In the old tourist neighborhood of Lalali in Istanbul, thousands of faces with distinctive features that mix between Turkish and Asian are attracting the attention of passers-by, but what attracts more attention are their routine movements preserved in the neighborhood's colorful streets paved with colored stones
Often these foreigners are traders who stack cheap Turkish goods in boxes, ready to load them on cheap cargo planes, or some of them may choose to transport their goods on buses passing through off-road, in order to save some money.
In fact, Turkey has a lot of products for these merchants to carry to their relatives in Central Asian countries in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, including cheap clothes, leather bags, and other industrial goods that shoppers are eagerly waiting for, but the ties that Ankara brings with these countries go beyond those operations. From the giant commercial investments and huge energy projects to universities, religious schools, and cultural and service institutions, the manifestations of Turkish soft power have become prominent in the ethnic Turkish countries in Central Asia, with the Turks wanting to expand their diplomatic, political and economic footprint in these countries, taking advantage of the ethnic roots. The common cultural, and close historical ties that bind them with the peoples of the region.
Ankara has long recognized the importance of becoming an influential player in a strategic region with a young population of more than 200 million, a combined GDP of close to two trillion dollars, and led by leaders eager to break free from the old Soviet skin, establish an independent national identity, and implement liberal economic policies. But what makes this region especially important for Turkey is its close connection with its energy security, not to mention the huge number of common political and security challenges that push the two parties to develop close cooperation between them.
Former President of the Kyrgyz Republic Almazbek Atambayev (Right) and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan
Despite deep cultural ties, language, and a common Turkish ancestry, a century of Russian domination in the region during the Soviet era prevented relations between Turkey and the Central Asian countries from progressing.
After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was an expectation that Ankara could play a role in confronting the Russians in their regions, but Moscow's grip on its former republics was still very strong, while Turkey had to deal with a set of pressing domestic issues, from Economic problems led to counterinsurgency, which made it busy enough to engage in active diplomacy outside its borders, even though Ankara was the first capital to recognize the independence of Central Asian countries.
Even when Turkey began to recover, its task was never easy to establish vital relations in the region due to the continuing competition with the hegemonic Russians, but three decades after the fall of the iron wall of the Soviet empire, the Turks were finally able to find a foothold for them as an emerging player. In the Central Asian republics, Ankara is quietly making its way in the region, taking advantage of the Russian retreat.
This shift coincided with the rise of the Justice and Development Party to power in Turkey in 2002, and the accompanying radical changes in the country's foreign policy that included a reassessment of its orientations in Central Asia as part of a larger plan to expand relations with countries linked to ethnic and cultural ties with Turkey.
In 2009, a "high-level strategic cooperation council" was established to promote Ankara's interests in the region, after the leaders of Turkey and Central Asian countries met in Azerbaijan and signed a treaty establishing the council, which became the first voluntary alliance of Turkish states in history.
Cooperation Council for Turkish-Speaking Countries, 2012
This Turkish trend has gradually developed and gained more momentum in recent years, after Ankara clearly announced that it had prioritized relations with Central Asian countries through its special initiative "New Asia" announced in 2019, which was accompanied by unprecedented diplomatic activity and huge Turkish economic investments. In the republics of the region, it extends from major real estate and infrastructure projects implemented by huge Turkish companies, through thousands of small Turkish-owned companies operating in various sectors of the economy, which resulted in an increase in Turkey's trade volume with the countries of the region, reaching 8.5 billion dollars in 2019. As for On the cultural level, schools financed by the Turkish government have become a preferred choice for students in Central Asian countries, as is the case with universities, with the establishment of the Central Asian Universities Association that brought together many of the most prestigious universities in the region.
Turkey's ties were not limited to the economic and cultural aspects only, but also extended to the security and political fields.
In this regard, Turkey's support for its most prominent Asian partner, Azerbaijan (located on the borders of Central Asia on the other bank of the Caspian Sea), in its long-standing conflict with Armenia is the best evidence of the depth of Turkey's military and security relations with the countries of its Asian periphery.
During the last round of conflict over the "Nagorno Karabakh" region that erupted in the fall of last year, Turkish firepower and drones played a major role in enabling Baku to control a large part of its territories occupied by Armenia and the change in the balance of power in the South Caucasus, and in general. Turkey trains hundreds of military personnel from the Central Asian republics through bilateral defense programs, provides security training and military assistance, and is actively involved in the plans of many countries in the region to modernize their armies.
As it advances in Central Asia, Turkey is playing a tough match on Russian soil par excellence.
With Moscow realizing Ankara's strategic moves in the region, it also embarked on taking steps to maintain and enhance its influence.
With most of the countries in the region - namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan - being members of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO), the Russian regional equivalent of NATO, Moscow already has the political cover needed to strengthen its presence.
Summit of Heads of State of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) Member States
In order to increase the readiness of its military forces in the region, in 2020 Moscow deployed drones at its military base in Kyrgyzstan, and two modern Mi-8MTV5-1 helicopters were also installed at the same base, equipped with modern defense systems, in addition to special sighting systems. In order to facilitate low-altitude flying, secure take-off and landing in unallocated places, and simultaneously, Russia also modernized air and missile defense systems at the base. The Russian base in neighboring Tajikistan was no less fortunate, as it received units of the advanced missile defense system (S). - 300 ".
Previous military moves have raised speculation about Russian motives, which at first glance seem to stem from traditional thinking that considers the countries of the region within their distinct sphere of influence, as Moscow has already begun since 2012 to strengthen its existing military bases and other related facilities in the region, coinciding with its support for the region's armies. In various ways, such as arms sales, joint military exercises, and military training programs, within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Historically, Moscow justified its increasing military influence in the region by what is known as a policy to protect the sagging belly, "Soft Underbelly", which is based on the fact that the territories of Central Asian countries have often been coveted by those wishing to target Russia's national security, whether from competing forces or even armed rebel groups. To Moscow, which requires the active presence of its armed forces in these countries to prevent the Russian territories from being threatened by the spillover of armed conflicts, or even the smuggling of weapons and drugs from the fiery theaters of conflict, such as neighboring Afghanistan.
However, given that the countries of Central Asia today enjoy a more stable security environment, it is clear that the Russian mobilization has unusual reasons that go beyond direct security threats to the Russian borders, and the greatest evidence for this is that the air and missile defense and weapons systems that Moscow is making the largest part of its efforts to plant in The territory of the region and its airspace are not originally designed to deal with these types of traditional threats. Moreover, the Russian forces deployed in the region - taking into account the recent developments between Azerbaijan and Armenia - are still unable to intervene effectively to prevent any major regional conflict threatening the security of the region. Russian ocean.
It is likely, then, that the recent increased Russian reinforcements in Central Asia are more related to the context of competition with regional powers aspiring to gain a foothold in Moscow's backyards.
Apparently, the matter is not limited to Turkey alone, as Russia primarily fears the increasing Chinese presence in Central Asia under the guise of the Belt and Road Initiative, as the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are major stations in the land part of the initiative, at a time when Armenia and Georgia are seeking Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are developing technological relations outside the scope of Russian hegemony, and by extension they view China as a great potential partner.
The Russians ’fears about Chinese influence are exacerbated by Moscow’s awareness of the increasing decline in its ability to contribute to the development of the economies of the region’s countries, and its inability to compete with the deep Chinese pockets in terms of aid, financing and investment, matters that threaten Russia’s hegemony over gas production and export operations in the vital energy-rich region. In light of the poor state of the infrastructure and its desperate need for major investments that Russia alone cannot afford, which opens a big additional door for Beijing.
With all these promising opportunities presented by the region, and coinciding with China's desire to take advantage of natural resources, commercial crossing points and large markets to promote Chinese products, it was not surprising that China soon became the first source of foreign direct investment in Central Asia. The Kremlin really is its realization that economic influence is often just a prelude for China to expand its presence in other areas, including definitely the security and military spheres.
The numbers provide unmistakable evidence of this fact.
For example, between 2016-2020, China increased its share of arms sales to Tajikistan to 18%, compared to only 1.5% between 2010-2014, built a military facility in the country without an official announcement, and pledged to support border protection activities in the region. Dushanbe is near Afghanistan with military facilities and equipment, and more than that, China implicitly indicated last summer that it considers the Tajik Pamir region as part of Chinese territory, which prompted Moscow to direct sharp public criticism to Beijing.
The message that the Kremlin wants to pass through these criticisms is very clear, which is that Russia's tolerance of China's economic expansion in Central Asia does not mean that it will turn a blind eye to Beijing's attempts to convert this economic presence into military influence.
Amidst this fierce competition, Russia today is embarking on a vigorous review of its waning influence cards in Central Asia, by presenting itself as a potential mediator and peacemaker during conflicts and a guarantor of regional stability.
In this context, Russia does not seem to be reluctant to cooperate with its new rival, Turkey, and accept it as a potential partner in the region, as long as this will help it contain the influence of China and Iran's moves, both of which arouse Moscow's anger much more than Ankara does.
But while Russia and Turkey share common interests, the two countries are geopolitical rivals by virtue of considerations of history and geography.
Strategically, Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, and Turkey has common political and security interests with the United States and the West much more than it does with Russia, although its relationship with them has not been at its best in recent years.
In light of these facts, it is natural for Russia to view Turkey's presence in the region as a threat to its long-term influence, though not the most urgent threat at the present time.
Conversely, Turkey's growing presence in Central Asia may provide an invaluable opportunity for Washington to make a fundamental breakthrough in an exclusive zone of Russian influence.
For decades, the Kremlin's strong grip on the former Soviet republics prevented the United States from establishing meaningful relations in the Central Asian region, which is of prime American importance thanks to its location as a geographic buffer between Washington's two biggest rivals, Moscow and Beijing.
Although Washington established military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan after 2002 in order to help mobilize its military operations in Afghanistan, America's influence in the region has remained limited and its focus is mainly on securing long-term access agreements to regional bases and military installations that can Used to respond to current and future security threats in Afghanistan.
So Turkey offers an opportunity for America to exist in a region it has always dreamed of penetrating.
Although Ankara is still a long way from replacing deeply entrenched Moscow or replacing Beijing, the leading economic player, US support would provide Ankara with confidence to make further progress in this vital geographical spot, and in the relatively long term. Cooperation between Turkey and America, through the effective use of soft power tools, can create a powerful front that is able to counterbalance the strong Russian influence and the rising Chinese presence.
Moreover, the current political environment in Central Asia provides a real opportunity for this potential cooperation to succeed.
With the desire of the countries of the region to improve their economic conditions, modernize their armies, develop their infrastructure and enhance the assets of energy production and transmission, and with the aspiration of their people to embrace Western democratic values, and the desire of their political leadership - to varying degrees - to liberate themselves from the old Russian influence and to maintain a certain degree of independence on the political stage. Given the failure of the traditional power cards from the Kremlin's hands, it would not be difficult to predict that Central Asia is on the verge of a new geopolitical organization that challenges - for the first time - the established conditions since the fall of the old Soviet state three decades ago.