Lebanese officials are looking for ways to address the repercussions of the unprecedented Saudi measures towards Lebanon, after it requested the departure of Beirut's ambassador to Lebanon, and summoned its ambassador from Lebanon, Walid al-Bukhari, for consultations, and announced the halt of receiving all Lebanese imports;

This was against the background of statements by the Lebanese Minister of Information, George Kordahi, about the war in Yemen, and his solidarity with the Houthis.

At a moment of political, security and economic difficulty, Saudi measures - in the opinion of many - put Lebanon's relations with the Kingdom and Arab countries at a dangerous crossroads, with Bahrain and Kuwait taking similar measures to Saudi Arabia.

The Saudi measures revealed two levels of the crisis: a diplomatic crisis with political and economic dimensions with the Kingdom, which Lebanon is discussing by forming a ministerial crisis cell headed by Foreign Minister Abdullah Bouhabib, in coordination with President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Najib Mikati to address the repercussions of this development;

Bouhabib announced that they contacted the Americans to attend the meeting because they are able to address the crisis with Riyadh.

The second level is a government crisis;

Observers expect that the Saudi measures will threaten the cohesion of the government, because its texture reflects the nature of quotas and political balances in Lebanon.

Qardahi made media statements before assuming the position of Minister of Information, in which he described the war in Yemen as "absurd", and said that it must stop, and described what the Houthis are doing in self-defense.

Najib Mikati's government has convened only 3 times since its formation (French)

Who heals the rift?

Researcher and political analyst George Alam does not count on the ministerial cell's ability to heal the rift, because "the deterioration of relations with Saudi Arabia has reached a stage that requires external mediation, as a result of Lebanon's inability to withstand the Saudi and Gulf escalation."

He finds that tackling the crisis requires bridging the rift from within first, then agreeing on its mechanism, and that it is acceptable to Saudi Arabia, and to the counterweights in Lebanon, "which is divided vertically between the axis of Iran and its allies and the axis of Saudi Arabia and its allies."

While writer and political analyst Ali Hamadeh describes the composition of the ministerial cell as a hybrid, "because the foreign minister is part of a government run by Hezbollah, and the treatment is directly entrusted to the presidents of the republic and the government."

Hamadeh believes that the Gulf Cooperation Council countries take Saudi Arabia's positions into consideration, "which puts Lebanon at risk of severe Gulf isolation."

It is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will retreat from its escalation, and no external mediation is expected to succeed.

And if the mediation is French, it will be repaid because Riyadh sees the government as a product of Iranian-French complicity that has strengthened Hezbollah's influence, according to him.

He also believes that "Egypt will not interfere with mediation that is not in the interest and approval of Saudi Arabia."

government scenarios

Questions arise about the fate of the Mikati government, which met within a month after its formation only 3 times, and failed to hold a meeting on October 13, due to the demand of the ministers of Hezbollah and the Amal movement to dismiss the judicial investigator in the explosion of the port of Beirut, Tariq Al-Bitar, and what followed on the 14th of this month. The same month of bloody events in Tayouneh.

Here, writer and political analyst Wassim Bazzi finds that "forming the government did not suit Saudi Arabia, and it seeks to overthrow it, because it realizes that pushing Qardahi to resign means booby-trapping the government, and its fate is with Hezbollah one; either Qardahi will remain or everyone will fall."

Bazzi finds that Lebanon is going through a fateful transitional phase, after the parliamentary elections are in jeopardy, and the Aoun era has entered its final year.

He said that Mikati is a political expert and is aware of the location of the Gulf, "but he knows that the moment of international intersection that produced his government between Iran and France, and America behind it, still exists, and his government is a regional need to prevent the explosion of Lebanon, and no one bears the consequences of overthrowing his government."

It is expected that Saudi Arabia will not stop escalation if it does not reap the fruits regionally, which will exacerbate the internal stalemate, but Ali Hamadeh believes that the government started faltering, and the crisis with Saudi Arabia is capable of overthrowing it, “either it turns into a caretaker government, or it becomes close to falling.” ".

For his part, George Alam finds that Saudi Arabia is clear in its demands, and it may be difficult for Lebanon to implement them, recalling that the government's inability to meet compounds the Lebanese embarrassment, and the government's fate - in his opinion - depends on the position of Hezbollah and the expected mediations externally.


Differing positions

The political positions reflected internal turmoil;

On the one hand, former prime ministers called George Kordahi to resign, and the leader of the Future Movement, Saad Hariri, had previously blamed Hezbollah and the presidency for the diplomatic crisis with Riyadh.

On Saturday, the head of the Marada movement, Suleiman Franjieh (who named Qardahi the government) announced that he had rejected Qardahi's offer of resignation, "because he did not make a mistake."

Saudi Arabia linked its decisions yesterday to 3 justifications: George Qardahi's statements, the Lebanese authorities' failure to take strict measures to stop the export of drugs, Hezbollah's control of the Lebanese state and its accusation of supporting the Houthis in Yemen.

Accordingly, analysts' opinions varied between those who saw Saudi Arabia's measures as shocking, while others saw them as expected.

George Alam believes that "Riyadh's measures shocked the authorities and the Lebanese, and paved the way for strife and severing of relations, especially as they included the economic aspect and halting imports from Lebanon."

Ali Hamadeh finds that Saudi Arabia's measures are not a product of the moment, but rather the result of a cumulative course of Saudi anger at the approach of successive Lebanese governments to what the Kingdom sees as an attack on its security.

He believes that Qardahi's resignation is a detail, and "the crisis in Hezbollah's influence and the interactions of the Yemen war."

Hamadeh refuses to describe Saudi Arabia's measures as an escalation, because the attack is on it from Lebanon and not the other way around.

By “Hezbollah sending ballistic missiles to the Houthis and training their personnel.”

The actual problem - according to him - lies in Lebanon's role and position, and "the use of its lands as a platform to threaten Saudi national security and Iran's regional functions."