An American academic: The collapse of Afghanistan may mean difficulties for the enemies of the United States

In an article by an American academic and researcher, "The National Interest" magazine dealt with the repercussions of the collapse of the regime in Afghanistan at the hands of Taliban fighters, and what this might mean for the troubles that may affect the enemies of the United States.

Mark Katz, a professor of political science at George Mason University in Virginia and a non-resident scholar at the Atlantic Council, wrote that many observers, past and present, have speculated that the fall of "corrupt authoritarian" regimes allied to the United States would lead to their replacement by even more horrific regimes. tyrannical.

He adds that these alternative regimes have been and will continue to be hostile to the United States, and they have been and will continue to exercise greater oppression on their people and pose a greater threat to their immediate neighbors than the regimes that were overthrown.

He went on to say that among the many examples of the fall of tyrannical regimes allied to Washington, they were replaced by other opponents of it, what happened in China in 1949, in Indochina in 1975, and in Iran in 1979. He expected that this approach would continue with the return of the Taliban movement to power in Afghanistan.

struggles

But the writer goes on to say that there is something else that often - if not always - happens after a pro-American regime is replaced by an anti-US regime, which is the outbreak of a dangerous conflict between America's enemies.

This happened many times, as soon as the Communists seized power and established the People's Republic of China in 1949, until the Sino-Soviet dispute emerged in a blatant manner and continued until the end of the Cold War.

The fighting that erupted along the border between the two countries in 1969 was about to turn into a wider war.

After the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie, an ally of the United States in Ethiopia in 1974, and his replacement by a Marxist-Leninist regime, a war broke out between the new government and the pro-Soviet regime in neighboring Somalia between 1977-1978.

When Moscow's attempts to mediate between its two Marxist allies failed, Somalia broke away from the Soviet camp and joined the Western camp.

After the American withdrawal from the Indochina region in 1973 and the Marxist seizure of power in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in 1975, Vietnam - an ally of Moscow - invaded its pro-Beijing neighbor Cambodia in 1978, and China clashed with Vietnam in a short war along their common border in 1979.

The common concern of the United States and Vietnam at that time contributed to the improvement of relations between them, and that was during the era of US President Bill Clinton, and the situation has continued in this way since then.

In Iran, as soon as the Shah, Washington’s ally, fell and the Islamic Republic was established in that country in 1979, a war took place between it and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq from 1980 to 1988. Despite the hatred that the two countries had for America and the West, Tehran stood on the sidelines when the coalition led by the coalition was expelled US Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, according to Mark Katz.

The two anti-American regimes in Tehran and Baghdad continued to monitor each other until 2003, when the coalition toppled Saddam Hussein, opening Iraq to the expansion of Iranian influence.

After the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq in 2011, the Shiite Arab-dominated Baghdad government - which has close ties to Tehran - faced an "existential threat" from the "Sunni jihadist" Islamic State in 2014, as the National Interest article described.

This organization was not only against the West, but also against the Shiites and Iran.

Perhaps Iran would have had to make much greater efforts to protect its Arab Shiite allies and its influence in Iraq had the United States not intervened again in Iraq to fight ISIS there, which relieved it of such a burden.

Likewise, America's military action against the Islamic State in Syria has spared both Russian and Iranian forces from engaging in direct combat with that group's fighters.

Taliban leaders during the process of taking over the presidential palace in Kabul yesterday (Al-Jazeera)

Does this apply to Afghanistan?

Since the overthrow of pro-US governments in the past was often followed by a struggle between their enemies, the question arises whether this will happen again, especially in Afghanistan?

Researcher Katz answers that there is no guarantee that this will happen of course, noting that although the Taliban had not yet seized power from the Washington-backed Kabul government - until the time of this article was published - the anti-American regimes in Russia, China and Iran began She is in a state of nervous tension over the negative effects that the possibility of the movement's return to power may have on these countries.

According to the author, China does not want the Taliban to support the opposition of the Muslim Uighur minority in Xinjiang, which borders Afghanistan, and Russia does not want the movement to harm Moscow's secular allies in Central Asia.

As for Iran, it also does not want to see the Taliban provide support to the Sunni opposition to the Shiite mullahs' regime in Tehran.

Finally, while Pakistan has been providing support to the Taliban (in this case Islamabad should be considered hostile to the United States), the Taliban's return to power has the potential to cause problems for Pakistan.

There are many opportunities - it seems - to repeat the pattern of the enemies of America in Afghanistan turning against each other in the event of the fall of the Kabul government and the return of the Taliban to power.

This scenario may happen in Iraq as well.

Given that this pattern of events has occurred so many times in the past, the potential for a recurrence appears high.

However, this does not mean - according to Mark Katz - that the United States does not care about the fall of allied governments and the possibility of replacing them with other hostile ones, as Washington's enemies will most likely establish relations of a discord among them anyway.

The US government must be prepared for such a scenario and, therefore, seek to seize this opportunity when the opportunity arises.

Sometimes, America's enemies, who have turned on each other, may increase the possibility of Washington's cooperation with a former enemy and consider it an ally against a common "enemy", as the United States did with Vietnam in the face of China.

At other times, perhaps the best option is for the United States to simply do nothing while its enemies and those of the West shed their venom on each other.

Above all, Washington should be careful about how one of its enemies might unwittingly benefit from its intervention against another.

For example, the United States, in its intervention against the Islamic State, ended up serving Iranian interests.

Mark Katz concludes that the fall of the Kabul government and the return of the Taliban is "extremely painful" for the Afghan people, adding that it is also an indication of the failure of the American efforts that took two decades to build an Afghan government that is more capable and attractive than the Taliban movement.

He adds that the United States will have to deal with the situation that will come into being, regardless of whether it is undesirable.

At the conclusion of his article in the National Interest, the writer believes that the possibility of a conflict between the Taliban and the enemies of the United States may provide them with opportunities that they can benefit from, but this requires them to be aware of the opportunities and risks of dealing with conflicts between their enemies.