Congo Hold-up: how to use the election budget?

The facade of the Céni in 2018 © RFI

Text by: Sonia Rolley Follow |

Mediapart

36 mins

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the last two electoral cycles have cost the Congolese state more and more, and their results more and more contested.

These dizzying increases in spending were justified by the urgency of the measures to be taken, after preparations blocked for months by political crises, and by a technical improvement of the process.

But the leak of millions of documents and transactions at BGFIBank reveals that at least 3.8 million have been paid into the accounts of companies linked to former President Joseph Kabila.

Survey carried out with Médiapart, PPLAAF, Public Eye, the Sentry.

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On February 21, 2017, in front of the press in Kinshasa, Corneille Nangaa, president of the National and Independent Electoral Commission (Céni) of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), came to make an update: the cost of the elections - which was to be hold since the end of 2016 and mark the end of the second and last constitutional term of President Joseph Kabila in power since 2001 - is reduced from $ 1.8 billion to $ 1.3 billion.

Corneille Nangaa, president of the outgoing office of the Céni, December 24, 2018 in Kinshasa.

AP - Jerome Delay

" 

It is a question of options and choice of the political class

 ," explains this man, both jovial and sharp, boss of an electoral center already criticized by the opposition and civil society both for its management, and for his proximity to the outgoing Joseph Kabila. Mr. Nangaa presents the information as good news and ensures that he is doing his utmost to further reduce this colossal amount. The dashing president of the CENI repeats it to whoever wants to hear it: the challenge is enormous, the elections must be organized urgently, the country is large, there is little infrastructure and the enrollment of voters would be alone already cost nearly $ 400 million.

Carried out by 19 media including Radio France Internationale (RFI) and five NGOs, the Congo Hold-Up survey reveals a whole different story.

Based on the analysis of more than 3.5 million documents and millions of transactions at BGFIBank obtained by the Platform for the Protection of African Whistleblowers (PPLAAF) and the French news site Mediapart, it points out that 138 million dollars of public funds were embezzled through this bank by Joseph Kabila, his family and a handful of businessmen close to this circle.

The CENI budget is no exception.

► To re-read: Congo Hold-up: the biggest leak of banking documents in Africa

Amid the chaotic management of this electoral cycle and unintentional or orchestrated errors, $ 3.8 million has been paid directly from the BGFI into the accounts of companies owned by former President Joseph Kabila and his inner circle.

But the increasing use of subcontracting companies created for the occasion, mainly followers of cash withdrawals, has undoubtedly further increased the bill considerably.

Rule # 1: Have internal complicity

There would be more than one way of telling the multiple questionable transfers that the DRC's electoral center has undergone to BGFIBank. The accounts of the Ceni at the BGFI are not opened until June 3, 2011, but the story begins six months before. That day, January 20, despite the protests, President Joseph Kabila, who wanted at all costs to serve a second term, promulgated a revision of the Constitution which limited the presidential election to one round. This can considerably facilitate his re-election. This election, as well as the national legislative elections which are due to take place by the end of November, will oppose him to his only real rival, Étienne Tshisekedi, historical opponent and father of the current head of state.

Tshisekedi, facing the press on December 9, 2011, near Kinshasa, as violent protests erupted in the capital after Kabila was named the winner of the election. Junior D. Kannah / AFP

Even if he will not make it public until a few days later, Mr. Kabila has already chosen the man who will manage this battle for him at the head of the Electoral Commission:

Pastor Daniel Ngoy Mulunda

. A founding member of his party, the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD), he campaigned for him in 2006 and boasts in interviews that he loves the money and the way of life it offers. The post of president of the Ceni

"

is by far the most lucrative position in the office for those who are interested,

 " confides a former member of Radio France Internationale (RFI). " 

Everyone wants to buy you, foreign companies, candidates, even the international community promises you a golden bridge, if you do what it asks you to do.

 ", He explains again, but he adds:" 

whatever the mode of appointment, a president of the Ceni in our countries is the president's man, because the elections must be stolen for him and it costs money

. "

Even before taking the head of the institution, Pastor Daniel Ngoy Mulunda has already chosen a new bank for him, BGFIBank, whose minority shareholder (40%) is none other than Gloria Mteyu, the full sister of the head of the 'State. This same January 20, 2011 when President Kabila promulgates his constitutional revision, a banker of the BGFIBank in Kinshasa is approached by one of the close collaborators of the pastor and a minister of the provincial government of Kinshasa. On behalf of the future president of the Electoral Commission, they are already asking for a loan of $ 250,000 from the institution's accounts to be opened. The banker reports to his hierarchy, but it is still cautious: the presidential ordinance designating Pastor Ngoy Mulunda and his acolytes of the office has not yet been signed.The order is however given internally to maintain close contacts: the bank does not lose sight of the importance of the Céni customer, especially since the budget announced for the 2011 cycle already amounts to 350 million dollars.

It was not until the appointment of one of Daniel Ngoy Mulunda's successors, Corneille Nangaa as president of the Céni in 2015, for the BGFI to become one of the main banks of the Céni. Of the 1.3 billion dollars of budget devoted to the electoral cycle planned from 2016, the accounts of the Ceni at the BGFI will see more than 250 million. This is ten times more than the transactions recorded in 2011 ... Between these two dates, Francis Selemani Mtwale became Managing Director of BGFIBank. He is the president's adopted brother.

The new boss of the Céni, Corneille Nangaa is an electoral expert with recognized skills, including outside the country where he has carried out several missions on behalf of different organizations. He was appointed to his post, as is customary in the DRC, by representatives of religious denominations. But there was no unanimity among them: the powerful Catholic Church expressed reservations about the morality of the new head of the electoral center. She is already denouncing her links with the authorities in place.

Mr. Nangaa did not wish to answer the questions raised by this investigation. He submitted a report on the electoral process from 2012 to 2019 to the National Assembly which validated it. For him, the page is turned. " 

From sound logic, it must follow that Mr. Corneille Nangaa cannot be required to take part in the exercise to which you invite him without discarding a posteriori vis-à-vis the validation of the Ceni report by the National Assembly

 ", explains his lawyer, Me Innocent Nkongo Budina Nzau, adding that he threatens" 

to sue any member organization of the consortium when it comes to recognize them as perpetrators of reprehensible acts and acts. in the eyes of the law

 ”.

On paper, Mr. Nangaa can claim to have fulfilled some of his obligations. As soon as he was appointed in 2015, with new elections fast approaching, he warned the government, including Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo and his cabinet. To meet the constitutional deadlines, he even insisted on signing a private contract as soon as possible with the Belgian company Zétès to provide voter registration kits. This company is criticized by the opposition, but it has, according to Corneille Nangaa, the merit of having already worked on an election in the DRC. A notice of no objection to award this private contract was even granted on June 30, 2015 by the Directorate General for the Control of Public Procurement. The amount of the contract with Zétès amounts to nearly 31,$ 4 million including $ 3.6 million for related maintenance and training services.

Without explanation, this draft contract was abandoned on February 10, 2016. Corneille Nangaa then launched an international call for tenders for the acquisition of electoral kits, voter cards and the generators necessary for any work in a country where the electricity is lacking. A call for tenders could mark the beginning of a new era of transparency at the Ceni, but Mr. Nangaa also knows that by doing this, the constitutional deadlines for the organization of the elections can no longer be met.

President Kabila is then suspected of wanting to run for a third term

 : he is quiet for a few more months.

At the same time, the bill for the supply of enrollment kits and technical support will climb to 46 million dollars, while the contract previously envisaged with Zelès "barely" exceeded 31 million. 

Until then, Corneille Nangaa was still trying to do his job honorably,

 " a close friend of the Ceni president told RFI today.

“ 

But the international community refused to support him, he was threatened not only by chancelleries, but by everyone else, the presidency, the government, the opposition and even religious denominations.

He gave in, but he kept this desire to organize the elections that brought about the alternation, whether we like it or not

.

"

Alternation. This will be the great novelty of the 2018 elections. But the historic transition, the result of secret agreements signed between Joseph Kabila and the new president Félix Tshisekedi, is extremely criticized. Corneille Nangaa will be in trouble: in March 2019, the day after the presidential election, the US Treasury places him under sanctions along with two other Ceni officials. On March 21, in a press release, Sigal Mandelker, US Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, indicates that this sanction " 

follows the persistent corruption of senior officials within the Commission

 ". He accuses them, as well as the outgoing government, of having " 

hindered and delayed the preparations for credible and inclusive elections.

 ".

The United States then said it was " 

concerned about a flawed electoral process in which, after the presidential election, the Ceni continued to obstruct the democratic process and failed to ensure that the vote reflected the will of the Congolese people.

.

"

Rule # 2: First turn away for the president

For the electoral cycle from 2016 to 2019, the alleged embezzlement begins even before the start of the enrollment of voters on one of the Ceni's accounts at the BGFI.

While this account had not been funded for months, the BGFI authorized in May 2016 the opening of a line of credit of $ 25 million over one year against a deposit of 30 billion Congolese francs, (at the era over $ 27 million).

This deposit may seem disproportionate, but the Congolese franc is then in full tumble against dollars.

Inflation exceeds 45%.

Statement of the Céni account at the BGFI in May 2016 © PPLAAF / Mediapart

On May 13, 2016, it was from this Céni account that more than one million dollars was transferred to an account of the Sud Oil company.

This company is directly controlled by relatives of Joseph Kabila.

The wording of this transfer mentions " 

notification fees

 " without further details.

It is mixed with other fees and commissions charged by the bank in connection with the opening of the credit line.

► To read also: Congo Hold-up: Sud Oil, the siphonneuse of the first circle of Joseph Kabila

A bank executive will later justify this payment during an internal audit, by producing an invoice indicating that Sud Oil would have sold 751,852 liters of diesel to the Céni.

This is surprising, since the wording of the transaction was different, and we could not find any trace of Sud Oil's activity in the distribution of petroleum products on that date.

Contacted, the current Electoral Commission did not respond.

Its former vice-president, Norbert Basengezi, indicates that he has " 

never heard of this file or of the company

 " Sud Oil.

The transfer appears to be irregular in all respects.

Indeed, on the same May 13, 2016, Jean-Jacques Lumumba, head of the commitments department of BGFIBank, asked for the Céni accounts to be placed under surveillance. Lumumba, who would become the first whistleblower within the BGFI and in the DRC, considers the opening of this line of credit illegal. “ 

There had never been a letter of request for credit, the customer had not signed a notification of acceptance. I had asked that the accounts be blocked so that everything is regularized,

 ”explains Mr. Lumumba.

That day, Jean-Jacques Lumumba was told that all Céni accounts, except his account in Congolese francs, were already blocked due to too many unpaid bills since May 22, 2014 by the Central Bank of Congo (BCC). . But that does not prevent anything. The transfer order is placed and a first million disappears. “ 

I didn't know about the transfer to Sud Oil, but I feared embezzlement. The opening of this credit line, despite the instructions from the Central Bank, was done on instructions from Selemani,

 ”says Jean-Jacques Lumumba. “ 

It is this Ceni file that gradually led me to leave the BGFI and raise the alarm.

 "

At the end of 2016,

Mr. Lumumba took the plunge

and told what he knew to the newspaper

Le Soir

and to the Bloomberg agency, two partners in the Congo Hold-up investigation.

This first leak of documents at the BGFI Bank, called “Lumumba Papers”, caused a scandal.

But it does not put an end to embezzlement, not even on the accounts of the electoral center.

 Of the 250 million dollars allocated by the Congolese state to the Céni between 2016 and 2019 and paid into its accounts at BGFIBank, a network of companies linked to the Kabila family thus receives 3.8 million.

Thus, on July 11, 2016, Sud Oil received more than $ 299,998 from one of the Céni accounts at the BGFI under the name “ 

FRAIS / VIR.RECU RPT 00008578

 ”. This account entitled "Céni INVESTISSEMENTS" had received shortly before a transfer of nearly $ 30 million from an account of the Céni in another bank under the name " 

RPT 00008578

 ". The transfer to Sud Oil is therefore inexplicably presented as costs linked to this repatriation of money between two accounts of the electoral center.

Funds disappear on many occasions. For the enrollment of voters, Gemalto SA, at the time a company incorporated under Dutch law (it was then bought out in 2019 by the French company Thalès), won the jackpot: a 46 million euro contract for the supply 20,220 biometric voter identification and registration kits, as well as technical assistance in this process. This contract was awarded by tender. It is $ 15 million more expensive than the one that was to be signed by mutual agreement with Zétès.

How did Gemalto get this deal? According to information gathered by The Sentry and Public Eye, two of the NGO partners of Congo Hold-up, Gemalto and in particular its Swiss subsidiary, Trüb AG, in fact carried out a real lobbying campaign with the Congolese authorities and officials of the majority. . They point in particular the senator and close to Joseph Kabila, Léonard She Okitundu. This former minister would even have met several months before the signing of the contract with representatives of Gemalto SA in various countries. Mr. Okitundu disputes this.

Norbert Basengezi, then vice-president of the Ceni from the camp of Joseph Kabila and himself today under sanctions from the US Treasury, agreed to answer our questions. For him, the electoral center can not be called into question on this call for tenders. It is not responsible, he says, either for the choice of Gemalto SA and its subcontractors or for the conditions for awarding this contract. It had entrusted this task to the Central Coordination Office (Bceco) which depends on the Ministry of Finance. The prime minister, the general public procurement control department, the public procurement regulatory agency had also validated the entire procedure, he explains, with supporting documents.

Mr. Basengezi gives all the more readily answers that he considers it is " 

a chance

 " for him to re-establish the truth about his role and their work within the office of the Ceni, after the American sanctions. He provided a 37-page response and explained: “ 

We impute too many responsibilities to the Ceni, everything that is done is collegial

. He said he discovered the links between some members of his family and some of the companies receiving election funds. But he also recalls that “ 

the Ceni is an institution under pressure, there are a lot of interests in an election, a lot

. "

On this market for the supply of enrollment kits, some 24.6 million euros will be paid directly to Gemalto SA. But for the rest, on December 23, 2016, the Céni and the BGFI embarked on an operation as absurd as it was expensive. 29 billion Congolese francs (nearly 24 million euros) are taken from the main account in Congolese francs of the Céni at the BGFI. They are converted into dollars and then into euros. Each time, exchange fees are retained. In the end, Gemalto SA must have received less than 20 million euros. During this strange succession of internal transactions, 953,390 dollars are stolen. Nothing to do with bank charges,this sum is paid from a BGFIBank account to the account of a mysterious company "Port de Fisher" whose majority shareholder since November 2015 has been former president Joseph Kabila.

► To read also: Congo Hold-up: in the footsteps of Port de Fisher, the mysterious company of Joseph Kabila

The following year, between April and August 2017, the Céni itself made four other transfers directly to the Port of Fisher account for a total of 864 million Congolese francs, or $ 593,000.

Three of the labels are entitled "

 transfer

 " and a fourth " 

logistics

 ", without further details.

Rule # 3: Choose the right partners

The Electoral Commission had insisted in the call for tenders that the chosen company use a local subcontractor.

This is a usual procedure in the DRC in the name of the importance of the transfer of skills.

But has this praiseworthy practice actually achieved its objective?

The Congo Hold-up documents show that some of these local partnerships have been an opportunity to withdraw millions of dollars in cash, without justification or control.

We thus discover that after having discarded a first local partner who would not have been in good standing with the Congolese tax authorities, Gemalto SA chooses as a subcontractor to respond to the order of 22,500 STIM PLUS France voter kits, a company who has never operated in the DRC.

According to a video published on its website under the mention “ 

project with commitment

 ”, STIM France has accomplished a large part of the Gemalto SA contract by assembling these kits in France, including software installations and encryption keys.

STIM PLUS France teams seem to have taken part in an assembly operation for these kits in Laval, France, between June and July 2016. The profiles of the social network LinkedIn of some of its employees attest to this.

However, this company does not appear in the Ceni reports.

Asked about the exact role of this subcontractor, the vice-president of the Céni at the time, Norbert Basengezi, remembers that STIM PLUS was " 

the main supplier of the equipment contained in the Gemalto kit

 ", and that she was in charge of "

 the training of electoral agents and technical support in the centers

 ". Mr. Basengezi recalls that he did not supervise this operation, but he thinks he remembers that the Ceni paid up to " 

210 dollars per month and per registration center

 ".

STIM PLUS France has engaged in strange operations. Instead of choosing a local partner, its founder, Yves Samama, himself created in Congo on September 1, 2016 another company of the same name in Congo (STIM PLUS RDC). It has as a minority shareholder, a Frenchman named Raphaël Edery (40%) who, in December of that same year, transfers his shares to a certain “Madame Yael Stephanie Edery” who probably does not work in the DRC. She presents herself on the social network LinkedIn as a sales representative at STIM PLUS France.

STIM PLUS RDC will open two accounts at BGFIBank, one in dollars and the other in euros. The parent company, STIM PLUS France, transferred there by transfers in September 2016 and July 2017 1.6 million dollars, then nearly 2.9 million euros. Most of these sums will be withdrawn in cash. These financial operations intrigued a BGFI banker from the beginning of October 2016. He asked some of his colleagues by internal mail to send him the “ 

physical file

 ” of the client “0019191 / STIM PLUS RDC” and obtained the contract of partnership signed in August 2016 between Yves Samama of STIM PLUS France and Raphaël Edery, presented at the time as an “ 

agent

 ”. The document provides that " 

the agent

 "Raphaël Edery should receive two million dollars as a" 

lump sum commission

 ", but that" 

this amount may change depending on the customer contract

 . " The subject of the contract between the two men is not specified, because the contract was cleaned of its most sensitive items, before being sent as proof to BGFIBank.

The compliance service of the BGFI also sounded the alarm, noting that the STIM PLUS DRC account was opened " 

without validation

 " and that the " 

file does not contain a photo of the legal representative, his passport does not contain any visa of establishment in the DRC, no proof of address is annexed in the file and the Head of agency did not sign the KYC form [note: Know Your Costumer]

 ”.

Blocking the account is therefore recommended.

Despite these alerts, transfers continue to the account of STIM PLUS RDC.

The Céni itself, which is not contractually bound to this subcontractor, in turn directly transfers some $ 2.4 million between December 2017 and April 2018.

But difficult to understand the expenses recorded on the accounts of this company.

Out of a total of 5.9 million dollars credited to the account of STIM PLUS RDC in different currencies, " 

agent

 " Raphaël Edery withdraws in cash a little more than one million euros and 2.5 million more in cash. dollars.

A company created for the occasion in mid-November 2016 officially specializing in import-export and called "TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS & MANAGED SERVICES" touches most of what remains, with the delivery of a check for 900,000. dollars in December 2016 and a transfer of 1.3 million dollars in April 2018. On her account at the BGFI, she herself withdraws half in cash.

None of the protagonists of this story wanted to react to questions from RFI and its partners. Despite several reminders by phone and by e-mail from RFI and its partners, the manager of STIM PLUS, Yves Samama, and his sales representative Stéphanie Edery refused to answer our questions and referred to Gemalto SA, holder of the contact with the Ceni. Thalès, which bought Gemalto in 2019, kicks in and recalls that the execution of the contract was completed before the acquisition. The French company also ensures that "

the people who worked on the development of this contract have since left the Thalès group

". All this “

context

” would not allow Thales today to answer the questions posed by our investigation. "

Theagent

Raphaël Edery could not be reached because he could not be identified.

Rule # 4: Remove all traces

In June 2018, the electoral roll resulting from the contracts signed with Gemalto SA, STIM PLUS and other suppliers and subcontractors was considered globally “ 

inclusive, exhaustive and up-to-date but perfectible

 ” by an audit mission mandated by the Organization. International Francophonie (OIF).

But behind this rather reassuring statement, the OIF experts note very serious anomalies which can in part be attributed to poor performance of these contracts. More than a quarter of voters registered with student, student or boarding cards, which are readily available and therefore considered unreliable pieces of identification. Almost one in six voters (16.6% of those registered) had not registered fingerprints. These omissions were concentrated in two provinces, both remote, 55% of those registered in Sankuru and almost 40% in Tshuapa.

Financially, there was no audit. The Ceni chooses the information it delivers and the more the years go by and the budget explodes, the more the reports are spaced out and are stingy in details on the contracts passed, their amounts or even the beneficiaries. It's a real black box.

Who knows the Guinean partner of the South African company Ren Form CC, which obtained by mutual agreement a market of 9.4 million dollars for the printing of 54 million voter cards? On May 4, 2016, Ren Form RDC was officially created with a partner, a company from Guinea-Conakry (G-STG). It becomes the minority shareholder with 40% of the shares. Behind this Guinean company are in fact hiding two Congolese who, according to documents consulted by the Congo Hold-up investigation, were nevertheless presented as “ 

business development manager

 ” and “ 

local agent

 ” of Ren Form CC during the negotiations. " 

Ren form RDC was established for future business

 ," assures Jean-Pierre du Sart, still sales director of Ren form CC. " 

The owner of the Guinean company is Congolese and his services were specifically used for the preparation of the tender document.

 "

On an account entitled "Ren Form CC RDC Kinshasa" at Standard Bank, however, there are nearly 6.2 million of the 9.4 million dollars promised for this contract. They are paid from a Céni account at the BGFI in two transfers between 22 and 26 August 2016. This time, it is not known how the money was used since these funds were paid into an account in another bank than the BGFI. The sales director of Ren Form CC confirms that the Céni made several transfers via this account, but that all were used to pay his company. "

 The contract was signed by Ren Form CC, Ren Form CC received 100% of the funds

 ", insists Jean-Pierre du Sart. “ 

The contract was awarded on the basis of a call for tenders and not on mutual agreement

. "

In any case, at the address indicated for this company on several sites, nobody knows "G-SMART TECH TECHNOLOGIE GUINEA", noted a correspondent of RFI. The contact number is for absent subscribers and its leaders too. And today, one of the Congolese involved in the negotiations with Ren Form CC, presents himself as the “ 

national manager of Flanders

 ” in January 2021, this American company would have committed to endow the city of Kisangani in the province of Tshopo of a new hydroelectric dam and a photovoltaic plant. Contacted about him, Flanders Inc did not respond.

Among the local partnerships that we did not know at the time of the elections, there is also this case made recently famous in January 2021 by the American NGO The Sentry, partner of the Congo Hold-up investigation, in one of its reports. It is that of Bravo Tozali Compagnie SARL (BTC SARL). This company, which has since disappeared, specialized in everything except electoral matters. It was trying to promote itself at the time as a mining drilling company. Overnight, BTC SARL finds itself associated in a consortium with a Lithuanian company UAB Neurotechnology which, for its part, has know-how and experience in Congo. Both will be responsible for the thorny operation of deduplication of the electoral roll from Gemalto SA kits.

L’ONG The Sentry pointait dans son rapport que l’un de ses actionnaires minoritaires et co-fondateur de Bravo Tozali, le Congolais Roger Abotome, était candidat et avait été élu député au cours de ces mêmes élections de 2018 et qu’il s’était associé par la suite dans une autre société avec le président de la Céni, Corneille Nangaa, et ce, jusqu’à sa mise sous sanctions par le Trésor américain. The Sentry estimait aussi que le prix du contrat de 8,4 millions de dollars était anormalement élevé au vu des problèmes détectés dans le fichier électoral congolais après cette opération de dédoublonnage.

À l’époque, déjà, M. Abotome avait répondu à l’ONG américaine ne jamais avoir directement fait affaire avec « la personne de Corneille Nangaa, mais plutôt avec des sociétés, personnes morales qui agissaient conformément aux prérogatives leurs dévolues par la loi et surtout leurs Statuts respectifs. » Il insistait : « D’ailleurs il n’y a jamais eu, avant 2018, un quelconque contact entre monsieur Abotome et Monsieur Naanga. »

Of the more than ten million BGFIBank documents and transactions that RFI and its partners have been able to consult, there are precisely the details of Bravo Tozali Compagnie's accounts.

Between January and April 2018, of the $ 8.4 million promised to the consortium formed with UAB Neurotechnology, nearly $ 6.4 million is paid by the Céni to BTC SARL accounts at the BGFI, of which four million will be withdrawn in liquid.

Who is the beneficiary of one of the last cash withdrawals?

According to a wording dated May 2, 2018, it is the co-founder of BTC SARL, Roger Abotome.

He who is only a minority shareholder, with only 15% of the shares, would have obtained half a million dollars in cash on the money of this contract.

January 2018 transfer © PPLAAF / Mediapart

April 2018 transfer © PPLAAF / Mediapart

In terms of expenses that can be directly linked to deduplication operations, only two million are transferred to UAB Neurotechnology, the company which actually has the expertise in this area.

255,000 dollars more are granted to an electoral expert of the organization ECES, the European center of electoral support co-founded by the first president of the electoral commission of the DRC, the abbot Malu Malu.

Mais ces dépenses ne correspondent pas à celles annoncées par les deux membres du consortium à la BGFI. Dans les documents Congo Hold-up figure, en annexe d’un « accord de groupement » entre BTC SARL et UAB Neurotechnology et daté du 17 juillet 2017, le budget de toutes les dépenses liées aux opérations de dédoublonnage. Il était prévu que plus de 4,5 millions soient versés pour « toutes les licences nécessaires à l’infrastructure », 773 000 pour du matériel et 376 000 dollars pour du soutien technique. Déjà, sur le papier, plus de 2,3 millions devaient être dévolus à la mise en œuvre du projet. Ce montant se répartissait entre la direction du projet et le personnel de BTC et les experts qu’ils pourraient engager. 900 000 étaient attribués à des rubriques aux intitulés vagues, «assurances et formalités diverses » pour la « logistique à Kinshasa » et les « frais légaux et administratifs, frais divers en RDC ».

À toutes ces questions sur la gestion des comptes de Bravo Tozali Company, M. Abotome et ses associés refusent de répondre. Me Atoosa Vakili, avocate de l’ancien actionnaire de BTC SARL, renvoie aux réponses qu’elle avait adressées à The Sentry. Elle insiste sur le fait que ce contrat avait fait l’objet d’un appel d’offres adressés à « différentes sociétés » et que cette procédure a respecté « toutes les lois et procédures relatives aux marchés publics en RD Congo, comme l'attestent les documents émis par les autorités compétentes ». Me Atoosa Vakili, affirmant par ailleurs que « la façon dont BTC SARL a dépensé ses revenus n'est pas pertinente et sort du cadre de votre enquête », puisqu’il s’agit là « une entreprise de droit privé et à but lucratif ». 

Interrogé, le gestionnaire de Bravo Tozali Compagnie Erick Bombado répond par l’intermédiaire de son avocat que sa société « n’était pas une ONG » et qu’elle « avait réalisé un profit de près de deux millions de dollars et qu’elle avait affecté à l’acquisition des équipements et machines à forages, camions, excavatrices. »

Celui de M. Abotome confirme : « Les montants retirés du compte de la BTC sur lesquels vous vous êtes renseigné l'ont été avec l'autorisation de la direction et pour l'achat d'équipement pour les opérations commerciales. »

Règle #5 : Se faire payer en cash

 À en croire le Trésor américain qui a mis sous sanctions Corneille Nangaa, Norbert Basengezi et un autre officiel de la Céni, il y a eu des surfacturations et des détournements des fonds des élections à plusieurs niveaux. Le président de la Céni aurait lui-même « supervisé l’utilisation de plusieurs sociétés-écrans pour détourner les fonds opérationnels de la Céni à des fins personnelles et politiques », affirme le Trésor américain dans son communiqué du 21 mars 2019. Lui et d’autres responsables « se seraient enrichis en achetant et en vendant de l’essence à des fins lucratives aux dépens de la Céni, ce qui a retardé l’enregistrement dans le Kasaï, un bastion de l’opposition, et a empêché de nombreux électeurs de s’inscrire. » Ils auraient aussi « gonflé de 100 millions de dollars les coûts du contrat des machines à voter électroniques dans l’intention d’utiliser les fonds excédentaires pour leur enrichissement personnel, des pots-de-vin et des frais de campagne pour financer la campagne électorale du candidat de Joseph Kabila. » M. Nangaa aurait « ordonné aux employés de la Céni de fabriquer des reçus de dépenses pour couvrir les écarts de dépenses résultant de l’utilisation des fonds de la Céni à des fins personnelles », il aurait même « remis des pots-de-vin aux juges de la Cour constitutionnelle pour qu’ils confirment une décision de la Céni de retarder les élections de 2016 en RDC. »

En réponse à ces sanctions, le 8 avril 2019, dix des membres de la plénière de la centrale électorale congolaise dénoncent des mesures prises sur base d’accusations non vérifiées. « d’allégations infondées et non-vérifiables du financement de la campagne du candidat du camp Kabila ». Ils disent également regretter que « la prolongation du délai des élections soit reprochée à certains de leurs collègues » et réfutent encore l’accusation d’utiliser des sociétés écrans. Ils assurent en outre avoir signé des contrats « avec des sociétés réelles, dûment constituées et qui ont produit des prestations effectives ayant conduit à l’organisation des élections. »

L’enquête Congo Hold-up n’est pas en mesure d’estimer l’ampleur des détournements sur les comptes de la Céni, mais ces millions de dollars se sont d’abord évanouis en liquide, malgré la directive de la Banque centrale qui limite les retraits sans justification à 10 000 dollars. Rien que sur l’année 2016, ce sont plus de 25 millions de dollars qui ont ainsi été retirés en liquide sur quatre comptes de la commission électorale à la BGFI BANK dont neuf millions soutirés en douze retraits depuis le compte « CENI INVESTISSEMENTS ».

5,6 millions sont retirés d’un autre compte dit « cash collatéral » sur lequel les retraits n’étaient pas autorisés. C’était l’un des deux comptes ouverts par la banque elle-même pour conserver les 30 milliards de francs congolais versés par la Céni et garantir la ligne de crédit de 25 millions de dollars qui devaient permettre d’amorcer l’enrôlement des électeurs. Cela fait partie des points soulevés en décembre 2017 par le cabinet PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) qui finalisait alors un rapport d’audit. « Nous tenons à signaler que le montant du cash collatéral de la Céni au 31 décembre 2017 (367 millions FC) ne couvre plus le risque de remboursement du fait de plusieurs prélèvements effectués sur ce cash collatéral au cours de la période sous revue, en contradiction avec les dispositions du contrat », alertent ses auteurs.

In December 2017, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) then finalized an audit report.

© PPLAAF / Mediapart

In addition, the people who make these withdrawals are not always formally authorized.

On June 28, 2017, a certain “ÉVELINE LOLONGA AKATSHI” manages to indirectly extract 580,000 dollars from an account of the CENI, under the wording “ 

guarantee fees

 ”.

This line of operation gets lost in the midst of the many other fees imposed by the bank.

Le vice-président de la Céni de l’époque, Norbert Basengezi, dit ne pas avoir d’informations sur cette opération. Mais pour lui, il ne faut pas reprocher à la centrale électorale ces millions retirés en liquide. « Connaissez-vous une banque à Djolu, Kinvula, Amisi, Hewa Bora ou à Bongandanga pour que désormais les agents de la Céni y touchent leur salaire par virement ou transfert? », pointe M. Basengezi. « La difficulté est que les agents non payés suspendent les opérations, il faut se remettre dans le contexte bancaire et financier de la RDC. »

Ces surfacturations présumées, assorties d’importants retraits en liquide coûtent cher à la Céni. Alors que des millions sont retirés en liquide ou disparaissent entre les mains d’intermédiaires, la BGFIBank prélève chaque mois aux environs d’un demi-million de dollars d’agios. Entre juin 2016 et septembre 2018, elle va même toucher plus de 4,5 millions par ce biais, malgré la multiplication de lignes de crédits et des prêts. En frais divers, elle va même toucher pendant cette période jusqu’à 8 millions de dollars. En prenant comme client la Céni, la BGFIBank a pris un risque, mais elle n’y perd pas vraiment.

 " 

The BGFIBank is the most criticized today, but it is like that with most of the country's banks and for most of the institutions

 ", still assures a former member of office of the Electoral Commission who confided in RFI .

“ 

It's not just a lack of information if no one reacts, there are a lot of accomplices in this heist that you don't name.

Members of the government and parliament obtained their posts solely through the corruption of the Ceni.

It is the basis of the Congolese political system until today

.

"

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