Dispute with Poland and Hungary: culture war in the EU

What is currently being fought between the European Commission on the one hand and Poland and Hungary on the other is nothing less than a European culture war.

From a formal point of view, it is about legal issues, about the compatibility of national law with that of the EU.

But it should be clear to all parties involved that the dispute goes deeper than the usual infringement procedures with which Brussels routinely reviews the legislation of the member states.

In the case of these two states, the EU is caught in the maelstrom of the great ideological conflict that is currently being waged in so many societies: authoritarian versus pluralistic, national versus multicultural.

In other words, it's down to the nitty-gritty.

On the sloping track

How could a union that was once founded for international understanding get on this steep path? There are political factors that are often overlooked. In the case of Hungary, the fact that Orbán recently left the European People's Party plays a role. He no longer has any formal allies among the Western European governments, which he felt especially at the most recent EU summit when it came to the issue of homosexual rights. And the Polish PiS government is a party-political pariah in the Council, which may explain some defensive reflexes on both sides.

More fundamental, however, is that Western and Eastern Europe have diverged in recent years. The eastward enlargement of the EU was linked to the expectation that sooner or later the states from the former Warsaw Pact would join the liberal-conservative and social-democratic basic convictions that dominate the discourse in the West to this day and that are also asserting themselves in Brussels to have.

Especially with some new big topics you can see that it didn't really work out.

Climate protection, immigration, women's rights, diversity - all these questions, which are increasingly determining the political agenda in the West, only play a role for minorities in Eastern Europe.

It is not the case that the PiS or Fidesz have come to power in Warsaw or Budapest.

They were even elected for promising to keep these changes out of their countries.

There is only a rudimentary European public

The EU's political system is not undemocratic, but it is unable to resolve fundamental value conflicts.

In a country you hold elections to clarify such questions in a reasonably satisfactory manner.

But the EU doesn't even have a government that could carry out the majority will;

there is also at most a rudimentary European public in which a debate could take place.

That is why the dispute ends up with the Commission, which, as the “guardian of the Treaties”, turns a political conflict into a legal matter.

That is unsatisfactory, but there is no other option given the current contractual situation.

The dispute still has to be resolved, at least at the points where it directly affects EU law.

In the EU there is room for the political idiosyncrasies of the member states.

But they are not completely sovereign; that was a basic principle of European unification from the start.

Achievements such as the internal market and the common judicial area can only work if EU law is respected in all member states.

A German who wants to do business in Poland needs an independent judiciary.

A Frenchman who settles in Hungary must be able to trust that the administration is not corrupt and that he will not be discriminated against because of his sexual orientation.

Crucial phase

The fact that the dispute is now entering a decisive phase is due to the fact that many in Western Europe no longer see how to transfer billions of euros to net recipients in the East who do not want to abide by the agreed rules of the game.

That brings a new edge to the argument, but it was inevitable.

The fact that the local taxpayer finances governments that openly pursue policies against the EU and Germany can no longer be justified.

German politicians in particular have often, if not always (see Nord Stream 2), seen themselves as advocates for Eastern Europe in the EU.

For economic and strategic reasons, this is basically correct.

Maintaining the rule of law is even more important, because the EU will only survive as a legal community.

It's hard to say how this struggle will turn out. For Orbán and Kaczynski, the political business model is at stake. On the other hand, many a nationalist big spokesman has given in when it comes to money. And EU membership is still very popular in Poland and Hungary. In the best-case scenario, the tougher course of the Commission will result in (social) reflection on their own positions and priorities in both countries. In the worst, exit debates begin.