(East-West Question) Xu Haiyun: Why is it irrational to say that NATO's eastward expansion is irrational?

　　China News Agency, Beijing, March 7th: Why is it irrational to say that NATO's eastward expansion is irrational?

　　Author Xu Haiyun Professor, School of History, Renmin University of China

　　After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States and Western countries strongly condemned Russia and imposed "the most severe sanctions in history", further escalating the tension between the parties.

After the start of the Russia-Ukraine negotiations, the situation is still complicated and confusing, and it continues to attract the attention of all parties.

　　However, the truth is as described by the United States and Western countries. Does Russia have to take full responsibility for the conflict between Russia and Ukraine?

Are the US and Western countries the righteous messengers who guard international justice, especially peace in Europe?

In fact, the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict can be described as another hidden reason, among which the eastward expansion of NATO is a major dimension to deconstruct its origin.

Data map: On October 25, 2018, NATO held the "Trident Junction 2018" joint military exercise.

　　As a product of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, NATO should have withdrawn from the stage of history after the end of the Cold War, but it is not willing to disappear like the Warsaw Pact.

Under the single-handed direction of the US State Department, NATO formulated a development strategy focusing on eastward expansion and transformation in the early 1990s, and eastward expansion became the theme of NATO's political and security life.

In the "NATO Eastward Expansion Report", NATO once proposed that the eastward expansion is not aimed at Russia, and should establish a strong relationship with Russia, and the two sides should work together to build a European security structure.

In the "Partnership for Peace Plan" that was subsequently introduced, NATO continued the idea of ​​North Russia jointly promoting European security, and even established bilateral consultation institutions with Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and other countries to jointly discuss the construction of European security.

　　It is against this background that NATO started the process of eastward expansion.

The Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary were absorbed in 1999, seven countries including Slovakia were absorbed in 2004, Albania and Croatia were absorbed in 2009, Montenegro was absorbed in 2017, and North Macedonia was absorbed in 2020.

After five rounds of eastward expansion, NATO has not made it clear that it will stop there.

In fact, during the five rounds of eastward expansion, NATO mentioned Georgia and Ukraine more than once in the hinterland of Eurasia.

Under the continuous guidance and provocation of the United States and Western countries, Georgia broke out the "Rose Revolution" in 2003, and Ukraine broke out the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Both countries established pro-Western governments, showing their tendency to get rid of Russian influence.

Although under the strong deterrence of Russia, NATO is afraid to directly absorb the two countries, but the intention to bring the two countries into its sphere of influence is very obvious.

　　From planning to having 30 member states, NATO's eastward expansion has lasted for more than 30 years, forming a unique logic of eastward expansion.

This logic is not the bilateral or multilateral logic of win-win cooperation as advertised by NATO, but a self-dominated unilateral logic, which not only lays the ground for the intensification of the conflict between NATO and Russia, but also becomes the hidden source of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

On February 27, local time, the streets of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, were empty and pedestrians were hard to find.

　　First, the logic of NATO's eastward expansion is irrational.

As American strategic thinkers George Kennan, Kissinger, Mearsheimer and others have emphasized, NATO's eastward expansion was a mistake from beginning to end.

NATO positioned itself as a defensive organization, but no Warsaw Pact-like competitor existed after the Cold War.

Therefore, preventing aggression is just a political excuse for NATO, which is an artificial inversion of logic. NATO rigidly sets potential threats or opponents to demonstrate the "reasonableness" of eastward expansion.

After entering the 21st century, Russia under Putin's leadership no longer submits to NATO's orders, thus becoming an "aggressor" that NATO guards against, and the North-Russian competition begins.

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is actually the inversion of the logic of NATO's eastward expansion, which in turn leads to the continuation and expansion of the competitive relationship.

　　Second, the logic of NATO's eastward expansion is contradictory.

NATO advocates cooperation with Russia in name, but it has always regarded Russia as a competitor in the past eastward expansion.

Although the two sides have established a cooperation committee and NATO even set up an office in Moscow, the eastward expansion has always aimed at squeezing Russia’s strategic space and weakening Russia’s strategic voice in European affairs, which will inevitably lead to a strong backlash from Russia. .

Since the first eastward expansion, Russia has raised objections to NATO. With each subsequent eastward expansion, Russia's protest has become more and more intense. The two sides have been fighting openly and secretly over whether Ukraine and Georgia should join NATO for many years, and the game has never stopped.

In this Russia-Ukraine conflict, it seems that Russia resolved the disputes between the two sides by military struggle, but it was actually a last resort after Russia exhausted all diplomatic means.

　　Third, the logic of NATO's eastward expansion is confrontational.

Although the Cold War is over, NATO has never abandoned the Cold War mentality. Instead, it has continued to expand its political and ideological territory through eastward expansion, consolidate the so-called victory of the Cold War, and even include the Euro-Atlantic region into its sphere of influence.

In addition, NATO ignored Russia's traditional geopolitical position in Eurasia, and kept provoking Ukraine, Georgia and other countries to provoke it, and then came forward to mediate, forcing Russia to make compromises.

The U.S. and Western countries continue to provoke Ukraine and repeatedly step on Russia’s bottom line. This practice is actually not new, and it has been tried and tested in the history of eastward expansion.

　　It is undeniable that despite the paradoxes in the logic of eastward expansion, NATO has achieved unprecedented development.

From the 16 member states at the beginning of the Cold War to the current 30 member states, after five rounds of eastward expansion, NATO has formed a certain inherent inertia.

However, the inertia of NATO's eastward expansion is irrational in nature, that is, NATO's existence and development are completely dependent on eastward expansion. It seems that if NATO does not expand eastward, it will lose its vitality.

This irrationality was also reflected in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

On February 27, local time, the streets of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, were empty.

　　First, due to the inertia of eastward expansion, NATO has left the impression that Ukraine seems to be the crux of the debate about NATO's eastward expansion, but this is not the case.

Whether before or during the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia set a very clear goal, that is, Ukraine cannot join NATO and should remain neutral.

But NATO has been reluctant to commit to it, although it has never publicly expressed its willingness to accept Ukraine.

Similarly, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed the EU accession agreement, the EU also showed apathy and indifference.

For this reason, even the host of Fox TV in the United States has fiercely accused NATO. Since NATO has no intention to absorb Ukraine, why not directly say that it will not accept Ukraine or make Ukraine neutral, so that the Russian-Ukrainian war can be avoided.

Obviously, the inertia of eastward expansion has made it difficult for NATO to escape from the anti-Russian ideological chariot, even if the war is destined to cost the Ukrainian people a huge price in life and property.

　　Secondly, also driven by the inertia of eastward expansion, NATO regards the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as a key to the geopolitical competition between North and Russia.

Through eastward expansion, NATO has built a European-Atlantic regional security structure of unprecedented scale, with its sphere of influence covering more than half of Europe.

As an auxiliary means of eastward expansion, NATO has also established various cooperation, dialogue and contact mechanisms around the world, which constitute the peripheral support of the Atlantic Community.

Although Ukraine's direct contribution to the security of NATO and its member states is extremely limited, Ukraine's political orientation is extremely important to NATO's geopolitical expansion, especially as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

NATO does not want to see Russia use the Russia-Ukraine war to interrupt its momentum of geopolitical expansion, nor does it want the world to see NATO succumbing to Russia's war power and strategic deterrence.

Therefore, the United States and Western countries continue to provide assistance to Ukraine, in order to display the image of "freedom and democracy" that NATO and the EU maintain peace, and then highlight its political demonstration effect among its member states and partner countries.

　　It can be seen that, in addition to setting up a large number of security barriers for Russia, NATO's eastward expansion also preset many political, diplomatic and moral traps, which were extremely obvious in the Russian-Ukrainian war.

(over)

About the Author:

　　Xu Haiyun is a professor and doctoral supervisor at the School of History, Renmin University of China. His research interests include the history of international relations, the history of NATO, and the history of American diplomacy.

In 2004 and 2005, he served as a visiting scholar at Leipzig University in Germany and Willinova University in the United States. He went to Europe and the United States, Israel, South Korea, Taiwan and other places to participate in international academic seminars for many times.

He has independently written two textbooks, published four monographs, translated one book, edited two books, and participated in the editing of four books. He has presided over a number of projects such as the National Social Science Fund and the Humanities and Social Science Fund of the Ministry of Education.

He has published more than 60 papers in various journals and newspapers such as "Xinhua Digest", "Modern International Relations", "World History", "Liberation Army Daily", etc. His academic masterpieces include "A Brief History of NATO", "Forging the Cold War Alliance - Research on the US "Atlantic Alliance Policy" -1945-1955, "Constructing a Regional Security Model: The Atlantic Security Model and the Asia-Pacific Security Model in the International System", etc.