Iraq elects .. Will the generation of protests succeed in overcoming the curse of sectarianism and corruption?

On January 3, 2020, the world reported the news of the killing of "Qassem Soleimani", the commander of the Quds Force in the Revolutionary Guards, and the spearhead of his foreign military policies, amid fears that the consequences of his killing would ignite a war between Washington and Tehran, although the latter was satisfied with preserving The face of it by directing several military strikes that did not cause huge losses in the ranks of the American forces in Iraq, the real war caused by the American strike, unexpectedly, erupted among the ranks of the armed militiamen loyal to Iran in Iraq, and its direct victim was a man whose fate was linked, without He knows, on that day, "Hisham Al-Hashemi".

Al-Hashemi was one of the shadow men in Baghdad, and one of the rare few with experience in the affairs of the armed movements, and with a deep and friendly relationship with its leaders, both Sunni and Shiite, and by adding the element of personal friendship that I gathered with "Mustafa Al-Kazemi", the former intelligence chief and the current prime minister, Pat Al-Hashemi The man needed when it came to consulting on the affairs of the Iraqi armed movements by the Iraqi leadership itself, or by the Americans as well.

Hisham Al Hashemi

This did not make al-Hashemi a less controversial person, as his history was associated with a number of sharp transformations, from the Shiite sect to the Sunni sect in the late nineties, and from the ranks of the Sunni fighters in Fallujah in the early 2000s to the ranks of researchers and government advisors after that, although this did not prevent him from gaining the approval of leaders Shiite armed movements, led by "Qassem Soleimani" and "Mahdi Al-Muhandis," whose killing was considered an end to the immunity that al-Hashemi had enjoyed for a long period from the threats of Shiite groups, especially after his support for the popular movement that erupted prior to their death.

Iraqi youth took to the streets in October 2019 calling for economic reforms, the elimination of corruption and an end to the foreign presence (the American and Iranian), which threatened the pillars of the deep state of the Iranian-backed militias, and put their agenda to the test, especially with the reports and statements that Al-Hashemi began publishing. Attached is information about the leaders of these groups, their armaments, and their areas of strength and influence. Therefore, it was not surprising that the armed militias put him on the "death lists" that they assigned to the names of the most famous youth of the Iraqi popular movement, and the loudest voice in the media and on social media. (1)

The aim of the assassination attempts was to prevent the formation of a front of Iraqi street youth to compete in the upcoming parliamentary elections at the time, and since the outbreak of the protests so far, more than thirty assassinations out of eighty have been carried out by unknown elements, none of whom have been arrested until now, and among the successful attempts The assassination of al-Hashemi in July 2020 in front of his house and his sons embodies the power of the militias and their indifference to the status of the man, and the status of any of those who sought to curb their influence in Baghdad.

(2)

Iraq Spring

Popular protests are not new to the Iraqi street. They began since 2011 in conjunction with the Arab revolutions, and almost regularly every year, in a series of popular uprisings whose causes ranged from demands for employment and improvement of public services, especially water and electricity, to political reform and an end to corruption. rampant in state institutions. Although these demands have not changed since then and until 2019, the recent protests carried an unprecedented nature, not only because of the huge popular presence, but also because of the mounting anger at the security conditions associated with the rule of militias and their penetration into the security services, which doubled the strength and continuity of the protests, Which did not succeed with the security crackdown and targeting of demonstrators with rubber bullets, live bullets and tear gas, and the killing of nearly 600 demonstrators. (3)

But the popular movement itself did not succeed in doing much on the ground at first, as the government of "Adel Abdul-Mahdi" at that time turned its ears to the demands of the street, and then released the hand of the security services to suppress the protests, which are the devices made up of former Shiite militia members and implicitly loyal to Iran. However, the continuation of popular pressure eventually wrote the end of the government of Abdul-Mahdi, who submitted his resignation to the House of Representatives on December 1, 2019, leaving Iraq for several months of a political vacuum that was only filled by Mustafa Al-Kazemi after he headed the new government in May 2020.

Overburdened by the demands and concerns of the street, the new government had to work to find quick and effective solutions to decades of mismanagement, corruption, economic depression and wars, which was complicated by the start of the “Covid-19” epidemic that swept the world, and its effects on the global economy caused more stumbles for the Iraqi economy. Based on oil and gas exports, which in turn are affected by the epidemic.

Hence, the price of a barrel of oil fell to $56 in 2020, after it was at its highest level in the previous year;

Causing a new crisis that was not in Al-Kazemi's mind.

(4)

Mustafa Al-Kazemi

The Iraqi spring ended almost completely with the cessation of protests within the measures of distancing and imposing a curfew that accompanied the epidemic, and although this did not stop the campaign of assassinations among the leaders of the popular movement, the problems of the health sector and the budget inability to meet the needs of millions who depend on the government (such as workers in the sector Public) as a main source of income, whether in salaries or pensions, in addition to the continuing electricity, water and public services crises, all of this caused preoccupation with the assassinations and protests, and attention to the reform attempt that Al-Kazemi adopted.

cobwebs

The formation of the “Emergency Cell for Financial Reform” was one of the first decisions issued by Al-Kazemi after heading the new government, according to which the cell was formed on May 12, 2020 with the aim of studying the financial and economic conditions and developing the necessary solutions to get the country out of its crisis, and formulating these proposals within a program agreed upon and legally legitimized. and to ensure that the necessary measures are taken to implement it after that.

The cell did not take long, and after more than twenty official meetings that were held between May and August 2020, the results of the cell’s research and studies came out within what is now known as the “white paper” of the Iraqi government. The paper detailed in precise detail how the Iraqi economy reached this degree of stagnation and growth stagnation starting in the seventies of the last century, when the state employed oil revenues to serve its interests, and volunteered all public services and interests to be in its hands without others, passing through its inability to open a path for small economies Especially for growth, then the outbreak of the first and second Gulf wars. This state-centric path has never deviated from his path, and thus the state has gained direct or indirect control over the various sectors of the economy. (5)

Then the American invasion came, courting the Iraqis with the possibility of improving social and economic conditions, but the cycle of internal battles and sectarian fighting and the exploitation of oil resources to treasure wealth and settle accounts internally and externally, along with the sectarian quota system that was followed after the fall of Saddam Hussein, opened the way to put sectarian affiliation and special interests on Accounting for the general interest of the Iraqi people, sectarian and ethnic parties with military arms, funding sources and external relations of their own were formed, so that this complex militia network replaced the grip of Saddam Hussein's regime, without a fundamental change in the equation of tyranny and corruption, to which fragmentation was only added.

These problems coincided with a steady increase in population growth in the period between 2004-2020, where the population increased from 26.3 to 40.2 million people, and an increase rate of 42% for those under the age of thirty years, which reached the percentage of young people (under 30 years old). ) to 66% of the Iraqi population in 2020. And if we take into account that the public sector is the largest and most important employment sector in the country, and that this sector is already experiencing difficulties in paying the salaries of its current employees and the pensions of retired ones;

It shows us the size of the obstacles that the Iraqi government faced in dealing with the economic crisis.

A thousand Saddam and Saddam

"Saddam is gone, and a thousand Saddam has come to us." These were the words of Kazem Sharif Hassan al-Jabouri, one of Saddam Hussein's former men whom Saddam abandoned among thousands of others and thrown into prisons for a year and a half. And when the Americans entered Iraq, Al-Jabouri became one of those who helped bring down the famous statue of Saddam Hussein in Al-Firdaws Square in the capital, Baghdad. Although he regretted participating in this act afterwards, the number of "Saddam's thousand" he talked about seems much less than the real number, as Iraq today is crowded with thousands of Saddam's men and enemies alike, who took advantage of his downfall to build their own glory.

The Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades was one of these groups that was formed several months before the American invasion, and it claimed jihad against the American occupier in Iraq while working in secret to achieve its own interests. Al-Hashemi wrote about it before his death, and perhaps this is one of the reasons that precipitated his assassination by men affiliated with the battalions, as some claim. The pro-Iranian brigades, made up of several different arms, have their own group of companies, and they work in collecting money from smuggling operations through the ports and crossings they control, and through which they allow the passage of ISIS members and their families, as well as using them to control the entry and exit of goods.

Hezbollah Brigades is only one of a wide network of militias affiliated with Tehran, and it has explicitly returned during the recent wave of demonstrations, and it is believed that it is behind many assassinations since that period until this moment, and it is within the network of the Popular Mobilization Control, which includes hundreds of thousands of fighters who They joined the Iraqi security services after the end of the war against ISIS, and although they receive their salaries from the general budget allocated to security, this did not prevent them from conducting their own operations on the sidelines of their official missions.

These armed and foreign-financed military groups not only threaten the security and stability of Iraq, but also threaten its foreign relations due to their close association with Iran, and thus Tehran's friendships and animosities, which constantly complicate Iraqi foreign policy. These groups have parties and men representing them in the Iraqi system of government that it built efficiently over the 18 years of the American invasion, which is one of the main reasons that prompted Iraqi youth to go out in massive protests since 2019, seeking to break free from the complex and complex grip.

In any case, it is not believed that these protests or others across Iraq alone are capable of making a huge difference in the country's future, at least the immediate, as the armed groups are sending messages of their ongoing assassinations, warning those who try to encroach on their political influence. As for the Iraqi government, which came with calls for economic and security change, it is cautiously trying to trim the nails of some of the military militias, at least opposing Al-Kazemi, even if it could not stand for a man like Al-Hashemi despite his personal friendships with senior statesmen and Al-Kazemi himself, just as it did not defend itself when the militia members besieged The Green Zone threatened war as the government did not release Qassem Musleh, who was accused of assassinations and bombings against American forces.

Despite this, Iraqi youth still have an opportunity to take the initiative in today's parliamentary elections, which many expect to witness a turnout from young people who started their path from the field for a more united homeland and a political project more interested in them and away from sectarian equations. In today’s Iraq, there are young people of a new generation, most of whom were born after 2003 or shortly before, and have only seen or are aware of the militia’s brutality, unlike their parents who witnessed Saddam’s brutality, and they do not belong to the sectarian parties that dominate the scene, but rather seek a unified Iraq. He was never seen.Apparently, the wheel of history in Iraq has begun to turn, contrary to what the sectarian leaders and their patrons in Tehran desire, and although it still holds the reins of power, weapons and oil, its golden age is on the way to fading and its grip will only witness more disintegration in favor of new projects, Al-Kazemi is trying to He will be one of them, and the boxes alone will tell us today whether the man has succeeded in convincing the majority of Iraqis, and the youth in particular, that he is the right man for this task.

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Sources