In one of the sessions of the Seventh Youth Conference in Egypt, it happened that the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was shown a satirical picture “Comic” showing the frog “Kermit” holding the microphone, announcing “the death of the late middle class after a long struggle with the country.” Al-Sisi did not comment on the matter. One month after this conference, specifically in September 2019, he only released some light, indifferent laughs, and the first economic and social protests of its kind erupted during the era of Sisi, and the middle class had no presence in it.
In the next world 2020, the demonstrations took place even before September, and their demands were in their entirety economic and social, and again, there was an almost complete absence of the broad Egyptian middle class, although it was primarily affected by Sisi’s economic and social project, as it came to the fore again The lower classes, which is surprising, especially when we know that the World Bank documented in a statement issued in 2016, i.e. at the beginnings of Sisi’s economic reform program, documenting the Egyptian middle class’s recording of “the largest decline of the middle class in the world” since the beginning of the millennium until the date of the statement’s issuance ahead of Greece, Argentina, and Russia.
According to the international statement, the middle class in Egypt shrank by more than 48%, from 5.7 million adults in 2000 to 2.9 million adults in 2015. They represent only 5% of the total adults and hold a quarter of the national wealth, despite the fact that Their contribution to the GDP is many times that percentage. In fact, we cannot hold Sisi and his policies alone responsible for this dramatic decline of the middle class, as the January 25, 2011 revolution can be considered, in one of its forms, an uprising of the Egyptian middle class in the face of the policies that led to its impoverishment and marginalization, policies that were launched in the first place in The era of businessmen governments prior to the revolution, led by Atef Ebeid and Ahmed Nazif.
In other words, we can consider the Egyptian political movement since 2005 through the January revolution as a protest of the middle class against the policies of impoverishment that threaten its existence, the programs of the International Monetary Fund and the governments of businessmen, a movement that continued until 2013 with massive demonstrations against the emerging rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, presented with full awareness Mostly - a popular cover for the military coup, which completely eliminated political life in Egypt, and returned the middle class and society as a whole to a worse situation than it was before the beginning of the entire movement in 2005.
While the June 30 scene seemed, in essence, a decisive bias of the vast majority of the Egyptian middle class in favor of military rule and a rejection of the political process and the turbulent path of democratic transformation that resulted from the revolution, the military regime led by Sisi did not bias in any way to the middle class that carried him to power. Instead, his policies weakened and destroyed them, faster than all previous governments had done.
Nevertheless, and amid the renewed protests of the lower classes in the outskirts, villages and marginalized neighborhoods, the middle class is completely absent from the protest scene in Egypt, despite the specter of extinction that threatens it, according to the data of Credit Suisse, which specializes in assessing wealth, which leads us to a fundamental and critical question: Why did the class stop? The Egyptian Central Bank refused to protest and retreated to the back rows of the political scene, at a time when it was being subjected to the fiercest attack in its history?
The rapid rebound of the middle class, from support for the revolution to support for the military coup, cannot be understood without understanding how the middle class is formed and its relationship to political power in Egypt. In his book, Difficult Births: Crossing over to Modernity in East and West, the academic and sociologist Essam Khafaji makes a foundational observation, which is that the state’s relationship with the modern classes in Egypt follows a pattern opposite to its counterpart in the European and American West, while the existence of the class preceded the existence of the state itself. In the modern West, the exact opposite is what happened in the East, specifically in Egypt.
Eric Hobsbawm (1) explains in detail how the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie class was formed in Western Europe, and formulated its basic rights such as guaranteeing individual freedom, the right to own property, movement, belief, freedom of expression, and political and social organization. 2) An economic history of the establishment of the modern Egyptian state at the hands of Muhammad Ali, where the state was not only non-representative of the interests of the traditional civil society, but was established mainly to confront it, as Muhammad Ali dismantled all existing traditional social structures and formations, as well as liquidating all the elites and social facades that The society created it, before it established its modern state and created its own classes of soldiers, technocrats, technicians and administrators, classes that began to expand later with the imposition of compulsory government education as an alternative to circles of science and the transfer of traditional Islamic knowledge.
Under the rule of Muhammad Ali, a numerically large middle class gradually emerged, genetically linked to the mother state. its features. In particular, as the Egyptian researcher Ahad Taha points out in his article entitled "The Egyptian middle class...from the state and to it", the modern education system established by Muhammad Ali represented "the main hatchery for the employees of the state's administrative apparatus, constituting the main segment of the middle class, which was characterized by complete loyalty." For the state, as it was educated in its schools, and employed in its offices. On the other hand, under the monopoly system established by Muhammad Ali, the state became the first farmer, the first manufacturer and the first merchant. In short, the state tightened its control over society and did not leave it the slightest space for self-movement.(3) In other words, this middle class's primary self-definition and view of itself in its early days was summed up by the slogan "Slaves of Effendina Ihsanat".
With the defeat of Muhammad Ali and the deterioration of his monopolistic economic system and the increase in foreign influence and then the advent of colonialism, the middle class gradually disintegrated after it lost power and the womb that created it and brought it into existence, and the situation remained as it was until the July 23 coup and the Free Officers regime led by Gamal Abdel Nasser in the middle of The last century, the Nasser regime carried out a process of extensive social engineering for the Egyptian society, through which it filtered the agricultural aristocracy politically and economically, through the agrarian reform law, organizing agricultural ownership, determining its size and distributing surplus land to farmers, but the most important step taken by the Nasserist regime is to re-form the middle class The Egyptian government again, through nationalization procedures, expanding bureaucracy, free education, fixing housing rents and expanding the construction of residential neighborhoods, and the state’s commitment to appointing all university graduates and holders of intermediate qualifications in the government and public sector companies, and expanding the acceptance of the sons of the classes.Central in the military and police colleges, the judiciary and the parliament, as well as the broad social support network established by the regime to support the health and food sectors (4).
These measures formed the pillars of the radical social engineering process that enabled the Nasser regime to build a broad middle class that is organically linked to his regime, which lives on food commodities that are supported by it, and whose health and treatment is supervised by the public health sector, which is funded by the government, educates its children in free government education, and receives their salaries Monthly of her work in the government public sector and the Egyptian bureaucracy, to which she is appointed under state supervision. This inverse relationship formed the political imagination of the Egyptian middle class in a way that despise politics, and sees the idea of the struggle for power as a betrayal of Egyptian patriotism and a threat to the integrity of the state, as well as causing the absence of individual initiative in the economy and investment, in building civil society and joining unions, parties, civil and human rights organizations, and so on. In addition to the absence of any liberal culture that sanctifies the secrecy of private life and separates the public from the private, and believes in the importance of individual rights and freedoms.
According to the Egyptian researcher Ahmed Taha (5), the middle class has become suffering from a "congenital defect", as it was born with authoritarian decisions and superior measures, and in its growth and spread, it depended, in the first place, on social engineering projects that were adopted by the Egyptian state. The middle class was not born as a result of A struggle with the authority, and it did not engage in a clash with the state to defend its interests or claim its rights, which made its gains hostage to the state, “what bequeathed it a tendency toward surrender towards that state, which made it in a state of ”permanent conviction” of what the latter bestows upon it.Here, the difference between the Egyptian middle class, in terms of the conditions of its upbringing, and its European counterpart, is clear. , offset by a response from the state, by issuing legislation that meets the demands of the middle class, unlike what happened in Egypt, where the relationship of the middle class with the state was one-way, in which the state played the largest role, and sometimes it played both roles together, so it was the state and the class, which eliminated every opportunity Historic development of the middle class in Egypt as a social class with political and economic effectiveness.
Contrary to the huge propaganda and propaganda about Nasser’s socialism and his regime and their bias towards the poor and toiling classes, Dr. Galal Amin argues that the Nasserist regime was the middle-class system par excellence, while it was hostile to the old feudal class, its policies ignored the poor and destitute classes completely, “as the Egyptian state took during the rule of Abdel Nasser made many decisions that fulfilled the interests of the middle class in particular, or certain segments of it, even if these measures clearly conflict with the interests of the lower classes, and also ignored some of the basic needs of these lower classes, when satisfying these needs was in conflict with the interests of the middle class. (6).
One of the indicative examples presented by Amin on the bias of the July regime in its Nasserist version to the middle class and not others is “what the state gave to the middle class in obtaining building lands and residential apartments, in building modern summer resorts, in determining what goods are produced and imported, and in providing support to Some types of goods and services that benefited only the middle-income classes at that time, such as cars, air-conditioners and refrigerators.Therefore, there was a clear preference when prioritizing the demands of the middle class, while more urgent needs could be sacrificed to the lowest-income people, such as launching an ambitious program to improve life In Egyptian villages at a faster rate, whether by providing drinking water in farmers’ homes or providing them with electricity, for example, problems that were already suffering from many areas of the Egyptian countryside and the slums on the outskirts of cities even after the death of Abdel Nasser” (7).
This Nasserist policy was a tacit unwritten agreement that represented the essence of the social contract on which the authoritarian state of July was established and politically based on the middle class as a social base subordinate to it. Citizens, and their transformation into subjects, but instead of being slaves of Afandina’s benevolences in the time of Muhammad Ali, they turned into slaves of the benevolences of the entire July state, where members of the middle class saw the policies of supporting basic commodities and providing them to citizens, such as bread, sugar, oil, and rice, along with Subsidizing fuel, electricity and water services, or the state's commitment to employ graduates in the government apparatus and public sector companies are Afandina's new favors, without social and social rights, as the regime's propaganda says.
In return for the state’s carrying out its economic and social duties, the entire political field was nationalized. After the decision to abolish political parties, “the new regime sought to fill this void by adopting the one-party system, or the superstructure of the “single totalitarian organization,” which was said to be the comprehensive framework for all classes and groups of society. However, in fact, it was the preserve of the middle class only from university graduates, government education and workers in the Egyptian bureaucracy, so social and political pluralism was confiscated in favor of the middle class, under "mobilization" slogans in the official discourse, revolving around the principle of "national alignment", such as "Union" order and work”, “the alliance of the forces of the working people”, and “dissolving the differences between classes” (8).
Since the 1970s and the Sadat coup against the Nasser regime, the July state entered a new phase in its relationship with the middle class. The Nasserist equation was manipulated a little, as the state reduced its bias towards the middle class in favor of opening the way for the upper class, thus abandoning some of its economic and social obligations, but in return it opened the way for a political life and limited pluralism (9). Some policy, which continued in the two decades following Mubarak’s assumption of power, as the state remained governed by the founding equation of the July state; The equation of bread and politics, which Mubarak was fully aware of. During the eighties and nineties, he did not approach the system of food and petroleum support, free education, and the healthy public sector, and he maintained relative stability of the local currency rate, and price control, while opening a margin that expanded with time for the upper classes in consumption, work and investment.
During the last decade of Mubarak’s term, that equation began to falter. This happened with the arrival of big businessmen to the forefront of the political scene, in what was later known as the “marriage of capital and power”; A wide number of statistics and reports (10) (11) indicate that this decade witnessed a remarkable transformation in the Egyptian political and economic society, as poverty rates rose for the first time since national independence, and a number of middle-class families fell to the poor classes, after allowing the proportion of Higher than inflation and higher prices, under the eyes of the first government of businessmen of Atef Ebeid (1999-2004), with the aim of treating the budget deficit to encourage foreign investment, which also continued with the next government headed by Ahmed Nazif (2004-2011), with the control of the new economic elite Gamal Mubarak's men on the ruling party.
Everyone in Egypt sensed the seriousness of this transformation, and the radical threat it poses to the equation of bread and politics that characterized the relationship between the authority and the Egyptian society, with the Egyptian middle class at the heart of it. Starting with the Kefaya movement, the April 6 movement, and the campaign to support ElBaradei, human rights and social civil society organizations were established, and new parties were established, such as the Democratic Front Party, the Wasat Party, and the Al-Ghad Party, as well as the gathering of various professional blocs to oppose the regime within the unions, such as “Lawyers for Change” and “Doctors.” For Change” and “Engineers for Change”, and labor strikes and protests escalated, leading to the emergence of a strong opposition movement from the heart of the Egyptian judiciary, represented by the “Judges for Independence” movement.In parallel with all this, new independent newspapers appeared, and many intellectuals, writers and media professionals entered the new opposition line in the various media platforms. In return, the security grip of the regime increased, and it became apparent to everyone inside and outside Egypt that the state and society in Egypt had become at a crossroads (12) .
From afar, it seemed to the beholder that the middle class in Egypt is preparing itself for the first time, perhaps since the coup of Gamal Abdel Nasser, for a round of political struggle to preserve its gains, that is, to preserve its right to bread - the system of welfare and support - and its share of the social contract of the state of July, or to transcend this The whole contract and winning bread and politics together, that is, establishing a sound political life for the first time in the history of Egypt.
Most of the analyzes agree that the January Revolution is basically the uprising of the middle class, and despite the decisive participation of the lower and marginalized strata in it, the uprising is the daughter of the middle class movement that began at the beginning of the millennium, with the erosion of the bread equation against the founding policy of the July state and its middle class. The Egyptian middle class behaves for the first time as a real social class with interests and rights that clash with the political power in order to preserve them. The revolution was the daughter of all the movement that resulted from the imbalance of the equation, with the spread of opposition within the unions, newspapers, new TV channels, blogs, protest movements and opposition political elites.
In his book "The People Want: A Radical Research on the Arab Uprisings"Dr. Gilbert al-Ashqar argues that the January movement carried all the factors of its failure within it. Although large sectors of the middle class split the stick of obedience and protested against the policies of the ruling regime, they did not carry within them any intention to seize power, adding that the spontaneity of the movement, and not to put forward Any real alternatives to the economic policies of Gamal Mubarak and Ahmed Ezz were nothing but an expression of the middle class’s vision of itself, as it does not see itself as its counterpart in the West, a class qualified to govern itself, and it has the right to formulate the state and political authority in a manner that suits its goals and interests, but it came out calling for the intervention of institutions The deep state, represented here in the military bureaucracy that established and created the middle class, against the increasing influence of businessmen that began at the beginning of the millennium, with the control of the Gamal Mubarak and Ahmed Ezz group on economic decision-making and public resources, in a way that violated the historical agreement between the class and the military state of July.
Gilbert Ashkar explains, adding: "The activists and the Brotherhood who led the revolution did not understand very well the limits of the movement in which they were involved, when they began to escalate against the military establishment and demand the civil state and the removal of the army from politics." What public interest, this analysis explains the question with which we began at the beginning of the report: Why did the middle class stop protesting and retreat to the back ranks of the political scene?
According to Gilbert, the middle class’s bet was mainly on the state apparatus that created it and the contract it signed with it fifty years ago, which explains the sharp division that occurred immediately after Mubarak’s resignation. The army sided with the January demands and the arrest of businessmen Ahmed Ezz, Zuhair Garana, Ahmed Al-Maghrabi, Ahmed Nazif and Atef Obaid with Alaa and Gamal Mubarak, in addition to the fact that others, such as Rashid Ahmed Rashid, were forced to flee, from choosing others to voluntarily exile outside the country after filing lawsuits against them, and the transfer of executive and legislative authority to the forces After Mubarak stepped down, they saw in him a rescue of the Egypt they know and a final victory for the January revolution, while young activists were more skeptical of this narrative and greater desire to search for a more profound change.
After a short political process that was not very successful, the middle class came out with a historic mobilization demanding a return to the arms of the state again, and imploring it to intervene to save it from the chaos of the revolution, as it rescued it from the growing power of businessmen and their neoliberal project. Amidst great popular support, the army chief reached the top of power in Egypt, and in just two years he had succeeded in dismantling all the organizational structures that ignited the revolution, until he announced to the middle class that carried him on its neck the worst surprise in its entire miserable history.
The July state itself abandoned the middle class, after the latter gave up almost all its cards. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced at the beginning of November 2016 the start of implementing economic policies that would reformulate the social and class map in Egypt, not the most dangerous of them. Floating the local currency and starting the procedures for lifting subsidies, but eliminating the entire welfare system that no one has dared to approach since Gamal Abdel Nasser, by transforming public facilities such as government school and university education, public health institutions, even highways and main hubs within cities into profit centers, without Any national social goals, as well as doubling all kinds of taxes, customs, and prices for government and private transport services, and all government fees and transactions at once, and finally raising the price of fuel by rates of up to 87%, and the state’s complete withdrawal from the process of price control and allowing always high rates of inflation.
According to many analyzes (13), the policies pursued since late 2016 represent a pivotal event in the history of Egypt, as they put an end to a context that spanned decades, and ended the devil’s deal made by the middle class with the July 23 military state, when it accepted to waive its political rights in exchange for Some bread is represented in the Nasserite Welfare and Social Solidarity Network, and throughout those decades, when the July state abolished some bread, it allowed in return some politics, but today with the advent of Sisi, the state announces that it has given up its economic and social duties (bread), while it does not allow Even with minimal politics, declaring to everyone that the July social contract is over for good.
The middle class gave up politics in exchange for bread, and is finally losing bread without winning politics. With the middle class shrinking in half in less than two decades, Credit Suisse expects that the middle class in Egypt will not survive another fifteen years under Sisi, which is consistent with World Bank data, which indicates that if these policies continue for two decades or more. More, the Egyptian middle class will be at risk of extinction.
It seems that this is the logical result of the fact that the Egyptian state created and supported the middle class, and that in the end it is the one who prepares for it. It is therefore not surprising that, in the January Revolution, it wasted its historical opportunity to establish itself as the state, like any middle class in the modern world.
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Sources
The Age of Revolution, Eric Hobsbawm, The Arab Organization for Translation
The Central State in Egypt, Nazih Al-Ayoubi, Center for Arab Unity Studies
The Egyptian middle class.. From the state to it, Ahmed Taha, The New Arab
The Central State in Egypt, Nazih Al-Ayoubi, Center for Arab Unity Studies
The Egyptian middle class.. From the state to it, Ahmed Taha, The New Arab
The Republic of July: When the Authority Creates Its Social Class, Moataz Mamdouh, Illuminations Site
previous source
The end of the "social contract" of the July 23 state in Egypt, Ahmed Taha, The New Arab
The Central State in Egypt, Nazih Al-Ayoubi, Center for Arab Unity Studies
The numerical indicator of poverty at the national poverty line
The numerical index of poverty compared to the poverty line of $1.90 per day per capita
The People Want: A Radical Research on the Arab Uprisings, Gilbert Achcar
The end of the "social contract" of the July 23 state in Egypt, Ahmed Taha, The New Arab