When a North Korean man traveled to the coast near the Unification Observation Deck in Goseong, Gangwon-do, he was caught by a surveillance camera (CCTV) 10 times, but the military missed it eight times, revealing a serious loophole in the surveillance and surveillance network.



The military did not know for 3 hours and 11 minutes until the man was identified by moving to the civilian control line (civil control line) Socho after he came to the shore, and after 31 minutes of being caught in Socho, the situation was delayed by spreading the situation to major departments and officers. Criticism is also raised for response.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the results of on-site investigations by North Korean men on the North of the Civil Control Line in the East Sea on the 16th today (the 23rd) on how to Vietnam and the military's countermeasures.



According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, North Korean men climbed to the shore near the Unification Observation Deck at around 1:05 am on the 16th and moved south along the shore in front of the coastal fence, leaving their wetsuits and flippers in the rocky ground.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "It is estimated that this man's maritime movement was in North Korea while wearing a wet suit and swam over the sea."



As a result of the inspection team checking the unit's coastal CCTV, the man was detected 5 times on 4 CCTVs from 1:05 am to 38 am, and the alarm sound (alarm) sounded twice on the monitoring room monitor.



Still, the situation room watchdog missed this, and no appropriate action was taken in the unit.



Subsequently, the inspection team also checked CCTV in other places along the route the North Korean man traveled.



Between 4:12 and 14 am, a North Korean man was detected three times on the guard CCTV for the fence of the Navy Joint Operations Support Center at the forefront of the east coast, but the alarm did not sound and the guards did not notice.



Subsequently, between 4:16 and 18 am, it was detected twice by Socho CCTV on the civilian control line, and it was investigated that the worker identified and reported the situation.



A total of 10 North Korean men were detected by CCTV, and the military only identified and communicated the situation when they were detected for the 9th and 10th time.



However, even this has been criticized for being procrastinated.



This is because the civilian control line Socho identified it at around 4:16 am, and at 4:47 pm, 31 minutes later, it spread to key departments and positions through the high-speed situational transmission system.



In particular, in this field investigation, it was revealed that a North Korean man did not even know the existence of the coastal iron fence drainage passage that had passed between 1:40 and 1:50 am.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "In order to confirm the drainage drainage that the unknown personnel (North Korean male) have passed through, we identified three drainage ditches that are not on the unit management list between the coastal search." It seems to have been in the state."



In July of last year, North Korean defector Kim Mo ordered the front line units to inspect the floodgates and drainage channels in Japan through a drainage channel near Yeonmijeong, Wolgot-ri, Ganghwado, Incheon, but the 22nd Division, where this incident occurred, did not properly comply with these instructions.



As a result of the on-site inspection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff explained that the management of the operation room and video (monitor) of the unit could not be identified because they did not comply with the mission performance procedures, and that the facility management was poor even in the order to check the sluice and drainage and take supplementary measures.



In addition, after first identifying a North Korean man on Road 7 north of Jejin Socho of the Civil Control Line, the 22nd and 8th Corps responded comfortably despite the severe situation when determining the initial situation, and concluded that the operation was insufficient, such as not complying with the situational action manual. I did it.



As a follow-up measure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that it would establish operational discipline for the commanders of all units and personnel performing the alert by holding a meeting of operational commanders led by Chairman Won-cheol Won.



Based on the problems identified in this case, he emphasized that the concept of operation of the scientific boundary system will be supplemented, and that it will be corrected as soon as possible through a thorough investigation of the drainage passages and water gates below the iron fence.



He added that we will diagnose the status of the 22nd Division's mission by integrating the Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Army Headquarters, and take measures to ensure the conditions for mission performance, such as unit formation, facilities, and equipment reinforcement requirements.



Some people question the effectiveness of these measures, as they rethinked the follow-up measures such as'Knock defection','rail fence jump defection', and'Walk to North Korea'.



The Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "The military recognizes this situation seriously and will intensively pursue fundamental supplementary measures with the resolution of the transformation of the pangol."



(Photo = Yonhap News)