A “militia escalation” aims to destabilize the country
Dimensions of the assassination attempt on Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi
Al-Kazemi is facing increasing dangers.
Reuters
A destroyed vehicle in the residence of the Iraqi Prime Minister after he was attacked.
AFP
The entrance door to Al-Kazemi's residence after it was attacked.
Reuters
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The head of the Security Media Cell, Saad Maan, announced that Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazemi was subjected to an assassination attempt, by three drones, and the C-RAM air defense system of the US Embassy shot down two of them, while the third managed to carry out the attack. , without injuring anyone.
No party has claimed responsibility for the attack, while Al-Kazemi called for "calm and restraint."
Indications of the involvement of the popular crowd
Many indicators suggest that the popular crowd, and behind it Iran, is the main suspect behind the attempt to assassinate Al-Kazemi, which can be clarified as follows:
1 Pre-crowd operations
Historical precedents confirm that the parties that were targeting the Green Zone with drone attacks to strike American targets are the Popular Mobilization factions opposed to "Al-Kazemi", such as the Iraqi "Hezbollah" Brigades, "Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq" and "Sayyid al-Shuhada".
It has been proven that the Popular Mobilization factions are responsible for these operations, whether in the attacks in Baghdad, the attack on Erbil airport or American camps in Iraq, the latest of which was the targeting of the American Al-Tanf base in Syria with five drones.
On the other hand, it is noted that the attempt to attack Al-Kazemi was carried out using three drones, meaning that the perpetrator of the attack was keen to liquidate him. the next Iraqi government.
2 Anti-Kazemi crowd statements
A review of the statements of these factions reveals the extent of their hatred for the Prime Minister, which suggests that they are responsible for these attacks, even if they tried to disavow them.
On November 7, Abu Ali al-Askari, a security official in the Hezbollah Brigades, mocked the attempt to assassinate Al-Kazemi, saying: “No one in Iraq has even the desire to lose a drone over the house of a former prime minister.” He added: “If There are those who want to harm this Facebook creature, so there are very many ways, less expensive and more secure, to achieve this.” Al-Askari continued: “May God’s curse be on you and those who support you.”
Other factions of the Popular Mobilization, such as the Secretary-General of the "Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades", Abu Ala' al-Wala'i, and Qais al-Khazali, "the leader of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq", accused al-Kazemi of being involved in shooting demonstrators of supporters of those factions during the past two days in Baghdad, who gathered Hundreds of them to protest against its results, which implies that the attack on it was in retaliation for the attack on its supporters, especially since the drones were launched from the place where these elements demonstrated, before Asaib retracted its previous position, and affirmed that it frankly condemns this act if it was a real targeting. .
3 unrealistic Iranian accusations
In a statement issued on November 7, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh announced that Tehran condemns the attack carried out by drones on Al-Kazemi's residence.
It is strange that the first reaction came from the Secretary-General of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, who did not condemn the assassination attempt, but rather blamed the attempt on Al-Kazemi’s assassination on “foreign think tanks that supported terrorist groups and the occupation of Iraq,” a vague accusation that seems to be Iran is seeking through it to deny the accusation against it, or the Shiite militias associated with it.
Reasons for trying to liquidate Al-Kazemi
The attempt of Iran and the Popular Mobilization factions to liquidate Al-Kazemi can be traced back to the following factors:
1 Hold Al-Kazemi responsible for losing the elections
Al-Kazemi insisted on holding early parliamentary elections in October 2021, despite the rejection of some of the “coordinating framework” parties claiming that they did not prepare sufficiently for the elections. Especially since the elections were held on the third anniversary of the outbreak of the October 2019 protests. Perhaps what increased the level of popular frustration against the Popular Mobilization Forces was its involvement in the attempt to liquidate the October protests’ activists.
The previous developments were reflected in the performance of these parties, especially the Al-Fateh Alliance, which represents the Popular Mobilization militia, which obtained only 15 seats, and therefore these forces tended to hold Al-Kazemi responsible for losing the elections, leading to accusing him of rigging the elections, as announced by these factions, especially the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades. For her defense of the sacred entity, in reference to Parliament, with blood, which indicates her willingness to use violence to maintain the leadership of the political scene, which was done through the failed attempt to liquidate Al-Kazemi.
2 Rejection of Al-Sadr-Al-Kazemi's plans for the next government
The leader of the Sadrist movement, Muqtada al-Sadr, condemned the attempt to assassinate Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, describing the attack as an attempt to return Iraq to chaos and violence.
It is noted that some analyzes indicate the existence of an alliance between Al-Sadr and Al-Kazemi, in a way that may lead to Al-Kazemi’s re-election for prime minister, especially in light of their convergence in many situations, such as rejecting the weapons of the Popular Mobilization factions, and trying to strengthen Iraq’s independence from Baghdad, all of which raise concerns. Iran and its allies.
3 Al-Kazemi’s attempt to limit the influence of the popular crowd
Al-Kazemi sought, with varying degrees of success, to limit the influence of the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces, as he refused government funding for the Popular Mobilization Forces and sought to end the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces after the elimination of ISIS. One of its goals is to try to curtail the Popular Mobilization Forces.
It is noted that Muqtada al-Sadr, immediately after the announcement of the results of the recent parliamentary elections, explicitly referred to confronting the uncontrolled weapons in reference to the weapons of the Popular Mobilization militias, all of which are messages rejected by Iran and the Popular Mobilization militias.
Investing despite failure
Despite the failure of the Popular Mobilization factions to liquidate Al-Kazemi, they will use the incident to send the following messages:
1 Imposing Iran's militias on the next government
The Popular Mobilization factions see that raising the ceiling of tension and threatening direct military confrontations or assassinations of Al-Kazemi represents a path of pressure on the forces that won the elections, specifically the Sadrist bloc, the Sunni Progress Movement, and the Kurdish bloc, to adapt their positions and reach a formula that guarantees the participation of the losing Shiite forces in the elections in The new government.
Perhaps what confirms this meaning is the announcement by the Popular Mobilization factions, after the failed attempt to assassinate Al-Kazemi, that he will not obtain a second nomination to take over as prime minister, despite losing the parliamentary elections, in a way that makes them an ineffective party in the negotiations to form the next Iraqi government.
2 Confirmation of Iran's military control of Iraq
Iran and the forces associated with it are trying to ensure that the Iraqi arena is its first direct security circle, and that Tehran will continue its efforts to keep Iraq under its direct influence, regardless of the success of the upcoming negotiations in Vienna.
On the other hand, Iran sees that Al-Kazemi’s national project is incompatible with its orientations, goals and interests in Iraq, and is trying to send a message that Al-Kazemi’s stay in his position as prime minister will not guarantee stability and security in Iraq.
• It is noted that the attempt to attack Al-Kazemi was carried out using three drones, meaning that the perpetrator of the attack was keen to liquidate him, as it was not just an attempt to intimidate or intimidate, which indicates the presence of Iranian despair over the success of its Shiite allies in forming the next Iraqi government.
• Al-Kazemi sought, with varying degrees of success, to limit the influence of the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilization Forces, as he refused government funding for the Popular Mobilization Forces and sought to end the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces after the elimination of ISIS. One of its goals is to try to curtail the Popular Mobilization Forces.
future pressures
The Popular Mobilization factions tend to put pressure on the Sadrist movement and the Kurds not to take over the leadership of the next Iraqi government, in order to thwart its tendencies to open up to the Arab countries and get out of the Iranian sphere of influence.
Perhaps the commander of the “Quds Force” in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Ismail Qaani, went urgently to Baghdad on November 8, and met with the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic and with the conflicting Shiite parties with the declared aim of calming the situation, but aimed at trying to disavow Al-Kazemi’s assassination attempt, and to present itself as an arbiter between the Shiite factions, which aims in the end to pass the demands of its militias in Iraq, which, at a minimum, is to ensure their participation in the next government.
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