After nearly five years of diplomatic estrangement, and 42 years of the Cold War, both Saudi Arabia and Iran expressed their intention to resume talks sponsored by Iraq to bring the two countries together, who stand at opposite ends in most regional files. The current rounds aim to reach a sustainable agreement driven by several regional and international changes, the most important of which is the departure of one of the most important international parties pressuring Iran (the administration of former US President Donald Trump), the launch of the Arab normalization train with Israel last year, which Tehran considers an explicit danger, and the Gulf reconciliation that defused The crisis between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Although the talks between the two countries, the last of which was on September 21, 2020, did not lead to any official moves on the ground, there are several indications that they are gradually restoring water.

Signs of shifts in the Iranian official position were reinforced with the ascension of "Ebrahim Raisi", the conservative Iranian politician, to the presidency of the Republic in Iran. Raisi adopted a plan initiated by his predecessor, Hassan Rouhani, for normalization with Saudi Arabia, which was reflected in Iranian official statements in recent months. Mohammad Javad Zarif, the former Iranian foreign minister, stated that his country was ready to restore diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and resume exchanges with Saudi Arabia. ambassadors between the two countries. Then King Salman picked up the thread of the Iranian initiative through a rare statement from within the United Nations General Assembly, when he said: “Iran is a neighboring country, and we hope that the talks between us will build trust and cooperation.”Although the contradictions of interests and ideologies cannot be easily overcome, the two sides have gains from rapprochement and negotiation for the time being, and although it is not hoped that the conflict between them will be resolved radically, any potential diplomatic truce will enhance regional stability.

OPEC.. agreements out of sight

In fact, the first talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran began in September 2019, after targeting the Aramco oil company’s facilities with drones and cruise missiles, an attack that cost Saudi Arabia about two billion dollars due to the halt in production. While the world awaited a major escalation, with the possibility of a full-blown war in the Gulf if Washington or Riyadh decided to launch a deterrent military strike on Tehran, they did not take any retaliatory action against Iran, which denied any link to the incident, and even, contrary to what was expected, signs of calm and dialogue appeared on the lips of a minister Iranian oil, which described its counterpart in Riyadh as a friend for more than 22 years, followed by a statement by the Iranian government spokesman, in which he claimed that the former Iranian President “Hassan Rouhani” had received a letter from Riyadh delivered to him by the head of one of the countries (he did not name him). Noting any details about what was included in the letter, he commented that his country was ready for dialogue.Saudi Arabia has officially denied the Iranian narrative, but it has shown signs that it welcomes negotiations.

Unexpectedly, the Aramco attacks raised the stakes of calm between the two parties, as they led to an acceleration of sitting at the negotiating table, especially since the strike coincided with Iran’s oil production tumbling to its lowest level in three decades due to the imposition of economic sanctions that included a ban on the export of Iranian oil ( Iran produces 2.1 million barrels of oil daily), against the backdrop of Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018. Iran believes that Saudi Arabia played a major role in removing it from the oil market, and struck it more than once in killing within the “OPEC” organization through its insistence on a low level of oil production. Prices, and the Kingdom announced its willingness to bridge the production gap to support the American plan that targeted zeroing Iranian oil exports, and then announced raising its daily production rates by 700,000 barrels to reach 10.7 million barrels.

But Saudi Arabia quickly switched to a more flexible position, allowing Iran to extend the exception in the “OPEC Plus” agreement to cut production, which kept its oil revenues, which were damaged as a result of US sanctions, from declining, and this step was officially considered the end of Saudi Arabia’s use of “OPEC” as a weapon against Iran. .

Recently, the Kingdom presented a golden opportunity to Tehran by making voluntary cuts in its oil production at a rate of one million barrels per day, which was offset by an Iranian announcement of a significant increase in oil production rates.

According to a Reuters survey published in April, Iranian exports increased to 2.5 million barrels per day, after previously falling to only 300,000 barrels per day at the height of the Trump administration's pressure campaign.

Yemen.. direct negotiations between the two powers

Two years after the outbreak of the Yemen war, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman declared in 2017 that there are no meeting points between Riyadh and Tehran for dialogue and understanding. However, after the Arab coalition’s battles entered their seventh year without achieving their goals of restoring Yemeni legitimacy after the Houthi takeover of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, in late 2014, Riyadh found that the security of the Gulf had been damaged, and that there were points for dialogue with its opponent in Yemen away from the extreme demands of both parties.

Hence, Riyadh decided that there was no point in pursuing its original goals, and that the most effective and most profitable for its military budget, which was drained by the Yemen war, is direct negotiations with Iran, which is also suffering from the trouble of supporting its allies in northern Yemen. Saudi Arabia had previously asked the Iranian delegation, which met with its representatives in Iraq, to ​​dissuade Al-Houthi from targeting the Saudi interior and oil installations with ballistic missiles and drones. Intentions on the part of Riyadh, and an introduction to ending the war in Yemen.

Iran has many strengths on the negotiating table related to the Yemen war, especially in light of the Houthi military expansion and their approach to controlling the strategic city of Marib, the last stronghold of the legitimate government in the north.

Although the Iranian demands seem more daring than the peace initiative that Saudi Arabia adheres to to resolve the Yemeni crisis, as Tehran demands the signing of a power-sharing agreement between the government and the Houthis and a political settlement under the auspices of the two countries (i.e. Saudi Arabia and Iran), Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan said The four rounds with the Iranian side are still in the exploration stage, and what is new in these statements is that Saudi Arabia for the first time moved away from setting previous conditions before negotiating with Iran, and decided open and direct dialogue without restrictions, something that Tehran received positively.

Iran from within..other reasons for rapprochement

Ibrahim Raisi

Just as Iran has strong cards in the Yemeni file, Saudi Arabia, in turn, has strong cards in the economic file, especially since Iran is waiting for the full legal return of its oil exports, coinciding with the high prices that are in its favor and will revive its economy. Hence, Tehran - like Riyadh - finds that it needs to negotiate with its arch-rival to reach an agreement that reduces escalation in light of the developments in the internal and regional situation. With Raisi coming to power, Washington fears that the Iranian regime will not be keen on concluding international agreements, as it is affiliated with the hard-line movement, but Raisi pledged that the most important priorities of his new foreign policy will be to consolidate relations with China and Russia without provoking the United States, in addition On the rapprochement with India and Saudi Arabia, two important allies of Washington.

There are several external factors that also affected Iran from within, and paved the way for accelerating the pace of negotiations with Saudi Arabia, the most important of which is the departure of Trump, who was considered the most pressured party on Tehran, in addition to the occurrence of major regional changes such as the fall of the Afghan government and the rise of the Taliban, the start of the American withdrawal from Iraq, and the acceleration of the pace Arab-Israeli normalization, and Iran believes that Saudi Arabia can put obstacles in the way of the normalization train as a regionally influential country, apparently reserving the drift towards Tel Aviv, which several Arab capitals witnessed.

There are also strong voices within the Iranian official establishment that are pressing to restore relations with Saudi Arabia, or at least open the door for dialogue with it. Eshaq Jahangiri, the former Iranian first vice president, was the godfather of this opinion, as he called for quickly reaching an understanding with Saudi Arabia while he was in office.

Therefore, the Iranian regime needs to make progress in its negotiations with Saudi Arabia, as well as the return of the United States to the nuclear agreement and the abolition of economic sanctions, directions motivated by the desire to repair what was spoiled by the economic crisis in Iran.

Although the economy of the "resistance" helped the Islamic Republic reduce its dependence on oil and the West, the current government realizes that it needs a break, even if temporarily, because the economic conditions are much worse this time.

The fifth wave of the “Covid-19” pandemic hit the country and caused great economic damage, as prices rose by 40%, and the Iranian regime has become unable to cope with inflation in light of a large budget deficit.

The Iranian president is betting that his foreign policy will pull the economy out of its stumble, to be his trump card towards a second term.

Other important files .. Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq

Iraqi President Barham Salih and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman

If the negotiation rounds hosted by Iraq succeed, the dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran will end with the restoration of relations cut since mid-2016, but restoring relations to the point of exchanging embassies between the two countries requires major concessions. On the one hand, Iran accuses Saudi Arabia of supporting factions opposed to the Iranian regime at home and abroad, and of providing them with political and financial support, led by the "Jaish al-Adl" in southeastern Iran (which represents the Sunni opposition) and the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, while Riyadh accuses Tehran of supporting Shiite groups based in Qatif, in the east of the Kingdom, and interference in the affairs of Arab countries and support for groups considered terrorist by Saudi Arabia, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Yemeni Houthi group, and the popular crowd in Iraq.

The understandings may also include major shifts in the positions of the two countries, as the Saudi rapprochement with Iran leads to the acceptance of the Syrian regime as a fait accompli on the part of Riyadh, especially since it no longer requires his departure from power as was the case in the past decade, but in return requires the departure of Iran and its militias from Syrian Arab Republic. According to the leaks published by the "Arabi Post" website, quoting sources familiar with the recent meeting between Iranian and Saudi officials, Iran expressed through the discussions its agreement that Saudi Arabia would play a role in the reconstruction of Syria, and that it would invest in Syria in the future, and the same would include Iraq as well, after Saudi companies withdrew from investing in Iraq previously due to harassment from Iraqi political parties and armed groups affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces.

It cannot be ignored either that the timing of the Iranian openness to Saudi Arabia and the desire to reach an understanding with it coincide with the fall of the Afghan government and the rise of the Taliban.

The former Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, warned that if Iran made itself an enemy of the Taliban, several Gulf countries would try to fund it to target Tehran, weaken it and divert its attention from Iraq and the countries in which Iran has political and military arms.

Iran believes that the possibility of forming an anti-Sunni political system pushes it to rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, and in return, Saudi Arabia expects that the talks will result in reaching a formula of understanding regarding Lebanon, which is witnessing a severe economic crisis, but the Kingdom will not support Lebanon as long as “Hezbollah” dominates It is an issue that leads to doubt the possibility of the success of the current truce course.

Back to the Cold War

Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz

Although each party has abandoned its old conditions prior to disengaging from its rival, Riyadh currently does not agree to the Iranian condition of opening embassies first, which Iran considers a necessary request and evidence of goodwill, and Iraq, which hosts the negotiations, does not seem capable of playing the role of mediator. The actual issue in this matter, being in the end relative to one of the parties, all that Baghdad offers is the “passive” mediation in order to bring the two parties to one table, and not the “effective” mediation in order to reach a comprehensive agreement with them. Hence, the negotiations will most likely restore calm to the hostility between the two capitals, to take its old "cold" phase instead of its hot, raging phase since 2011, a position that is relatively comfortable for both parties, and incurs fewer losses compared to the current escalation.

An old telegram issued by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leaked by WikiLeaks in 2015, refers to the reasons for the impossibility of a full settlement between Riyadh and Tehran, as the Kingdom sees that Iran is seeking to stir up Shiites inside Saudi Arabia and use its influence in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon against the interests of the Kingdom, as well as It aims to separate southern Yemen from its north, a desire that was later revealed by the Houthi movements to establish a state in the north.

It does not seem, then, that the Islamic Republic, which has remained for four decades since the outbreak of its revolution in 1979, will easily abandon the ideas of its revolution, which it sought to spread in the Islamic world, east and west, just as it will not abandon its victories in Yemen, its influence in Syria, its presence in Lebanon, nor its control in Iraq, and in On the other hand, it does not appear that Riyadh will accept a comprehensive reconciliation with the Wilayat al-Faqih regime in light of the presence of its arms in several Arab countries, and it will not allow a comprehensive normalization between it and the West that would allow it to launch politically and economically at the expense of the Gulf, in addition to that, of course, an endless competition for religious leadership in the world. Islam between the two Islamic systems. However, the two sides, despite their hostility to each other, cannot face the consequences of escalation forever, and therefore it seems that sitting at the negotiating table is better than searching for a final comprehensive victory that will not come to one of them.

Lebanese journalist Kim Ghattas says, in an article for the British newspaper, The Guardian, that the painful truth for Saudi Arabia is that it needs the Iranian regime to survive without its fall or alliance with it. Regionally, the American-Iranian hostility also helped it acquire strategic weight in the Gulf region as a central hub for Western and international security. It played the role of the indispensable balancing force for all in confronting Iran, in contrast to a more subtle role before the Islamic revolution when Tehran and Riyadh shared the role of protecting stability. in the Gulf region.

In addition, the Washington-Riyadh alliance may lose many of its bases if the Iranian regime remains completely, and therefore it can be said that the current moves and the existing public consensus do not aim to reach an agreement as much as they are common desires to reduce escalation in a way that restores life to the Iranian economy, which it did not have Riyadh never wants to bring it to its full knees, as well as to defuse the war in Yemen to ease its burden on Riyadh, and after that comes the attempts to resolve the outstanding regional crises between the two parties at the negotiating table, and not through the mutual military or economic strikes that seem to have exhausted the two parties too much.