The Russian government has decided not to take part in this year's security conference in Munich.

Nevertheless, Moscow will follow very closely what is said at this meeting, because it has always provided insight into the positioning of the leading powers.

A signal from the Bayerischer Hof may have surprised Putin: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke out with remarkable clarity against military intervention in Ukraine.

When Putin was recently in Beijing for the opening of the Winter Olympics, it still looked as if the two authoritarian superpowers were of the same heart.

Head of state and party leader Xi Jinping signed a joint document against NATO expansion.

This gave the impression that Beijing was giving the Russian president far-reaching powers of attorney in his confrontation with the West.

Putin is weakening his own eastern flank

Wang maintained his stance on NATO at the security conference, but otherwise he drew a line with Putin: his point that the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity also apply to Ukraine shows the limits of the Russian-Chinese alliance.

The Chinese leadership, which itself questions these principles vis-à-vis Taiwan or the countries bordering the South China Sea, should be aware that a Russian attack could have unforeseeable, potentially destabilizing consequences for all of world politics.

For Putin, who is the weaker partner in relations with Beijing, the Chinese stance is at least a diplomatic setback.

With his high-risk game in Eastern Europe, he is now weakening his own eastern flank, and not just politically.

The fact that an American submarine is said to have recently invaded Russian waters off the Kuril Islands may have been a Russian hoax, a coincidence - or a subtle hint from Washington that Russia is making itself vulnerable in Asia.

Putin can be less surprised by the transatlantic solidarity that characterized the Munich meeting.

For weeks, NATO, the EU and the extended Western camp have shown great unity in the conflict with Russia.

It is an old experience that external threats, even if only indirect, weld together world politics.

In Munich, many speakers emphasized that the conflict over Ukraine is ultimately about whether democracy, freedom and self-determination remain the most important principles on the European continent.

It seemed as if they themselves were a little surprised at how quickly the West came together again after the Trump years and the recent hangover about its own (relative) loss of importance.

It doesn't have to stay that way in the long run.

Many in Washington are not quite so relaxed about the fact that China's rise to become a great power is only a "return to the status quo ante", as Chancellor Olaf Scholz put it.

But as far as Russia is concerned, the current consensus seems to be what NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said: if Putin wants to divide, he gets a more united alliance;

if he wanted less NATO, he would get more.

The accusatory and emotional speech by the Ukrainian President reminded the assembled transatlanticists that ultimately they are speaking and acting from a comfortable position, because they declared that they do not want to fight for Ukraine.

And the fact that the West upholds the principle of free choice of alliances, but will not allow Ukraine into NATO (not even into the EU) in the foreseeable future is indeed a contradiction, even if it is strategically justifiable.

It was noticeable that in Munich Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not want to agree with the American representation that Putin had already made the decision to attack.

Unfortunately, his argument that panic only harms his country, especially the economy, is correct.

Ukraine is also currently paying the highest price in the information war being waged between the West and Russia.