discoveries expanded far beyond local needs, it adopted, in 2013, a decision that the export percentage should not exceed 40% of the total production, and allocated the Tamar field, the second largest discovered rights, to the local market (20).
Second:
Exporting through pipelines, not liquefaction: Israel is aware of the security challenges surrounding its coast, so it chose not to build onshore or floating liquefaction stations, and it was more likely to export gas through pipelines and to liquefy the surplus from it in the Egyptian stations of Idku and Damietta, in order to avoid the security and environmental risks that may be caused by targeting Gas stations, and this is one of the reasons for their enthusiasm for the "EastMed" project;
It ensures the flow of good quantities of gas without the need to build liquefaction stations.
Third:
Gas as a tool of regional influence: Israel did not move to export gas until two decades after its discoveries. It concluded two export deals with Jordan and Egypt, in 2016 and 2018, respectively, in which it approved that it exports a total of 10 billion cubic meters of gas annually to the two countries for a period of time. 15 years old (21) (22).
Israel considered the deal with Egypt to be the most important agreement between the two countries since the 1979 peace agreement(23), in an expression that reflects Tel Aviv's use of gas as a tool of influence;
It mortgaged the energy market of neighboring countries to Israeli gas, and used gas as a tool to enhance rapprochement with the countries of the region, especially in the security and military fields, as in the case with Greece, despite the presence of a left-wing government whose audience does not warmly view the relationship with Israel, and through which it strengthened the rapprochement with The Emirates deal to sell 22% of the share of the Tamar and Dalit fields to the Abu Dhabi government’s Mubadala Petroleum Company in late 2021 (24).
Between 2013-2014, Israel viewed negotiating with Ankara on gas transportation as an opportunity to enhance coordination and joint regional cooperation, which was not achieved.
Which emptied the project of its content according to the Israeli vision.
Officials’ statements reflect the desire to diversify gas export routes, so that they are not limited to countries with which trade may be exposed to political fluctuations or pressure from street protests, so they place direct export to the European Union through “EastMed” as a priority, in order to “deprive Arab countries of the opportunity to place Israel under Political pressure," according to the former Energy Minister Yuval Steinitz (25).
Ankara's fortunes and opportunities from the Israel-Turkey pipeline
Feasibility
The huge financial budget required by EastMed seems the most obstacle to it, and its huge cost is due to the length of the route and to the technical challenges that require overcoming the construction of pipelines in deep sea depths (26).
Accordingly, the budget of the Israel-Turkey pipeline seems really competitive, but this does not negate doubts about the enthusiasm of the concerned parties to cover the costs, especially since a recommendation from the Israeli National Security Institute warned that an energy agreement with Turkey can only be achieved with the participation of a third party that undertakes finance (27).
Nor does the European Union seem eager to co-finance the Israel-Turkey line;
His foreign policy options still favor supporting the "EastMed" path, which meets his security visions for the region, in addition to the complete French bias to the Greek narrative regarding the maritime dispute with Turkey, and the absence of Germany's leading role in the union.
It is true that Europe has always been interested, and after the Russian aggression against Ukraine in particular, to find an alternative to Russian gas. However, the Israel-Turkey line cannot play the role of an alternative, as its transport capacity may be able to cover a proportion ranging between 6-12% of the gas that it supplies. Europe imports from Russia, which amounts to 155 billion cubic meters annually, according to the consumption in 2021 (28).
On the other hand, a balanced current of decision-makers in the Union believes that it is in Europe’s interest not to drain huge budgets on long-term projects to import gas through pipelines, while it can replace them with liquefied gas shipments during the transition plan towards clean energy sources, which is the goal that was approved in the map A path to zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (29).
Cypriot/Greek worker
When looking at the map of the eastern Mediterranean, one notes that the Israel-Turkey pipeline would pass either through Syrian territorial waters or through what Cyprus sees as its exclusive economic zone.
This dilemma was one of the reasons for the failure of the project negotiations in 2014, in addition to the Israeli aggression on Gaza at the time.
It is not possible to examine pipeline projects without looking at the political and security environment of the transit countries, and in the absence of any visible horizon for resolving the Syrian crisis in a way that guarantees relative stability, in addition to the strong presence of Russia and Iran that is likely to continue beyond the solution, the idea of crossing from water does not seem Syria is useful for discussion.
As for the Republic of Cyprus, which has many issues of conflict with Turkey, it will not seem welcoming to host the pipeline, especially since this means eliminating the last hopes for the implementation of "EastMed".
To solve this dilemma, the Turkish company Turgas Petroleum had proposed, in 2013, that the project also include financing a natural gas liquefaction facility in the Republic of Cyprus, in exchange for the latter’s agreement to host the pipeline (30), but such a deal is no longer attractive today, as Cyprus has reached To a deal with a foreign investor backed by European funding to build the terminal in the port of Vasilikos, in 2019(31).
Turkey is a regional energy hub
Turkey hopes to become an energy transit hub, increasing its chances of being a regional power in the region by using energy as a political tool.
This vision is not hidden from any observer;
As it was expressed in several statements by Turkish officials, it considered that “Turkey is at the center of energy geopolitics” between the Caspian Sea, the Middle East and Europe (32).
The sale and transportation of gas depends on the goodwill of the transit countries;
As the carrier countries can disrupt the delivery of gas from the producer to the consumer through various measures, including illegal monitoring of the pipeline, or inaction towards security threats for political purposes, transit countries have influence over producers and consumers, especially if the quantities of gas transferred are large, and they were not There are alternative modes of transportation;
It may try to review the terms of long-term agreements to demand higher transit fees, deeper price discounts, and re-export rights for gas (33).
Therefore, pipeline projects cannot be studied without scrutinizing the domestic policies of transit countries and their foreign policy concerns.
Energy security is closely related to security of supply, so political considerations are critical to support, or may contribute to thwarting, particular pipeline projects (34).
It is true that economic feasibility also plays a vital role, but countries may often tend to skew towards economically costly options that provide a comfortable measure of political and security stability.
This is seen as a secure and long-term investment.
In light of the above, the question arises about the Israeli desire to move forward with a strategic project that limits the export of gas from the largest Israeli field to the Turkish track, after 12 years of loss of confidence between the two sides, and before the seriousness of reconciliation is demonstrated this time. Perhaps the same question arises about the desire of Europe by relying on Turkey as a transit country, as it seeks to break free from dependence on Russia.
If Turkey is termed as a "trading country";
In the sense that its foreign policy is steadily shaped by commercial and economic considerations (35), the main driver of Israeli foreign policy on gas is security and energy security, not economic gains. Perhaps this is what made Ankara seem impulsive in its recent rapprochement and its clear statements about cooperation in the gas file, while Tel Aviv is more cautious.
Finally, if Turkey’s purchase of the Leviathan gas field and opening the way for Israel to export it to Europe, does not contradict Ankara’s vision of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and considers the two-state solution a recipe for ending it, but the Palestinians believe that Israel is exploiting their looted gas illegally, and the arm deliberately The armed forces of Hamas sent a message of rejection of this exploitation by targeting the Tamar field extraction platform during the confrontation between the two sides in May 2021, which prompted the Ministry of Energy to close it for a few days despite the economic losses (36), a scenario that casts a shadow on the future of securing pipelines.Although Ankara considers the export of gas from Israel to Europe as a means to enhance its chances of becoming a regional power, this role may leave negative impressions on the peoples of the region, in a way that undermines these fortunes. The Jordanian and Egyptian gas agreements with Israel are still subject to popular rejection and resentment. The Jordanian street has witnessed periodic protests against the agreement since its conclusion in 2016 until today (37).
a summary
In conclusion, it is no secret that the main motive for Turkish enthusiasm towards reactivating relations with Israel rests on hopes that the latter will help it break its isolation in the eastern Mediterranean, by activating the discussion of the Israel-Turkey pipeline, which Ankara sees as a contributor to its economy and its growing energy needs, and an opportunity to maximize its power. The region has turned into a transit center for gas, and a power card in the maritime dispute with Greece and on the island of Cyprus.
However, a project of this size in terms of budget, long term, the prior need for political and security stability, and distance from the fluctuations of foreign policy, many obstacles stand before it.
Before negotiating it, it requires building a sustainable state of trust between Ankara and Tel Aviv, and testing the strength of this trust against the contradiction of political biases in the region that divide the two sides more than what unites them.
If the trends of Turkish foreign policy are affected by economic determinants, Israel pays the most attention to the issue of security, and perhaps this explains Tel Aviv's export of its president, who holds an honorary position, to meet Erdogan, in a situation that reflects Israel's reservations.
Therefore, it seems likely that Tel Aviv will push to extract more gains from Ankara, in the context of demanding proof of good intentions, before taking serious steps regarding gas.
If the Israel-Turkey pipeline project represents a key to the Turkish compulsion complex in the Eastern Mediterranean file, Tel Aviv is looking for a key to the compulsion complex with the Europeans, not the Turks.
It considers that the "EastMed" route provides direct trade with Europe in a way that guarantees a smooth flow of gas in the event that the volatility and security turmoil engulfs its Arab and Islamic surroundings.
The trust that needs a building process also applies to the relationship with the Europeans, who will not be enthusiastic about financing a project that will turn Turkey into a strategic energy transit point, in a way that gives it influence over European consumers, and strengthens its position and presence in many of the region’s files, especially since the EU’s ties theoretically require priority to support the interests of the two member states;
Greece and Cyprus.
It should be noted that although the United States expressed, last January, its lack of enthusiasm for EastMed, this does not mean the death of the project, as Washington invoked environmental concerns and the potential for instability it carries, in an implicit reference to the exclusion of Turkey from it. However, the approach to dealing with the gas file from an environmental perspective, or from the perspective of building peace and stability between the parties, will recede in the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and the European national security approach and the policy of deterrence against Russia will return to the fore more than ever, which is the realistic approach to the security of Energy, which outweighs the choice of dealing with technical and economic challenges, over the option of playing in an environment of lack of confidence and the fluctuations of foreign policy.
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This article is taken from: Al Jazeera Center for Studies.