Every day there is fighting in Ukraine.

Russian bombers fly their attacks at night, rockets fly during the day.

The Ukrainian armed forces are fighting back on the ground and with drones, and the decimated units have to regroup again and again.

Our maps cannot capture this dynamic.

But they show something else: the Russian advances are not getting beyond a certain line.

On the one hand, this is due to the massive resistance of the Ukrainians and, on the other hand, to major logistical challenges.

The Russians remain limited to a corridor of up to 140 kilometers between their own and the Belarusian borders.

Thomas Gutschker

Political correspondent for the European Union, NATO and the Benelux countries based in Brussels.

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That in turn is no coincidence, but the result of objective constraints: according to Western calculations, 140 kilometers is the maximum range for the Russians to be able to supply their units completely from their own logistics bases.

This is indicated by the dashed green line on our map.

Of course, in reality it is not 140 kilometers as the crow flies.

The range is road bound and the supply hubs are not directly on the border.

In reality, it can also be just 80 or 100 kilometers.

On top of that, the Russians have already lost hundreds of vehicles.

But how can it be that such a powerful army is so severely restricted in its ability to move?

No army relies more on the rail network

"The logistics forces of the Russian army are not designed for large-scale ground offensives far from their railway network," writes Alex Vershinin in an essay for the Internet portal War on the Rocks.

Vershinin is an American officer specializing in logistical operations planning.

The text was published last November and now provides a key to the faltering Russian offensive.

The crucial point is the rail network.

"No other European nation uses railways to the extent that Russia does," writes Vershinin.

You could already see that during the months of the march.

Combat units were brought thousands of kilometers from eastern Siberia to Belarus.

In the largest country in the world, this is the most efficient method.

During the Cold War, the NATO countries also relied on rail, there were routes that were only built for the military and corresponded to the defense plans for Europe.

After the end of the Warsaw Pact, this infrastructure was shut down.

The transfer points were no longer needed, troop bases were closed, tanks were scrapped.

And the many flat wagons with which they were once transported, as well.

It was only after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 that military planners remembered what national and collective defense meant in concrete terms.

For example, a NATO logistics command is set up in Ulm to facilitate the transport of American troops through Europe.

American forces are much more mobile than Russia's, Vershinin points out.

It's because of their lighter equipment.

An American armored brigade (about 3,000 soldiers) usually includes only one artillery battalion (600 soldiers) and one air defense company (150 soldiers).

A Russian brigade formation, on the other hand, includes two artillery battalions and one battalion each of rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns.

Everything has to be transported, not only the vehicles, but also their supplies of fuel, ammunition, grenades, rockets.

On the road, this is very time-consuming for the Russians because, despite their heavy equipment, they have fewer vehicles than the Americans.