Undoubtedly, the most striking news recently (1) was that Russian President Vladimir Putin put the Russian nuclear forces on high alert. This means that the nuclear combat tools are ready for immediate deployment and launch orders that may occur at any time. Of course, this announcement caused a state of fear. Among the citizens of many countries of the world, even US President Joe Biden declared that America should not fear nuclear war.
This came in the context of several developments, the first being a barrage of Western reprisals against Russia because of its war on Ukraine, and we mean here specifically the initial economic restrictions that actually caused the value of the Russian ruble to plummet, and it also seemed that the Russian plan to invade Ukraine was not going as planned. , with a decline in some areas, and finally, Western countries strengthened their military support for Ukraine in the war, and some even supported Kyiv's call to form a corps of foreign fighters willing to participate in the fighting.
Long history of fear
Several years ago, Putin was at the forefront of those against waving nuclear weapons, even declaring at the time, "Waving nuclear weapons is the last thing to do. That's harmful rhetoric, and I don't welcome it." And now he's doing it three days later Only from the beginning of the war.
Here the main question arises during all these events, is Russia brandishing the nuclear weapon only as a matter of political maneuvering, or does the Russian military doctrine make it really possible?
For a deeper understanding of this point, we can consider a six-page document published by the Russian government on June 2, 2020, outlining its perspective on nuclear deterrence, and its official title (2) “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence,” in which the Russian threat of nuclear escalation or The first actual use of nuclear weapons is a behavior that would lead to a "de-escalation" of conflicts on terms that serve Moscow's interests.
But in this context, Russia considers nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, and sets a set of conditions that clarify that point, so the right to use nuclear weapons is in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies, or in response to an attack by adversaries on sensitive government or military positions in the Russian Federation, which would undermine the actions of nuclear deterrence, or in response to large-scale aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons could jeopardize the very existence of the State.
Although these restrictions practically reduce Moscow's options in deploying nuclear weapons, they remain elusive and can easily be adapted according to the whims and personal preferences of the Kremlin leaders. The Soviet Union has long followed a doctrine (3) incorporating nuclear weapons into its military exercises, suggesting that it may be more inclined to rely on nuclear weapons than other nuclear-armed powers. This is clearly shown in reports that Russia's military exercises appeared to simulate the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons against NATO members.
This doctrine has deep historical roots in Russia, which views nuclear weapons as the best and shortest means of deterrence in cases of weakness. When the Soviet Union retreated politically and militarily during the Cold War, and then collapsed after that, the only guarantor for the continuation of Russian deterrence was nuclear weapons.
But besides all of the above, there is an additional, more important reason that leads some analysts to believe that activating the nuclear option for Russia is not a completely impossible option.
What is Russia doing now?
The Soviet Union conducted its first nuclear explosive test on August 29, 1949, four years after the United States used the atomic bomb against Japan in World War II. The Soviet Union tested its first version of the thermonuclear bomb in 1953, and since then the Soviet stockpile of Nuclear warheads rapidly increased, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, peaking in 1986 with 40,000 nuclear warheads.
By the 1960s, Russia had developed a triad of nuclear forces like the United States of America: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers equipped with nuclear weapons.
This set of tools of war are called strategic nuclear weapons, that is, those that are able to strike an enemy far away from the country.
For more than half a century, Russia has been involved in agreements and treaties that reduce the number of its nuclear warheads, so since the eighties the number of Russian warheads has decreased to only about 6 thousand, but in return for this decrease in numbers Russia has been interested in developing and fully modernizing its arsenal. .
In December 2020, Russian President Vladimir Putin (4) reported that modern weapons and equipment now constitute 86% of Russia's nuclear triad, compared to 82% the previous year, and indicated that he expected this number to rise to 88.3% within one year And he stated that the pace of change in all critical areas of the armed forces is unusually fast today, adding: "If you decide to stop for one second, you will begin to lag immediately."
Russia's long arm
intercontinental ballistic missile yars
This is evident on several fronts.
For example, Russia currently continues to withdraw its mobile Topol missiles at a rate of 9 to 18 each year, to be replaced by the Yars or RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Yaris was first tested in 2007 It was adopted by the Russian Strategic Missile Forces in 2010, and production began during the same year.The arsenal now includes more than 147 missiles of this type, of which 135 can launch a mobile platform (16-wheeled vehicle) and only 12 require fixed launchers.
The Yaris (5) has a range of 12 thousand kilometers (this is equal to the width of a country like Egypt twelve times), and it can carry 6-10 nuclear warheads with a power of 150-500 kilotons each (the previous Topol missile had one warhead). .
The technology "MIRV" qualifies this missile to carry more than one warhead, each capable of hitting a different target.
The Yaris is also designed to evade missile defense systems. It maneuvers during flight and carries booby traps, and thus has at least a 60-65% chance of penetrating counter defenses.
Yaris hits the target with accuracy within 100-150 meters from the target point only, and preparing the missile for launch takes 7 minutes, and once there is a state of high alert, Yaris missiles can leave its bases through cars that run at a speed of 45 kilometers per hour, capable of operating In remote forest areas to increase its stealth ability.
god of the seas
One example that is also widely cited is Status-6, known in Russia as Poseidon or (God of the Seas).
Poseidon is (6) a long-range nuclear-powered torpedo, described by a Russian government document as intended to create "extensive radioactive contamination areas which may be unsuitable for military, economic or other activity for extended periods of time".
Put more simply, this was designed to attack ports and cities to inflict large-scale indiscriminate damage.
The potential power of this weapon is 100 megatons, which is twice the power of the largest known nuclear explosion.
The Soviets began developing this weapon in 1989, but it was interrupted by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, as well as with the policies of nuclear disarmament.
However, Russia later developed it again, and in 2015 information about this weapon was deliberately revealed by the Russian Ministry of Defense.
According to the information, this vehicle has a range of 10,000 km, and its underwater speed can reach 200 km/h.
That's much faster than typical torpedoes can travel.
Moreover, Poseidon is planned to operate at depths of up to 1,000 meters, making it difficult to intercept, and it is even believed that this terrifying piece of technology can operate under the ice sheets in the Arctic, here it is very difficult to detect and engage.
Poseidon is due to start working in Russia's nuclear arsenal within five years.
Fire from Tupolev
Putin inside the Tu-160.
The Tu-160 multi-mode supersonic strategic bomber is also a component of Russia's recently developed nuclear arsenal.
Although there are many larger civil and military aircraft, this aircraft is the largest in terms of thrust, and the heaviest in terms of take-off weight among combat aircraft.
Each aircraft of this type can carry up to 40 tons of munitions, including 12 air-launched nuclear cruise missiles.
In all, bombers of this type can carry more than 800 weapons.
This aircraft was the last strategic bomber designed by the Soviet Union, but it is still in use today. In addition, two distinct modernization programs for the development of the Tupolev are being implemented simultaneously: an initial program that includes a "deep modernization" of the existing airframe to integrate a next-generation engine. , in addition to new avionics, a modern radar based on artificial intelligence techniques, and another program that involves integrating similar systems into completely new aircraft structures.
On November 3, 2020, Russia announced that the latest version of the Tu-160 (the West calls it Black Jack) had been launched from Kazan powered by new NK-32-02 engines, with a thrust of 55,000 lbs. This is the largest and most powerful engine ever installed in a military aircraft.
The first flight of the upgraded bomber with the new engines took two hours and 20 minutes, and traveled at an altitude of 6000 meters, after the new engine raised the plane's range of about 1,000 kilometers.
(7)
Yaris, Poseidon and the modernization of the Tupolev grenade launcher are a few examples of a great state of development in the Russian nuclear arsenal, besides, Russia is diversifying the scope of development, it is not only working on a strategic nuclear weapon (which strikes the distant enemy), but also there are great strides In (tactical) nuclear weapon development, a term referring to nuclear weapons that are designed for use on the battlefield with friendly forces nearby, possibly on friendly contested territory.
Russia stock
Of the current (8) Russian nuclear warhead stockpile, there are approximately 1,600 strategic warheads ready to strike, about 800 of them on ICBMs, about 624 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and about 200 on strategic bombers.
In addition, there are about 985 other strategic warheads in the store, along with about 1912 non-strategic (tactical) warheads.
In addition to the military stockpile of the operational forces, there are about 1,760 retired warheads, but they are still largely intact, awaiting dismantling and restarting, making the total stockpile about 6000-6300 warheads, knowing that these are estimates only, as countries do not announce The real number of its nuclear warheads.
The conclusion, then, is that the Russian nuclear modernization programs, along with the increase in the number and size of military exercises, and the explicit nuclear threats posed against other countries (what happened in the case of Ukraine 2022 is not new), and the Russian doctrine related to nuclear weapons all contribute to supporting a state of non-violence. Certainty about Russia's nuclear intentions!
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sources:
1- Putin puts nuclear deterrent forces on 'high alert' amid spiraling tensions over Ukraine
2- Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence
3- Russia's Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization
4- Nuclear Notebook: How many nuclear weapons does Russia have in 2021?
5- RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2)
6- Status-6 / Kanyon / SS-N-38 / Poseidon – Ocean Multipurpose System
7- Russia's upgraded Tu-160M2 bomber just took off with the most powerful engine ever put on a military aircraft
8- Russia's Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization