Military columnist Zack Cullenborn prepared an article for Defense One on the technology of "swarm of marches", the technology used by Israel in its recent war on Gaza.
How does this technology work?
And why do some believe that the international community should confront its spread?
It was reported that during the operations in Gaza, in mid-May, the Israeli army used a flock of small drones to locate and identify Hamas fighters and then attack them. This is believed to be the first time that drone squadrons have been used in combat. Usually, drones are controlled individually by remote control devices, but a swarm is a network interconnected unit that flies itself using artificial intelligence, and can cover a large area and continue to operate even if several units (drones) are lost from the swarm, as required Only one person to run its operation and direct it towards its goals.
An IDF spokesperson told New Scientist that the IDF Paratroopers' Support Unit used the drone squadron to target Hamas fighters who launched rockets into Israel: "The drone squadron was used on the battlefield, after a barrage of rockets was launched on Israeli territory. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a tool has been used." According to Israeli reports, these drones were prepared by Elbit Systems, which was not confirmed by the Israeli army spokesman, saying that what was used on the battlefield was traditional drones. Elbit Systems produces the "Thor" drone, which is a four-propeller drone, weighs 9 kilograms and is said to be almost silent, along with other specialized drones that can land and continue to monitor or deliver explosives.
The Israeli army spokesman said: “The drone squadron operation was led by a single operating official whose mission was to control it all, with another commander at his side to make the important decisions.” Perhaps a swarm of a handful of drones is not a serious threat, but what about a swarm of ten thousand? According to the same spokesman, the drone squadron collected intelligence information, identified targeting sites, launched attacks on Hamas forces, and provided information to assist guided mortars in targeting operations. In a statement circulated by the local media, the commander of the Israeli army claimed that the first attack hit the Hamas rocket launcher equipment hidden in an olive grove, adding that the squadron unit launched more than 30 successful operations, some of them against targets far from the Gaza-Israel border.
"Reports suggest that the IDF is the first to use a squadron of drones on the battlefield. However, without knowing more details about the capabilities of the drone squadrons," said Zach Cullenborn, an analyst with the National Coalition to Study and Counter Terrorism in Maryland. It is difficult to assess the consequences of their use and assess whether they are important or worrisome.”
In an article for Defense One, Zack came to the conclusion that the Israeli drone swarms are in fact a cause for concern, and even urged the United States to lead the global effort to bring these squadrons under international control.
Cullenborn asserts that what happened in the Gaza war should serve as a wake-up call for the United States and its allies to reduce the dangers of these weapons to national defense and global stability. Israel's use of this technology is only the beginning, as reports do not indicate that the Israeli army has deployed any specific advanced military capabilities. According to reports, they are just a few of the drones manufactured by Elbit Systems, but they were used in coordination with mortars and ground-based missiles to hit "dozens" of targets located long distances from the border with Gaza. The drones helped to reveal the hiding places of the enemy (Palestinian fighters), and to transfer the information to an application that in turn processed the data with other intelligence information, but the drone swarms will not be that simple in the future.
The term 'swarm of pros' usually refers to multiple propellants being used simultaneously. But in a true swarm of marchers, they communicate and cooperate with each other, and make collective decisions about where they are going and what they are going to do. In a military-style squadron, the squadron is a single integrated weapon system guided by artificial intelligence in its various forms, not just a group of 10 or 100 separate drones. So, swarms of marchers have come into being, and then we have to worry. But what is the best way to reduce the danger these weapons pose?
The United States should lead the international community through a new dialogue to discuss the need for new international principles or treaties designed specifically to manage and limit the use of drone swarms. Drone swarms may fall under the umbrella of some of the existing proposals that would require a complete ban on autonomous weapons, but a treaty like this is unlikely to cover the drone swarms used by Israel. Despite media reports to the contrary, there is no indication that the swarm made a spontaneous decision about the people it targeted to kill (whether or not such a small swarm controlled by someone should be banned is a different matter), It is also unlikely that major powers would agree to a broader ban on autonomous weapons.So, a limited restriction on high-risk autonomous weapons, such as anti-drone squadrons, may have greater appeal, particularly if they pose disparate effects that threaten rather than assist major powers.
The world's militaries should expand their efforts to develop, test, and share anti-swarm technology. Effective anti-swarm systems need to be low-cost, fast-charging, and capable of hitting multiple targets simultaneously. Such systems should be deployed in the vicinity of sensitive target areas, such as airports and critical infrastructure, and where states' political leaderships are located. Since the threat is primarily international, states must also provide the latest deterrent capabilities for swarms of drones to their partners and allies who are in danger.
Keeping swarms of drones out of the hands of terrorists requires separate efforts. Countries might adopt measures similar to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent terrorists from acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons to apply to drone swarms (or just 1540 could be expanded). Local, regional, and international law enforcement agencies should also look for indications that terrorists are seeking to own drone swarms, such as massive drone purchases, or a known extremist developing or modifying drone control systems.
In the past few years, the threat of march swarms has grown in tandem with their escalating development. In 2016, the US Department of Defense launched 103 Perdix drones from three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets. The planes operated using a "collective mind", took on various squadron formations, flew a mock battlefield prepared for testing, and reconfigured themselves into new arrangements. It is interesting to note here that the designers of this system are students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, so if the marches are so simple that students can make them, then the appearance of the marches can be expected in various conflict areas around the world. China, France, India, Spain, South Africa, the United States and Britain have all detected or tested new swarm programs during the past year.
With the global spread of swarms of marches, several destabilizing risks arise. In the Nagorno-Karabakh war last year, the Azerbaijani use of parades made a significant contribution to the rapid surrender of the Armenians (other factors undoubtedly contributed to this as well). The more unmanned squadron amplifies many of these results, using more sophisticated tactics that can overcome already-existing defenses, a concern the US military has been studying for a decade. In a study published in 2012 prepared by the Naval Postgraduate School, a simulation was carried out in which eight drones attacked a US Navy destroyer, and the result was the success of four drones in hitting the destroyer. Terrorists may see drone swarms as a great opportunity as accessible air forces that can overcome ground defenses and then launch attacks on vital infrastructure and VIPs.
Drone swarms pose risks very similar to those posed by conventional weapons of mass destruction. At a time when a swarm of drones may become a super swarm of a thousand or even a million marches, no human can reasonably control them. Herein lies the problem, as autonomous weapons can make only limited decisions about the nature of their targets and whether they are civilian or military. A pixel difference with the incoming information could turn a fighter-bomber into a dummy. The occurrence of such mistakes means that civilians or soldiers have been killed in the ranks of the army itself, and thus an unintended escalation of the confrontation.
The truth is that in theory, and so far, anti-drone systems have not been designed for anti-drone swarm operations, and current detection systems cannot necessarily accommodate multi-drone handling. A swarm can overcome interception systems that include limited or slow-release interceptors, and a swarm of drones can simply spread out at an irresistible density. Of course, over time, new anti-drone systems such as the Air Force's microwave Thor, and low-cost-per-fire systems such as lasers, may prove effective, as may anti-swarms. While these defenses can protect major powers, smaller states and civilians are likely to be more vulnerable.
Countries use too many cars at once. While human perception limits the success of a simultaneous multi-role operation, due to the difficulty of monitoring multi-drone operations, ensuring that they do not collide, and above all achieving the desired goals of the mission, the (US) military is working to overcome these human shortcomings. In a study issued in 2008, it was found that one employee or officer entrusted with operating the marches can handle only four marches without significant losses in the effectiveness of the task. By 2018, the US military's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) confirmed that a single person could control an entire swarm of telepathically, using a single chip implanted in their brain.
The military value of drone swarms stems from the fact that they provide a degree of flexibility and complexity. Existing swarms typically use small, homogeneous marches. As for the future squadrons, they will be of different sizes, equipped with a set of different interchangeable sensors, weapons and other payloads. All of this facilitates complex military tactics, in which drones are hit with multiple weapons from multiple angles: one might fire bullets, while another fires a chemical. Swarms may also have adaptive properties such as self-recovery, in which the swarm self-adjusts itself to losing some of its paths, or self-destruction, to complete tasks from which there is no return. It is also likely that the swarms of the marches will be further integrated into a “mother march” arrangement, perhaps arranged in a larger or more marched form in what looks like a mixture of pure lethality.
The bottom line is that drone swarms are already in the works, they're spreading fast, and they're not science fiction anymore.
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This report is translated from Defense One and does not necessarily reflect the website of Medan.