Russian President Vladimir Putin is losing his war in Ukraine, but he has not lost his battle in Russia, says columnist for The New York Times.
In an article in the newspaper, the writer explained that Putin has abandoned his ultimate goals in Ukraine at the present time, and his forces have retreated around Kyiv, and he has disavowed his imperial dreams;
He has more modest goals to turn to, and may still be able to keep resources and farmland, but a month of Ukrainian courage and Western support dealt his ambitions a devastating blow.
The writer added that the Western reaction to Putin's "extremist" ambitions was to demand regime change in the Kremlin, to thwart his war in Ukraine, to topple him and to establish a more rational government, adding that this was not an official goal, but an hope that directs politics and criticism, and slips from the lips of US President Joe Biden in enthusiastic moments.
Western hope for Putin change is weaker than ever
He noted that this had always been a weak hope, and it was now even weaker than it was, despite the military quagmire and unprecedented economic sanctions.
In polls and anecdotes alike, Putin appears to be bolstering support from the Russian public, mobilizing a nation that feels - as he portrays it - beleaguered and unjustly besieged.
According to the main independent opinion polls in Russia, Putin's approval ratings look like the approval ratings of George W. Bush after the events of September 11, 2001.
He noted that it was already known that Putin's inner circle would not break with him for many reasons, such as that its members are mostly from the same background, share the same geopolitical assumptions, and are much more likely to "fight" mercilessly for a long time than to turn on their leader suddenly.
But even in the broader circle of Russian elites, the war has so far engendered anti-Western solidarity and fulfilled Putin's dream of integrating with the Russian elite, said Russian journalist Farida Rustamova.
Putinism will remain dominant in Russia for generations
The writer argues that sanctions imposed from the outside, and economic war, often lead to a strengthening of the internal strength of the target regime in the short term, because it will present an external scapegoat, a clear enemy to be blamed for the hardship rather than the leaders of the system, and in the long term, the academic literature indicates It may make states more repressive, and less likely to democratize.
The writer goes on to imagine the kind of change that will occur in Russia as a result of Putin's defeat in Ukraine, to say that even if the rush to him fades as the economic pain increases, the forces that are able because of Russian suffering will not be liberal forces, and any change in leadership is likely to be comparable to a succession Nicolas Maduro to Hugo Chávez in Venezuela more than likens him to the revolutions of 1989, which changed the Soviet system.
However, the writer called for the continuation of Western sanctions against Russia and military support for the Ukrainian army, because, as he says, Russia will remain an enemy of the West and America for generations, assuming the continuation of Putinism, and therefore work must be done to weaken it from now on.