"The Islamic Revolution of the Iranian nation was strong, but merciful and tolerant, and even oppressed. It did not commit any extremist or perverted actions that stigmatized other movements and uprisings. It stood firmly and courageously against the tyrants and the oppressors, and defended the weak."

(From the speech of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution in the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the revolution (1))

The address to the nation delivered by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution, on February 11, 2019 was not just an ordinary speech in which Khamenei memorializes the memory of the revolution that made him the most powerful man in Tehran ten years after its outbreak. A manifesto and a plan in which the man outlines the "achievements" of the past forty years, and outlines the general features of the decades to come. Although the speech did not include a clear detail of Khamenei's efforts to "renew revolutionary blood" by empowering a new generation of religious revolutionary youth to take the leading positions of the state, the events of the following two years of the Islamic Republic's life will take over for Khamenei to clarify his goals.

The recent Iranian policy shifts reveal a clear deviation from the path of power-sharing between conservatives, reformists and pragmatists that has defined politics in the country since the end of the war with Iraq at the end of the eighties. This started from the Iranian legislative elections in 2020, which were dominated by conservatives and excluded many reformists, up to yesterday night, which witnessed the thirteenth presidential elections since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, and won - as everyone expected - Ibrahim Raisi, the conservative candidate, after the establishment of the Elections Committee Banning several prominent reformist and pragmatic names from running. Many described those “uncompetitive” elections as a turning point after thirty years of non-conservative presence on the scene, embodied by the pragmatist “Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani” and his presidency throughout the nineties, through the reformist “Mohammed Khatami” between 1997 and 2005, and the prominent presence of the reform movement led by “Mir Hossein Mousavi” was defeated in the 2009 elections during a protest movement that is the largest since the Iranian revolution, and finally the outgoing President Hassan Rouhani since 2013. (1) (2)

Conservatives over the past decade have made no secret of their disenchantment with the Rouhani administration and their desire to block the 2016 agreement he reached with the United States and the West, which loosened their grip at home following Iran's integration into the global economy after decades of isolation. That isolation was exactly what conservatives wanted to preserve the authoritarian state structure and its military and economic networks in and around Iran, and then used their parliamentary control last year to block Rouhani’s plans and promises to the Iranians to bring the United States back to the negotiating table and ease sanctions on Tehran. (3)

What appeared as the failure of the reformists to implement their promises and the success of the hardliners in defeating them in the elections, was only the first stage of Khamenei’s renewal plan / forty years, and his vision to revive the principles of the revolution in a way that supports the continuation of the conservative movement at the head of the centers of Iranian power for at least the next ten years. As for the second phase of Khamenei’s plan, its features became clear during the preparations for the presidential elections for the current year, which Sina Tosi, a prominent researcher and analyst at the National Iranian American Council, described as “the clearest attempt by hardliners in Iran’s history, not only to exclude the moderates from the competition, but to remove Their whole pattern of thinking is from the Iranian political scene,” and with it it seems that the coming days of reformists in the political scene are numbered, and that the seventieth Islamic revolution is regaining its spirit, and re-promoting itself as the only way to ensure Iran’s security and safety locally and globally. (4)

The eighty-two-year-old Khamenei knows that he does not have much time left in power, or perhaps in his entire life. Whether his declining health hinders his ability to exercise the affairs of the Wali al-Faqih or his death, the Islamic Republic needs a caliph to take over its affairs. But most importantly, the man wants to continue implementing and spreading the teachings of the Iranian revolution, which he fears will be extinguished with the demise of the last generation of its men. Therefore, from 2019 until now, he has been working to "inject new blood into Iranian institutions" from radical revolutionary youth who are capable of managing Iranian power centers, and the guarantor of the continuation of the "principles of the revolution" after him.

In its simplest case, the centers of Iranian power are divided into elected and unelected centers, and while the Supreme Leader himself undertakes the task of appointing the unelected part or does so through his agents in several positions, the elected part is the one that has been constantly quarreling with Khamenei, and has remained disobedient to Complete compliance with his conservative definition of revolution and its principles. Parliament (the Islamic Consultative Assembly) and the presidency are at the top of these elected institutions, as both of them witness periodic popular elections every four years. (5)

The Islamic Consultative Assembly includes 290 seats, which are usually contested by hard-liners/conservatives, and reformists/moderates with some pragmatic names, with independents and less important parties lined up in the Iranian street.

During the past eight years, reformists and moderates have dominated both the parliament and the presidency under the leadership of the reformist Rouhani, despite him being a cleric and one of the previous candidates to succeed Khamenei as Supreme Leader, a dream that ended for Rouhani, as his two presidential terms led him to become an outcast among most of the men Religion, as well as its supporters in the Iranian street who have been affected by the poor economic conditions.

(6)

Rouhani with a picture of Khamenei in the background

In its infancy, Rouhani’s presidency bore the good news for Iranians eight years ago, because it came after turbulent years of the presidency of the conservative and radical “Mahmoud Ahmadinejad”, whose hard-line policies caused many political, economic and social crises, foremost of which was the suppression of leaders and youth of the “Green Movement” demanding reform in the 2009 demonstrations Rouhani came after him with a package of internal economic reforms and international negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program that ended with the signing of the nuclear agreement in 2015, and then the Iranian economy witnessed a boom that raised the popularity of Rouhani and the reformists, but that boom did not last long after the US administration headed by Donald withdrew Trump opted out of the deal in 2018, and imposed more severe sanctions on Iran, leaving Rouhani and the reformists in the wind at home and abroad, and providing a golden opportunity for a counter-attack from conservatives.

The US withdrawal angered Iranian hardliners who mainly refuse to negotiate with the United States and the West, and fueled popular anger resulting from the renewed economic decline, and led to the decline in the popularity of the reformists, and then their loss in the 2020 parliamentary elections to the conservatives, who won 219 seats out of 290 in one of the lowest elections. Iran has been attractive to voters since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, as only 43% of those who had the right to vote participated in it, compared to more than 70% who participated in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections. (7)

It was not only the effects of US sanctions that caused the reformists' loss, but the clear and unprecedented bias shown by the Guardian Council in favor of the conservatives. The Guardian Council consists of twelve candidates, half of whom are jurists elected by Parliament from a list drawn up by the head of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (appointed by the Supreme Leader), and the other half are clerics who specialize in Islamic law (who are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader), and the Council is responsible for - Among several other powers - to check and review the papers of candidates for the elections and to present the final list of those entitled to run for office or not.

The council rejected the nomination papers of 90 members of the former reformist council, in a move that will be repeated again in the run-up to the presidential elections, where the papers of dozens of reformist and moderate candidates were rejected in exchange for broad acceptance by the conservatives. Out of the nearly 600 candidates who submitted their papers to the council, only seven candidates who won the right to enter the presidential race that was held two days ago were accepted, and among these seven, only one name star won the elections, as expected, after losing to Rouhani in the 2017 elections, to become the next president At the same time, he maintains a sheet of expectations and nominations that favor Khamenei's succession as Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic at a later time.

Paradoxically, Raisi received only 17.8 million votes, a slight increase from the 15.8 million he obtained when he lost to Rouhani in 2017, who received 23.6 million votes at the time, and Rouhani also obtained a larger number in the 2013 elections, with 18.6 million. A vote, while Mahmoud Ahmadinejad remains at the top with more than 24 million votes he obtained in 2009, although his second election was marred by accusations of fraud and manipulation, as the reformists insist.

It also shows the significant drop in turnout for elections this year, as the participation rate for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic fell below half of the voters, to about 48.8%, after it exceeded 70% in 2013 and 2017, and reached about 60% in 2005 and 2001, and also exceeded 80 % in 2009 and 1997.

“What we see in the country today is not related to sanctions, it is related to mismanagement.”

Follow Favorite

Ibrahim Raisi was not widely known before he ran in the 2017 presidential elections against Rouhani out of his "religious and revolutionary responsibility", as he declared at the time, and the man gained popularity only in the ranks of the hardline anti-Rouhani movement. It can be said that he was pushed to participate in the race with the blessing of Khamenei, who appointed him, just months before the election date at the time, as the master of the holy shrine "Astan Quds Razavi", which is one of the richest charitable institutions in Iran, in addition to its responsibility for managing other religious institutions and holy places inside Iran On top of it is the "Sacred Shrine of Imam Reza" in the city of Mashhad. (8)

At the time, the decision was considered an indication that Raisi was the most likely candidate to succeed Khamenei as Supreme Leader of the revolution. Khamenei assumed the position of supreme leader after the death of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Khamenei was then head of state before succeeding the leader of the revolution in her most prominent and powerful position. But the loss of Raisi and the conservative movement to Rouhani in both the presidential and parliamentary elections that preceded it, pushed Khamenei toward a more hardline approach in removing the reformists completely from the political scene in this year’s elections, and so Raisi was pushed back into the presidential elections after years of pressure on him to modify his approach by moving away from Spotlight and entry into the political arena from the widest doors.

Raisi took it upon himself to attack Rouhani and his reformist policies, and seek to unite hardliners and conservatives under his banner, using anti-Americanism and the economic problems resulting from the collapse of nuclear talks with it as a basis for rejecting the entire reformist approach. On the other hand, Raisi, with his long history, fortified himself at the head of the judiciary and his role in consolidating the pillars of the Iranian regime after the Islamic revolution. It is no secret to anyone that the role he played as one of four judges who formed what was known in the eighties as the “Execution Committee”, which issued and executed death sentences. against thousands of Iranians hostile to the regime who were buried in unknown areas, while their cases are prohibited from being discussed or investigated in Iran until now.

Although access to the presidency may have cut my head half way towards the supreme leader’s seat, there is no guarantee that this will be achieved so far, but it is more likely that, in cooperation with the leader and his men, “Raeesi” will set many policies that will remain beyond the end of his presidency, and perhaps after Khamenei. At the present time, Iranians find themselves in front of one of the most conservative and conservative men of the Iranian revolution, and the closest to the Leader and his succession in office, and in front of the Iranian political and electoral system in its weakest and least moments based on popular legitimacy that everyone has been accustomed to providing the minimum of for forty years, In the face of the unprecedented weakness of the reformist movement, he is absent from the scene as a result of the conservatives' squabbling on the one hand, and the international and economic conditions caused by Trump's presidency on the one hand.

The recent Iranian presidential elections are the last piece in Khamenei’s revolutionary puzzle. Raisi’s victory was not just an urgent need for him to continue the Iranian revolution as he sees it, but rather a necessity for the Islamic Republic to continue its networks without disputes that might unravel the regime’s grip and lead to a major reform transformation in conjunction with the presidency Biden and Khamenei's illness. However, the situation created by Khamenei’s forty-year plan makes it difficult, if not impossible, for any ordinary conservative candidate to survive. Rather, it needs what Khamenei himself described as a leader who possesses sufficient “revolutionary loyalty” to hold the pillars of the system and pass with it an important turning point. in its history.Only Ibrahim Raisi possesses these characteristics, to whom the unelected state institutions owe more than others to listen and obey, and he is now holding his hand in the elected institutions as well, just as his rival presidential candidates owe him loyalty as well in a farcical scene with which the real competitiveness that was known about the Iranian elections has eroded Previously. (9)

On the other hand, the reformists reject this game, but, without real representation in the elections, and without sufficient popular popularity, they found themselves more helpless than ever before that conservative wave, until they rearranged their cards behind a party and a candidate, and behind a plan that would help them restore Their position in Iranian politics. Despite all this, there is one constant factor that Tehran knows best, which is that surprises are always able to turn the tables on everyone without exception, and that the Iranians - especially when they lose their voice - will not hesitate to take any means to restore it. Therefore, the Islamic Revolution continues with a more authoritarian and less popular face compared to any previous period of its life, and we can only follow what will happen during the next eight years, and the expected debates between Tehran and Washington on the one hand, and Tehran and its neighbors on the other hand, and most importantly, between the authority in its new form and its reluctant people About participation, to know the consequences of that fragile and authoritarian equation at the same time.

_______________________________________________________

Sources: 

  • The “Second Phase of the Revolution” statement addressed to the Iranian nation

  • To Secure His Legacy, Khamenei Is Packing Iran's Government With Young Radicals

  • Iran Clears Way for Hard-line Judiciary Chief to Become President

  • The Islamic Republic's Republic Is Dying

  •  Politics in Iran 

  • Iranian elections... The moderate current's impasse complicates Rouhani's remaining term

  • What Conservative Control of Iran's Parliament Foretells

  • Ebrahim Raisi: Chief Justice of Iran

  • Iran's reformists don't have a strategy yet—let alone a candidate