The presence of Islam in the regional order between Trump's restrictions and the Biden dilemma

There is no doubt that the presence of Islam in the public sphere and the political discourse has witnessed a sharp decline in a number of Arab countries in the last ten years that followed the Arab Spring revolutions and their counter-revolutions, and the interchange between different representations of the Islamic presence and fierce and confused liberal nationalities.

With a new US administration taking over power in Washington, the question that many Muslims may not want to acknowledge is important: What is the impact of this administration’s orientations and policies in the Middle East on the presence of Islam?

First of all, it is important to clarify what is meant in this brief article "in the presence of Islam" and where?

Quite automatically, it is possible to suggest a number of spaces imposed on us by our political imagination, limited by the divisions and classifications of modernity that do not deviate from: the presence of Islam as a source of a cross-national identity and a foundation for a legal, institutional and value framework for collective action between Muslim-majority countries and their interaction with other countries, and the presence of Islam As a source and guide for the national interest of Muslim-majority countries individually or at least as a restriction on some of the options available to achieve materialally formed national interests (security and economy), and the presence of Islam as a source for mobilizing the moral and material resources for political and social organizations that express the desire of sectors of Muslim societies to work Organizational to push, problematic and often state competition in both the first and second levels, the presence of Islam in the level of local legislation, values, public manifestations and social relations, and the presence of Islam in the level of individual religiosity as a guide for personal behavior and spiritual assurance.

While Trump saw Iran's hostile behavior as a major cause of instability in the Middle East, Biden appears to see it as the result of a classic security dilemma.

Contrary to the assumption of "bad" motives for one of the parties to the conflict, the concept of the security dilemma (which is one of the most important concepts of realistic theories, especially defensive realism) suggests that states enter into conflicts that may reach military confrontations despite none of them carrying offensive intentions.

There is also no doubt that Islam lost its presence in both the first and second levels a long time ago, perhaps since the emergence of the modern regional system itself, while the presence of Islam at the third level was the most prominent victim of counter-revolutions, but it also became feared for the presence of Islam in each of the fourth levels. And fifth.

Some may see the liberation of the Arab national elites from international restrictions in their endeavor to reset the regional system at its various levels, including the state-society relationship, as an important entry point for understanding some of the influencing factors and their impact on the presence of Islam at these levels.

This brings back into account the international environment and its variables, the most important of which is the policies of the hegemon: the United States.

It is useful to start from the different handling of Biden and Trump with the regional security rivalries between Iran and US allies.

While Trump saw Iran's hostile behavior as a major cause of instability in the Middle East, Biden appears to see it as the result of a classic security dilemma.

Contrary to the assumption of "bad" motives for one of the parties to the conflict, the concept of the security dilemma (which is one of the most important concepts of realistic theories, especially defensive realism) suggests that states enter into conflicts that may reach military confrontations despite none of them carrying offensive intentions.

In short, the security dilemma means that when a country seeks to increase its military capabilities, even if the goal is security and defense, this raises the concern of other countries that see that increasing the capabilities of that state makes them less safe and then they also increase their capabilities, pushing that two parties towards a non-security competition. A necessity that can be avoided if the security dilemma is managed in a way that reduces its severity.

This does not mean that there is no real material conflict of interests, but rather that the perceptual, perceptual dimension plays an important role in the parties' belief that it is difficult to reach a solution to this conflict.

In Trump's view, Iran appeared to be an expansionist, offensive country with bad intentions, and that this is the cause of the conflicts in the Middle East, and then it should be confronted by activating alliances with its opponents in the region.

Trump did not see a dilemma, but rather a clear hostile behavior, and on the contrary, Biden saw a security dilemma in the Middle East that needed to be managed.

During the Trump administration, the United States acted as a "protector" of the US allies, with conditions for protection related to the distribution of responsibilities and bearing the burdens (Burden Sharing) that reflected Trump's vision of the concept of (protection).

As for the Biden administration, the role of the "manager" is expected to reflect US policies towards the security dilemma in the Middle East.

Although these roles seem unfamiliar in regional political discourse, they do not deviate from what Cal Holstey presented during his development of the role theory in analyzing foreign policy, proposing 17 roles through which states define themselves in the international environment.

So what we see in terms of the difference in US policies is not disengagement or isolation, but rather a redefinition of the US role in the region.

Playing the role (manager) of the regional security dilemma requires restoring a great deal of credibility and influence that has been clearly eroded due to Trump's policies in allocating responsibilities to face common regional challenges, and the resulting release of these policies of freeing the hand of allies in the region to face these challenges, and the new administration may need Quick and direct steps to restrict them within the framework of managing the security dilemma that requires pressure on the two sides of the confrontation, providing guarantees, controlling the size and type of offensive military capabilities, and other policies that do not only aim to deal with a lack of consensus on interests, but more importantly with a lack of confidence in the future intentions between the two parties .

It is also important to link this regional role of the United States to its international role, which Biden clearly expressed on more than one occasion, especially in his article in the Journal of International Affairs titled "A democratic / liberal international leader leading a coalition of democracies to confront the forces of tyranny and save the liberal international system." Liberal International Order).

This places an additional burden on US allies in the region.

In addition to the expected restrictions on the movement of these countries at the regional level, there will also be some pressure on their relations with their societies, which was clearly expressed by the US administration when it indicated to control the relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia not only according to the interests of the United States, but according to its values ​​as well.

Therefore, these countries will have to think carefully, not only in dealing with an objective cost in the context of regional security competition, but also in redefining their roles vis-à-vis the regional and international roles of the United States, as expressed by the US administration.

Of course, roles as an economic partner and strategic ally in the war on terror will not lose their luster, but they may not go as far to give US allies a hand in its regional and domestic policies as was the case during the Trump administration.

To understand the context of these intersubjective physical interactions between the United States and its regional allies it is useful to consider what the concept of order means;

In the end, the dispute between the United States and its regional allies can be described as a dispute over the nature of the regional system and the elements of its stability.

Biden sees the regional system in the context of the rehabilitation of the international liberal system and its values. Therefore, managing the security dilemma by adjusting the balance of power is nothing but a stage that precedes or coincides with building a regional system on legal, institutional and value grounds to be a true part of the international liberal system.

This understanding is consistent with the theoretical dealings with the concept of the system and its levels of stability in the literature of liberal international relations, as it represents the balance of power and its restriction to the desires of states to expand the most superficial level of stability, while the level of reconciliatory compliance with the laws and institutions of the system represents a level of medium depth, and then the level of integration and internal acceptance. With the system’s values ​​of collective security and economic openness, and the values ​​of democracy and human rights.

Arab national elites view the regional system in a slightly more complex manner, in which the factors of internal and external stability are linked together. Focusing on this link has clearly been a recurring theme in political discourse on regional stability in the post-Arab Spring phase.

This view can be understood using the Shiping Tang concept of the system: the degree of anticipation and orderliness of events in a social system.

Tang sets the standard of expectation and regularity versus randomness and chaos, defining 4 elements of order stability: First, the exclusivity of the use of force.

Second, the welfare of individuals improved under the existing system.

Third, the institutionalization of the system (horizontally: the scope of the provisions and procedures covering different areas and issues) and (vertically: the degree of penetration at the collective and individual level).

Fourth, internalization of the legitimacy of the system’s institutional structure.

This concept provides a good space to understand the argument and justification, and even the role of Arab national elites at the regional and internal levels. These elites see that regional security competition cannot be separated from the exclusive use of force as a basic element in their relations with their societies. Rather, security competitions in the region usually mutually target the ability of each A state that controls security and stability internally.

In this context, Arab national elites understand the Arab Spring revolutions as a source of instability and chaos in the region that affected their ability to provide security and well-being to their societies.

On the other hand, the failure of these revolutions and their destructive effects in a number of Arab countries helped these elites to overcome the value questions related to the legitimacy of institutions that provide security and welfare services.

In other words, the efficiency of providing these security and economic services has turned into a basis for the legitimacy of these elites, away from any value or cultural inputs.

The question is: What are the possible responses to this multi-level pressure?

Of course, the experience of the Arab national elites with Obama casts a shadow over the range of possible responses, especially keeping pace with the United States in rediscovering its international and regional roles in the Middle East.

This case not only provided a justification for the Arab national elites to form their relations with their societies in a purely material way, but also acted as a justification for their external movement at the regional level in search of elements of instability abroad that usually take the form of armed groups or political organizations with transnational ideologies questioning, forming and erupting elements of value instability And legitimacy away from the efficiency of providing security and luxury services.

Trump's support for this justification also helped move these elites in their true face as an alliance between the ruling elites running national security and economic networks that seek to extend or clone them in failed or swing states between the Arab Spring and its supporters, groups and states, and the counter-revolutions to it.

So despite the intensity of the geopolitical rivalries in the region, which may tempt the analyst to shorten the regional rivalries within its framework, the struggle to form the regional system in its dimensions and levels represents a broader framework for understanding these competitions in a way that leads to a more comprehensive understanding of the crisis facing Arab national elites on two levels in the face of the shifting role of the states. While managing the security competition as a classic security dilemma restricts the movement of this alliance at the level of traditional geopolitical expansion, while the restoration of the United States' role as a leader of the international liberal system represents a fundamental challenge to the rhetorical content of this movement in the first place.

The question is: What are the possible responses to this multi-level pressure?

Of course, the experience of the Arab national elites with Obama casts a shadow over the range of possible responses, especially the United States ’support in rediscovering its international and regional roles in the Middle East, and what this entails in terms of seeing regional powers and combat and political groups exploiting the spaces resulting from the response to US pressures at the regional and state levels. Society, and that makes the unconditional compromise out of the range of possibilities.

There is also the classic solution: to breathe life into representations of radical Islam at the ideological and organizational level, thus facilitating the continuation of, and even strengthening, the “securitization” of the space between the state-society, provided that this policy is part of a strategy that also includes: Strengthening the security and political partnership with Israel, And openness to what China can offer, and each of them, by the way, understands the security and economic needs of the alliance of Arab national elites, and even their concept of regional stability in an excellent way and has the desire to work with these elites to achieve them.

In this path, the attachment to the American-Israeli relationship and the acceptance and influence of the Israeli rhetoric of its regional policies on the decision-making circles in Washington represents an attempt to persuade the United States to stop dealing with hostile countries such as Iran as a country with defensive intentions, while enhancing openness to China represents an attempt. To push the United States to deal with the region as part of a geopolitical security competition with China and not a project to strengthen the international liberal order.

The Saudi-Turkish rapprochement represents a slightly different direction to deal with the variables of the American position.

There is no doubt that both Saudi Arabia and Turkey represent the most obvious targets for US pressure, whether at the level of their regional or domestic policies.

In addition, Turkey is going through what can be described as a state of declining ability to attract alliances, at least in the Arab region, while the decision-makers in Saudi Arabia do not seem comfortable with the UAE's accelerated steps, especially in its relationship with Israel and its investment of this relationship in the status of Saudi Arabia, with its political weight and depth. My identities are facing difficult choices to keep up with these steps and maintain their position in the Saudi, Egyptian, and Emirati alliance.

Also.

The recent Turkish-Iranian tension represents another element of attraction for rapprochement with Turkey, compared to, for example, the Egyptian role with regard to Iran specifically, which did not exceed the symbolic and intermittent moral support for the Kingdom.

Finally, the Turkish-Saudi rapprochement represents a favorable opportunity to ease the tension in the relationship of each side with the broad spectrum of Arab and Islamic world opinion.

Regarding the presence of Islam at the level of political discourse, some instrumental uses of some Islamic inputs may appear to justify regional moves such as Turkish-Saudi rapprochement, and at the level of cross-border Islamic political organizations, pressure will continue.

The foregoing does not mean that we will witness a real alliance on multiple levels between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who only rationalize the steps of rapprochement that the relationship between them has already witnessed, but rather a convergence that gives space to influence (leverage) that is almost automatic in the interactions of the two different countries, especially against the claims of the United States related to the administration Regional security rivalries and the revival of the international liberal system.

And in anticipation of any Islamic celebration of this rapprochement, it should be emphasized here that this rapprochement is an instrument convergence, meaning that it comes within the framework of both Saudi Arabia and Turkey to maximize their security and economic benefits in light of the options available in the regional and international environment.

In other words, the discussion here is not about the desire of the two sides to "the presence of Islam" at different levels, rather it is about what can be described as the unintended consequences of this response to US policies and the resulting regional challenges.

However, because of the weight that Turkey and Saudi Arabia enjoy in the Islamic world, it will be difficult to ignore the Islamic dimension of this rapprochement, even if the decision-makers in both try to reduce it so as not to attract unfriendly attention at the regional and international levels.

On the other hand, the political discourse of Saudi Arabia in particular may benefit from some Islamic inputs in parallel with calming the intensity and ferocity of patriotism, which seemed "appropriate" as a discourse for a counter-revolution at the regional level in light of the decline of the liberal system at the international level.

However, the situation is more complex now: the justifiable power of the national discourse at the regional level has diminished to a certain degree with the adoption of a liberal discourse at the international level, which makes the ethically poor national discourse in need of identity inputs that balance the international liberal discourse on the one hand and enhance the regional presence in exchange for Adversaries like Iran or allies like the Emirates on the other hand.

Finally, the decline in the intensity of the national discourse represents an opportunity to reduce the pace of internal assimilation and integrate individuals into a vision of a collective life. The network of material values ​​distribution represents the foundations for its sustainability, access to its benefits and its connection with it as a guide to personal behavior and a source of psychological reassurance.

In the end, in light of responding to US policy changes by modifying the direction and speed of movement of some Arab national elites regionally, spaces may be opened and restrictions eased. As for the presence of Islam at the level of political discourse, some instrumental uses of some Islamic inputs may appear to justify regional moves such as Turkish-Saudi rapprochement. The level of transnational Islamic political organizations will continue to pressure, but at the level of local legislation, values, public appearances, social relations, and the level of individual religiosity as a guide to personal behavior and spiritual assurance, the pace and severity of the erosion of the presence of Islam in exchange for patriotism may decrease;

What will Muslims do to take advantage of these spaces?

A question that is beyond the scope of this article.