Stratfor: New political divisions and challenges at the door with the end of the war in Syria

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American website "The Stratfor" stated that, with the war in Syria approaching its end, a new dispute emerged between the reformists within the regime and the hardliners, casting a shadow over Moscow's options and the relationship with Iran and other internal and external forces.

The site's analyst, Ryan Paul, says that the reformists within the system want to re-engage with the world in exchange for the desire of the hardliners to maintain tight control over the country's economy and political system.

He added that Russia - a crucial military ally of Damascus, whose intervention turned the tide of the war in the country - will be forced to play the role of mediator between the two parties (reformists and militants) to end the endless cycles of violence in Syria without endangering its situation.

first bubbles

Paul explains that with the end of the military emergency of the war in Syria, food issues have returned to the forefront of the country's rigid policies, and with the deepening economic and social crises, protests have emerged even in government strongholds such as Damascus, as Syrians took to the streets to express their anger at the lack of fuel, among other grievances. Against this background, the first bubbles of a possible new phase of turmoil appeared.

He said that even the Alawites - the main supporters of the Assad government - had become more emboldened in their complaints about economic policies, and began to pressure Damascus to find ways to restore trade relations with the outside world, as well as those close to them had become victims of the government's policies.

Reconnecting with the outside world would mean concessions to the opposition, and likely take the form of a deal that either federalizes Syria, or weakens the powers of the presidency, or both, something hard-liners in the regime hate, and there are few indications that the inner circle is ready. To concede now, especially after achieving a strategic military victory in Daraa.

Russia and Iran

However, Paul says the militants do not have a complete monopoly on what happens in Syria, and the regime's two main security partners (Russia and Iran) also have a say, particularly amid the regime's dwindling army over the past decade of war and population migration.

Russia has already sent signals that it prefers a less risky approach than civil war, while maintaining detente with the United States, while halting de-escalation agreements with both the armed opposition and Turkey.

Russian pressure

At a time when Syria's economic isolation undermines the sentiments of some loyalists, and threatens the resumption of civil unrest;

Moscow also wants Assad to support reformists within the government, press for reconciliation with at least some opposition groups, and ultimately wants the regime to move away from a scorched-earth strategy for fear of "purging" more Syrians and pushing the country away from reconstruction.

With the end of the civil war - according to the article - Russia may have to take greater risks in pursuing its strategy, which aims to maintain its naval base in Tartus and rebuild credibility as a superpower in the region, goals that depended on the Assad government remaining in power.

And if Russia decides to back Assad even as the Syrian economy collapses further, Moscow is likely to play a deeper role in calming tensions between hardliners and reformists.

In Daraa, Russia appears to have avoided a costly military offensive by mediating between the opposition and the regime, a role that Moscow has also played in Idlib, eastern Damascus, and elsewhere in the country.

From intervention to partial occupation

Now, Russia could face the prospect of having to balance the middle classes, the poor, the merchants in Damascus, and the Alawites in Latakia against a hard-line inner circle;

These tensions can sometimes erupt into violence, and while a repeat of the mass uprisings of 2011 is unlikely, such unrest could force the Russian military to play the role of a peacemaker and turn its intervention into an occupation in parts of the country.

On the other hand, if Russia uses its influence to try to push hardliners toward reform, it risks alienating members of Assad's inner circle who play a key role in maintaining Moscow's position in Syria.

He explains that this hard-line circle relies on Iranian support for much of its security, knowing that Tehran supports an all-out war to impose complete control over Syria, and as a result may encourage resistance to Russian reform demands.

Paul concludes his analysis that the excluded regime loyalists may also force Moscow to choose between ending its intervention in Syria at the risk of leaving the field to Iran and Syrian militants, or perhaps reviving Moscow's Cold War-era tactics to try to select the leaders of its allies.