Colonel of the Airborne Forces Sergey Pivovarov fought in Afghanistan and performed tasks in several hot spots in the territory of the former USSR.
In 1996, he commanded an operational group of airborne troops in Chechnya.
Then - the peacekeeping contingent of the Airborne Forces of the Russian Federation in Abkhazia.
He was awarded military orders and medals.
— Sergey Leonidovich, what happened in the summer of 1996 in Grozny?
— The militants suddenly captured the city.
There were several thousand of them.
They entered for several days under the guise of civilians: the fifth column in Grozny kept weapons in caches.
Fighting began in all areas, the FSB administration and paratroopers held out in the center, soldiers of the internal troops and the republican police defended themselves at checkpoints.
I was ordered to open a corridor from the base of our troops in Khankala to the city center in order to release the encircled units.
In fact, it was a local assault on the city, carried out in one of its districts.
— How did you prepare?
- Then the command first sent infantry forward.
She heroically rushed to the center of Grozny in columns on armored vehicles - and heroically died in her burning infantry fighting vehicles and MTLBs.
It was take number two of the original assault on New Year's Eve 1995, only on a smaller scale.
After that, it was decided to entrust the military business to the paratroopers.
At the headquarters of the group, they indicated the direction of movement to me.
I gathered the commanders of the Airborne Forces units, we carefully studied the map of the city in the area of the upcoming operations.
He ordered the soldiers to be divided into assault groups.
The enemy did not have heavy armored vehicles and artillery, only small arms and hand grenade launchers, so our groups were small.
Machine gunner, grenade launcher, several shooters.
The officers explained to the commander of each such assault unit his specific task, indicated landmarks, communication frequencies.
In general, nothing extraordinary.
Everything is described in the Battle Regulations, which are really written in the blood of our ancestors.
How was the operation itself?
- We went ahead at night, and not along the street indicated to me at the headquarters of the group, but along a parallel one.
There were information leaks, so we, the paratroopers, in Chechnya tried to “correct” the orders a little.
What matters is the end result, not the path to it.
The fighters cleared houses in private buildings from the enemy, immediately set up checkpoints on the cleared street and on neighboring ones, so that the enemy could not only not shoot at us, but even put his hand with a grenade out of the window.
The enemy began to retreat.
In the morning the task was completed in full, our losses were two people.
Envoys from militants came to me with a proposal to exchange their dead for the bodies of our dead during the first, unsuccessful breakthrough of motorized riflemen.
It was a wild heat, and the bodies decomposed in a day.
There were many dead on both sides, and the whole of Grozny was saturated with a putrid smell.
We started the exchange, and along the cleared corridor,
which General Konstantin Pulikovsky, who then commanded the grouping of troops in Chechnya, called "the road of life", reinforcements were already on their way to the partially unblocked city center.
The paratroopers were withdrawn from the blocks to perform another combat mission, we transferred the conquered positions to the infantry.
But then the head of the Security Council, Alexander Lebed, flew in, negotiations began with Aslan Maskhadov, ending with the stupid Khasavyurt “peace”.
- During the Great Patriotic War, the Germans stormed Stalingrad, ours - Oryol, Königsberg and Berlin. Everywhere there were heavy losses on both sides, and cities were destroyed to the ground. What should we do now with Mariupol and Kiev?
- One of my teachers at the military academy, a man who fought, explaining the topic “Fight in the city” to the audience, jokingly said that people used to be much smarter: two troops went out into the open field, fought, and the city with all its riches went to the winner in safety and security.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine and the national battalions will not go into the field.
They soberly realize that the Russian army, which is on a different technological level and much better prepared, will exterminate them quickly and completely.
It is already clear that the Ukrainian troops will hide behind civilians to the last.
And we have declared that we do not intend to kill civilians and destroy cities.
I've retired a long time ago.
I am not privy to the plans of the Supreme Commander and the military command.
Therefore, I can only speak hypothetically about a number of possible solutions to the problem.
In my opinion, there are only two ways.
- What kind?
- Gradual, unhurried, methodical "gnawing out" of city blocks by assault groups or forcing the enemy to surrender by non-military or paramilitary methods.
- Lay it out on the shelves.
- At the end of December 1994, I was expelled from the front.
Before the storming of Grozny, I was appointed chief of staff of the North federal troops grouping.
Having received the task of entering the city, we, the staff officers, made a complete calculation of forces and means.
It turned out one thing: our troops are waiting for a catastrophe.
He proposed blockading the city in the zone of responsibility of the "North", not letting anyone in or letting out, and taking most of the personnel to the near rear.
Days - wash off, sleep off.
Then, within a month - training and preparation for the implementation of actions on the Stalingrad tactics.
The battle in the city and the tactics of the actions of the assault groups of the commander Vasily Chuikov in Stalingrad are studied in all military schools and academies.
The composition of the group is 25-30 "bayonets", that is, together with attached specialists, this is a little more than a platoon.
In each assault unit, in addition to machine gunners, there are sappers, signalmen, an aviation gunner and an artillery spotter.
For fire support, a tank is allocated, as well as a mortar or artillery crew.
Everything where resistance comes from must be hollowed out with shells to brick chips.
I don’t know, maybe something has changed in the Battle Manuals now, but in my time they didn’t mention any “humanitarian” assault.
- With what wording did you, as you say, “kicked out” before the storming of Grozny?
- From the informal: "For cleverness."
The officers of the headquarters of the group - we were all from the Airborne Forces - were put into helicopters and sent to Mozdok.
A day later, the troops went to Grozny to take it as a birthday present for the then Minister of Defense.
But this is a long-standing thing ... I don’t know, perhaps now assault groups are already being trained with might and main near Chernigov, Sumy, Kiev or on our territory.
If you don't rush, don't give someone "gifts" by some date, then this tactic of mastering cities can lead to success.
But my, I repeat, personal, private opinion: there is no need to take the city.
- Tell us about the second option, paramilitary.
“We need to get the civilian population out of the cities by any means.
I welcome the decision of the Russian Ministry of Defense to introduce a regime of silence for the exit of people along the humanitarian corridors from Mariupol and Volnovakha.
Well done diplomats, who convinced the Kyiv regime not to interfere with this, agreed on humanitarian actions.
The same must be done in Kyiv and other encircled cities.
The best thing, of course, is to force Zelensky to order an end to senseless resistance.
If it does not work out kindly, it is necessary to include the tactics of "a cat with mustard under its tail."
We need a mass and preferably a voluntary exit of unarmed citizens.
- How to achieve this?
Where is our special propaganda?
Why don’t special vehicles with loudspeakers drive through the streets of Ukrainian suburbs, from which calls are heard at full power to go under the protection of the Russian army, which is not at war with the Ukrainian people?
Why isn’t Kyiv being “fired upon” by propaganda shells (and there are such), scattering leaflets stating that Russians are already paying pensions in Kherson, and that soldiers’ field kitchens with borscht and buckwheat porridge are waiting for the starving Kievans?
You can also launch alarmists into the cities.
A lot of things are possible.
After all, why is Zelensky still talking to the US Congress from the bunker?
We must use the capabilities of our electronic warfare troops to their full potential.
Electronic warfare systems should cut down all channels of communication and information.
Their complete absence, believe me, will very soon cause ferment and panic not only among the population, but also among all the armed forces - the Armed Forces of Ukraine, nationalists, the defense forces.
I saw in the war: as soon as the first ones run, everyone immediately rushes after them.
In 1996, when creating a corridor to the center of Grozny, we really fought for the first few hours, then the militants, realizing that they were faced with superior force, either retreated from their positions, or simply scattered.
Can be repeated.