The top leaders and members of nearly 10 provincial-level rural credit cooperatives have been sacked
Why the Rural Credit Cooperatives are Corrupted Frequently
Our reporter Han Yadong
In July of this year, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced that Tong Tieshun, the former party secretary and chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Rural Credit Cooperatives Union, was prosecuted for alleged bribery; in June, he was a member of the party committee and deputy director of the Sichuan Rural Credit Cooperatives Union. Wang Ting, the vice chairman, was announced as "double opening"; in May, Sun Bin, former party committee member and deputy director of the Anhui Rural Credit Cooperative Union, was announced as "double opening"; in April, the party secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Rural Credit Cooperative Union, Chairman Wang Zhongyin is under review and investigation... Recently, a group of leading cadres of rural credit cooperatives have been investigated and punished, sending a clear signal of resolutely cutting off the chain of corrupt interests in the rural credit sector.
Since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, among the 31 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities across the country, nearly 10 provincial-level rural credit unions such as Liaoning, Shaanxi, Anhui, Sichuan, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Hainan, Shandong, etc. have been downgraded. In some places, there have even been cases of decay and continuation of the case.
Why did the provincial-level rural credit unions become the worst-hit areas of corruption?
Judging from the situation of the case, what are the main tricks used by the leaders of the rural credit cooperatives to make money?
Regarding the system and supervision loopholes exposed in the case, how to use the case to promote the reform and the case to promote the governance?
1 The “top leaders” and members of rural credit cooperatives in many provinces were dismissed, and some of them still accepted millions of dollars in bribes after their leaders were detained and many colleagues were committed.
In recent years, there have been frequent cases of provincial-level rural credit unions, and in some places there has even been a phenomenon of stray cases and stubborn cases.
From 2015 to 2018, Luo Min, the deputy secretary and director of the Provincial Associated Press, who was regarded as the "troika" of the Yunnan Provincial Associated Press, Wan Renli, the former party secretary and chairman of the board, and Jiang Zhaogang, the former party secretary, fell.
In 2018, Song Wenxuan, the former party secretary and chairman of the Shandong Associated Press, was "double-opened", and Wu Weixiong, the former party secretary and chairman of the Hainan Associated Press, was expelled from the party.
From 2019 to 2020, Yang Alin, the former deputy secretary and chairman of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Associated Press, was expelled from the party, and Tong Tieshun, the former party secretary and chairman, was investigated and punished.
In 2020, Chen Peng, the former party secretary and chairman of the Anhui Provincial Associated Press, and Sun Bin, a member and deputy director of the Provincial Associated Press, were down. The Shanxi Associated Press also broke a nest case. The former party secretary and director Cui Lianhui, the former deputy party committee Secretary, vice chairman and director Xing Liang, former full-time deputy secretary and deputy chairman of the party committee Wang Zhongze, and former deputy secretary of the party committee Wang Zaisheng were investigated and punished.
In 2021, Yang Jianxin, the principle chairman of the Shaanxi Provincial Associated Press, and Wang Xuming, the deputy director, and Wang Zhongyin, the party secretary and chairman of the Liaoning Associated Press, are under review.
Some leading cadres are greedy, bold, extravagant, bad in nature and serious in circumstances.
For example, Chen Peng, the former party secretary and chairman of the Anhui Provincial Associated Press, has been asked by China Insurance General Manager Deng Moumou to help him promote insurance in the provincial rural commercial bank system since 2011.
Under Chen Peng's instruction, Deng Moumou thought that Chen Peng was celebrating his birthday, and organized many dinners and invited the chairman of various rural commercial banks to participate. Chen Peng and his wife tried their best to be the platform.
The rural commercial banks "will respond to requests", and more than 50 rural commercial banks participated in the insurance (about 2/3 of the provincial rural commercial banks), with a total amount of more than 9.696 billion yuan. The relevant purchase behavior continued until 2019, and Chen Peng accepted Deng Moumou's bribe of more than 60 million yuan.
Sun Bin went from the director of the Provincial Associated Press Office to the Deputy Director of the Provincial Associated Press to the Deputy Mayor of Hefei and then back to the Provincial Associated Press. He was corrupt all the way and dared to collect any money. He was detained in Chen Peng and several senior executives of the rural commercial bank were involved in the case. Later, he still accepted millions of dollars in bribes.
He has long been greedy for pleasure and loves to play golf. He plays golf in all over the country, and he will definitely play every weekend. He is addicted to gambling, and the amount of winning or losing in a gambling is tens of thousands of yuan. He was gambling in Huangshan the day before he was detained. Chaos transactions are all negotiated at the mahjong table.
The so-called "the upper beam is not right and the lower beam is crooked", and the "big rat beetles" unearthed by the crime scene, in addition to the leaders of the provincial association, there are also cadres from various rural commercial banks and county and township credit cooperatives under their supervision.
After Chen Peng fell, 13 executives from the Agricultural Commercial Bank of Anhui Province were investigated one after another.
The Yang Alin case caused more than 400 people in the Inner Mongolia Rural Commercial Bank system to be involved in the case, and more than 10 executives were investigated.
Under the "demonstration" effect of Wan Renli and other leading cadres, the collection and delivery of gifts within the rural credit cooperative system of Yunnan Province became a trend.
The investigator said that the “top leader” of the Provincial Associated Press and members of the team were not upright and took the lead in corruption, which would almost inevitably lead to the spread of corruption in the whole system and severe damage to the political ecology.
2 Corruption problems in the leadership positions of rural credit cooperatives mostly occur in the links of credit approval, personnel adjustment and infrastructure construction
According to the case handling personnel, judging from the situation of the case, corruption problems in the leadership positions of rural credit cooperatives mostly occurred in credit approval, personnel adjustment and infrastructure construction.
He has repeatedly intervened in the credit business and regarded the power of credit approval as a "cornucopia."
Some rural commercial bank executives have misaligned political and commercial relations, bank-enterprise relations, and issued favored loans and relationship loans. Although the provincial association does not directly handle the credit business, it has a great say in the supervisory unit of each rural commercial bank.
The Rural Credit Cooperative of Yunnan Province is known as "the largest bank in Yunnan."
The verdict showed that many loans handled by Luo Min were released by "greeting".
For example, she sought profits for Gui Yong, the owner of Yunnan Bangye Landscaping Company, in corporate loans and real estate sales, and received a bribe of more than 1 million yuan and a peacock picture worth 240,000 yuan.
Jiang Zhaogang had close contacts with Wu Minzhang, former member of the Standing Committee of the Yunnan Provincial Party Committee and Secretary of the Secretary-General Cao Jianfang. Because the development of a project requires a loan and credit, Wu Minzhang and the chairman of Yunnan Renze Real Estate Company Chen Yong invited Jiang Zhaogang to dinner.
At the dinner table, Jiang Zhaogang called Li Hongkun and Li Ming, then chairman of the rural credit cooperatives in Panlong District, Kunming, to "let them take care of Chen Yong."
Renze Real Estate applied for a loan of 700 million yuan and a loan of 390 million yuan from the Panlong District Rural Credit Cooperative. Chen Yong bribed Jiang Zhaogang 200,000 yuan.
"The rural commercial banks of various provinces are deeply connected with the local economy. These illegal and criminal cases with the background of power and money trading and financial violations as means are extremely harmful to the society." Li Xiaodong, deputy director of the Ninth Discipline Inspection and Supervision Office of the Anhui Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, told reporters. The investigators colluded with illegal businessmen inside and outside, using their power, through illegal lending, misappropriation of funds, and illegal issuance of financial tickets, so that a large amount of funds illegally flowed into the “two high and one overcapacity” and real estate and other state-controlled industries, the stock market, or even not at all. The "shelf company" with the ability to repay has caused serious harm to the local business environment and economic development.
Lax checks on employment qualifications, avoidance of relatives, exchanges and rotations, etc., and the problems of relationship, background, and "inbreeding" are prominent.
For example, Chen Peng's "double open" notice directly pointed out that he "violated organizational discipline, used his power to seek personnel benefits for others, and received property in violation of rules and regulations."
The investigator revealed that Chen Peng was nepotism, money, and authority, and accepted bribes from about 40 people in the system. He also convened the Provincial Associated Press Party Committee to express consent and greeted relevant rural and commercial bank executives to seek promotion for relevant personnel. The transfer of personnel interests, such as the recruitment of relatives and friends, has seriously damaged the political ecology of the provincial rural commercial bank system and caused severe impacts.
In addition, Yang Alin, Wu Weixiong and others were also notified that “accepting property from others in the process of adjustment and promotion of cadres’ positions” and “violating regulations interfered with the recruitment and employment of the provincial rural credit cooperative system”. Among them, the Yang Alin case was determined by the Supervisory Committee of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Commission for Discipline Inspection. "A relatively typical case of corruption in which a leading cadre of a financial institution took advantage of the personnel power of the cadre to accept bribes and madly accumulate wealth."
A large amount of money has been invested in infrastructure and other areas, but some of the bidding procedures are not standardized, which brings opportunities for corruption.
Sun Bin regards the informatization construction in charge as a "private territory" and accepts it from the boss of a Shanghai company who has a cooperative relationship with the provincial association in mobile phone shield, mobile banking, community e-banking, and Jinnongxin e-loan. The company’s 5‰ equity (valued at 6 million yuan), through his lover Li Moumou, received 10% of the company’s 10% equity interest in Nanjing, the boss of a certain company in Nanjing, who cooperated with the Provincial Associated Press to carry out business cooperation such as the "Yintietong" project and grid marketing system. (Worth 500,000 yuan), 400,000 yuan "commission fee" and 30,000 yuan shopping card, and also asked for a car worth more than 550,000 yuan.
3 There are loopholes in the system and supervision, and the lack of an effective power supervision system has led to the high incidence of corruption in some provincial associations.
Corruption problems occur frequently in provincial associations and rural commercial banks, and the exposed system and regulatory loopholes are eye-catching.
At present, the top-down management system of the rural credit system is subdivided into multiple models, most of which use the so-called "provincial association-county-level association dual system."
Under this model, the county-level associations act as independent legal persons, and the provincial associations are an administrative agency responsible for daily business supervision and management.
In recent years, most of the county-level rural credit cooperatives across the country have been restructured into rural commercial banks, and the provincial associations have flattened the management of county-level rural commercial banks, assuming management, guidance, coordination and service functions.
"The provincial association has less explicit power and greater implicit power." Chen Yong, deputy director of the Ninth Discipline Inspection and Supervision Office of the Anhui Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection, analyzed that the provincial association manages dozens or even hundreds of county-level farmers in a province. The leadership of the commercial bank has a high concentration of personnel power. Some provincial association leaders accept bribes from senior executives in the system to sell official officials. It is also very convenient for the leaders of the provincial association to intervene in the construction, project management and credit business of various rural commercial banks.
According to Mo Kaiwei, a researcher at the China Local Finance Research Institute, the Provincial Associated Press is nominally an operating and management organization, but in fact it is a government administrative organization, and the county rural commercial bank it manages is also an enterprise operating unit.
Under this management system, the powers of people, finances, and things are over-concentrated in the Provincial Associated Press. Although the Provincial Associated Press is nominally under the dual supervision of the provincial government and the provincial financial supervision, in fact, its various powers are not. Obtain effective control.
"Using strong administrative skills to manage the rural commercial bank system, and lack of an effective power supervision system itself, this is an important reason for the high incidence of corruption in some provincial associations." Mo Kaiwei said.
The supervision at the same level failed, and the power of the "top leader" was out of control.
Before the disciplinary inspection and supervision were dispatched to the reform, some key persons in charge of the provincial associations were extremely powerful in controlling power, and they practiced "paternalism" and "one-speaking", and supervision at the same level was in vain.
For example, regarding Chen Peng's issues during his work in the Anhui Provincial Associated Press, the Provincial Associated Press Discipline Inspection Commission was absent, neither biting his ears, tearing his sleeves, sweating, nor reporting the relevant situation to the higher-level Commission for Discipline Inspection in a timely manner.
Over the years, the agency has mostly handled internally the problems of violations of regulations and disciplines discovered by audits and inspections, and few have been transferred to the judicial department for criminal responsibility.
Similarly, the supervision of county rural commercial banks also has problems such as lack of supervision and restriction and insufficient pressure transmission.
According to the analysis by Qian Shuo, a case handler of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of Anhui Province, although the banking and insurance regulatory authorities have regulatory powers, they are not the competent authorities; the city and county party committee governments have no specific management functions, and the proportion of state-owned capital in the equity of rural commercial banks is obviously low. Commercial banks do not even have state-owned capital; the provincial association's supervision of county rural commercial banks is relatively weak for various reasons.
The high incidence of corruption in the rural credit system is also related to the chaotic management of some units.
In some places, there are problems such as weak concepts of employee discipline and law, widespread violations of regulations, absence of the rotation system for important positions, inadequate investigation of potential risks, loss of control of verification management, and failure to strictly implement the internal audit control system. This provides opportunities for people with ulterior motives to commit crimes. Opportunity.
In Hohhot City and Lin County Rural Credit Cooperatives, employee Wang Moumou used his position as the director of Fan Jiayao and Dahongcheng Credit Cooperative to fraudulently use other people’s ID cards to make 74 illegal loans to himself. A total of 2.04 million yuan, and squandered the loan.
The chairman, vice president and chief supervisor of Anhui Yingdong Rural Commercial Bank conspired to "collaborate" with the left hand "wearing a mask" to borrow money, and the right hand to "open the back door" to lend money. They used their hands to make money during the stock raising process of their own bank.
4 Insist on paying equal attention to investigation and handling of cases and prevention of risks, and do a good job in promoting reform and governance by cases to ensure and promote the healthy development of the rural credit system
Corruption cases occur frequently, seriously damaging the political ecology of the rural credit system, and affecting the quality of the reform and development of the entire system.
Discipline inspection and supervision agencies at all levels follow the idea of "three nos" in one promotion, insisting on finding out facts, recovering stolen goods, preventing and controlling risks, remedying loopholes, and reshaping the ecology. They have maintained the purity of the rural credit system team. It maintains the seriousness of discipline and law, and also helps prevent and resolve financial risks, and reflects the organic unity of political, discipline and social effects.
In response to the failure of supervision at the same level and the out-of-control of the power of the “top leader”, some localities have paid close attention to the reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system, and the “probe” of supervision has been calibrated.
In Anhui, Yunnan and other places, the Discipline Inspection Commission of the Provincial Rural Credit Cooperatives was abolished, and the Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection instead dispatched a disciplinary inspection and supervision team to the Provincial Rural Credit Cooperatives.
After the reform, the Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Team of the Provincial Associated Press was directly led by the Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection. It changed from the original “supervision at the same level” to “supervision at a higher level”, effectively solving the lack of authority and independence of the Disciplinary Commission in the original Provincial Associated Press. Strong issues; the former Provincial Associated Press Commission for Discipline Inspection reports to the Provincial Associated Press Party Committee, and it has been transformed into the Provincial Associated Press’s Discipline Inspection and Supervision Team and the Party Committee’s regular meetings and important information notifications. The Provincial Associated Press Party Committee pays more attention to the Provincial Associated Press’s Discipline Inspection and Supervision Team. Suggestions made.
Promote rectification and reforms in response to prominent problems such as "violating regulations and employing personnel" by some leading cadres and illegally interfering in the work of rural commercial banks.
The Associated Press of Anhui Province has formulated 48 negative lists in key areas such as “three important and one large”, selection and employment, credit distribution, financial management, etc., and timely revised key systems such as employee recruitment, exchange and rotation, and started with the conduct of selection and employment. Special rectification. In 2020, a total of 25 “top leaders” in rural commercial banks will be adjusted, 16 secretaries of the Commission for Discipline Inspection have been promoted to exchange posts in different places, and one rural commercial bank’s chairman and one president were removed due to lack of responsibility.
After the Yang Alin case, the Commission for Discipline Inspection and Supervision of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region investigated 46 corruption risk points in credit management and other aspects, formulated 73 prevention and control measures, rectified the unhealthy practices of selecting and employing people, and tightened the system for the operation of dense power.
The Yunnan Provincial Associated Press conducted "returning" on the selection and employment of Jiang Zhaogang, Wan Renli, and Luo Min during their tenure, the provincial party committee inspected and rectified twice, the Provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection transferred problem clues, handled major cases, issued loans, and written off bad debts. Look", resolutely correct the original improper handling, strengthen supervision and inspection, and urge the province's rural credit cooperatives to comprehensively rectify the violations of laws and regulations and major problems around them, and promote the restoration of the political ecology of the provincial rural credit system.
Regarding the system loopholes exposed behind the corruption of the “top leader” of the Provincial Associated Press, industry insiders believe that it is necessary to gradually deepen the reform of the Provincial Associated Press system and mechanism.
In May 2020, the Office of the Financial Commission of the State Council issued a document stating that 11 financial reform measures will be introduced, including the formulation of the "Implementation Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives."
Almost at the same time, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission formulated and issued the "Implementation Opinions on Deepening the Reform of Rural Credit Cooperatives," and deployed relevant reform pilots.
In January of this year, the 2021 China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission's work conference proposed to "advance the pilot reform of provincial associations in an orderly manner."
Regarding the reform of the Provincial Associated Press, Guo Shuqing, Secretary of the Party Committee of the People’s Bank of China and Chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, said in an interview with the media in March this year that the reform should proceed from reality, improve the corporate governance structure, and manage the board of directors, shareholders’ meeting, and board of supervisors in accordance with the modern corporate system. It is necessary to clarify the relationship between the party according to the ownership structure, strengthen the party’s management and leadership, and at the same time conduct asset and capital verification, dispose of some non-performing assets, and recover arrears.
In July of this year, at a press conference on the operation and development of the banking and insurance industry in the first half of this year, Ye Yanfei, head of the Policy Research Bureau of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, revealed that most provinces and regions have already submitted plans to deepen the reform of the provincial association.
"The'management' powers and responsibilities of the Provincial Associated Press are the product of a special historical period. This kind of management system is now in place when rural commercial banks have been restructured, modern corporate governance structures have been established, and commercial banks have transformed their business models. It is time for a thorough reform. "Mo Kaiwei said.