Iraqi military and political leaders and officials emphasized that the rivalry between Iranian intelligence services in Iraq cast a shadow over the country's security scene and deepened disagreements among Tehran's allies.

A report published by the British "Middle East Eye" website, last Wednesday, stated that since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraq has become a major battlefield in which global and regional powers fight, especially Iran and the United States, indicating that Iran has deliberately To build a strong network of proxies and allies that includes political, religious, and armed groups.

The report indicated that for 15 years this network had served Iran's interests.

What happens when these groups receive contradictory instructions from Tehran?

Ain Al-Assad base, where American forces are stationed, were subjected to several missile attacks (Al-Jazeera)

4 Iranian intelligence services

The author of the article, Suad al-Salihi, explained that instructions are transmitted from Iran to the Allied network in Iraq through 4 intelligence services: the first is the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security, and the second is known as a "monastic house," which is a section that handles sensitive files related to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and the third intelligence agency is linked The Revolutionary Guard Corps, while the fourth device is affiliated with the Office of the Supreme Leader.

The last three intelligence agencies operate under the direct orders of Khamenei and his closest aides.

Each intelligence agency controls dozens of Iraqi armed factions, political and security leaders, and media and religious institutions.

Although the work of these services depends mainly on Shiite militias, they have also worked to recruit Sunni Iraqis, Kurds, Christians and Yazidis.

In the past two weeks, the activities of these agencies increased, and the difference between them in directions, visions and goals was stark.

The writer pointed out that while intelligence ministry agents are calling for restraint, it is the services associated with Khamenei that are causing confusion now.

Although the Murshid’s loyalists all seek to please him, their plans and methods differ greatly.

This inconsistency poses a danger to Iraq, especially in light of the escalation of tension between Tehran and Washington regarding the possible negotiations for the US return to the nuclear agreement.

Most of the Iraqi armed factions were loyal to Soleimani and Al-Muhandis (Reuters)

Soleimani’s control

The aim of foreign intelligence operations in the first place is to form an information bank for the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security, but the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (especially its Quds Force) remains the most influential Iranian arm on the outside, due to its direct association with the Supreme Leader's office.

The Revolutionary Guard strengthened its grip on foreign affairs thanks to its former commander, Qassem Soleimani, but the situation has changed dramatically since his assassination in January 2020.

The Islamic State represented a great challenge to Soleimani and a great opportunity at the same time, when the Iraqi army suddenly collapsed in June 2014, a four-year conflict broke out that left Iraq in a deplorable state, but the collapse of the army also represented a real and historic opportunity to form a strike force with loyalty and goals. And specific leadership to achieve the required balance between the major powers in Iraq.

And when the supreme Shiite cleric in Iraq, Ali al-Sistani, called for taking up arms to confront ISIS, he indirectly gave an ideological umbrella to form this force.

Soleimani seized the opportunity in cooperation with his Iraqi partners, and the result was the formation of the paramilitary Popular Mobilization Units, whose backbone was the Iranian-backed Shiite factions.

Under Soleimani, the PMF played a major role in defeating ISIS from its strongholds in Iraq.

After the defeat of ISIS in 2017, differences began to resurface between the Iraqi factions.

However, these factions remained under Soleimani's control until he was killed on January 3, 2020, by a US air strike near Baghdad airport, and the Iraqi leader Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the spiritual father of most Iraqi armed factions, was killed with him.

Qaani (right) could not fill the void left by Soleimani in Iraq (communication sites)

A big mess

A number of observers confirm that the killing of Soleimani and the engineer left a state of great chaos, which was directly and clearly reflected on the work of the four Iranian intelligence services, the armed factions, and the political forces associated with them in Iraq.

The author quoted an expert on Iranian affairs that Soleimani was forming a link between the factions and political forces together, but the Americans killed him, and also the engineer who could have mitigated the divisions.

According to observers, a number of armed militias and political factions were later associated with various Iranian agencies.

The expert emphasized that the differences inside Iran were reflected on the performance of these factions and militias in Iraq.

The report adds that due to the weakness of General Ismail Ghaani, who succeeded Soleimani in command of the Quds Force, and his lack of strong relations with Iraqi leaders, and his limited powers, the door was opened wide for the return of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and other agencies to exercise their influence in Iraq.

Some sources confirmed that Qaani's inability to control the Iraqi factions prompted Khamenei to encourage a monastic house to intervene.

Ali Asghar Hijazi, Khamenei's advisor for security affairs and in charge of a religious house, became directly responsible for the most prominent Iraqi armed factions, including the Hezbollah Brigades and Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

According to an Iraqi political leader close to Iran, Qaani is the weakest link, as the leaders of the Iraqi armed factions do not respect him and are not afraid to reject his orders.

He added, "The actual leader of the factions at the moment is Hijazi, and when he wants them to carry out any mission, he asks them to go to meet him at Khamenei's office in Tehran."

More divisions

The writer said that these divisions became more apparent in the wake of the air strike launched by the United States on 26 February against the fighters of the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades and the Brigades of the Master of the Martyrs in Syria near the Iraqi border, and as a result, the Iraqi Military Operations Command sent a committee to the borders to investigate into Incident, while Hijazi called for an urgent meeting in Tehran, and Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called the leaders of a number of small factions to another meeting in Beirut.

The escalation decision was quickly translated into a missile attack on March 3 against the Ain Al-Asad military base in Anbar Province, western Iraq.

The pro-Iranian militia media launched an intense media campaign against the Iraqi government, claiming that Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kazemi seeks to increase the number of US forces in Iraq to secure protection by extending the US military presence within the NATO mission.

Al-Kazemi had to calm the situation before things got out of hand.

In recent weeks, small armed factions with unknown names, such as "the Saints of Blood" and "Ashab Al-Kahf", claimed responsibility for the attacks on American targets in Iraq, while officials described it as a new tactic adopted by well-known factions to launch the attacks without bearing the consequences. .

Although these attacks are of limited effect, they are annoying and embarrassing for the Iraqi and American governments, and cause casualties from time to time.

According to an expert in Iranian affairs, all of these new groups are fake and do not exist, and the attacks were carried out by known factions, but they do not want to bear the consequences, so they are attributed to fictional groups, which may provide the armed factions and the Iranians with the required margin to maneuver and move in secret, and disavow responsibility for this. Attack or that.

The expert pointed out that the messages sent by Iran to its allies in Iraq, which sometimes seem contradictory, can serve Iranian goals on the ground and form part of a broader strategy.

"The Iranian apparatus is good at the game of maneuver. While one side denies its relationship with this attack, another side claims responsibility for it. They are playing the game of the good cop and the bad cop with the Americans and the Iraqi government. This tactic always pays off," the expert said.