• Column. "But Illa seems nice", by David Jiménez Torres

The essay begins with an evocation of 1898 and ends with an analogy between the replacement of Rajoy by Sánchez in 2018 and that of the liberal Sagasta by the conservative Silvela in 1899, one of those "gestures of a dead age" to which Ortega alluded.

David Jiménez Torres

(Madrid, 1986), columnist for EL MUNDO and professor at the

Complutense University of Madrid, analyzes in

2017. The crisis that changed Spain

(Deusto) the consequences of the last secessionist attempt in Catalonia as part of

a "constitutional crisis" that represents a turning point in the political model illuminated during the Transition. It is an acute x-ray of the challenge posed by the Catalan labyrinth, macerated from an analytical, calm and reflective tone.

"I would like us to start thinking about the crisis of 2017 and not so much about the process."

That year, in his opinion, «what I call the Premise [he writes the word with the initial capitalized], which consisted in believing that the State of Autonomies was enough to integrate nationalisms and that, in case they were uncomfortable, they were never going to break the deck. ”In addition to being a specialist in the figure of Ramiro de Maeztu and the Anglo-Spanish bond, Jiménez Torres is the author, among other novels, of Cambridge in the middle of the night (2018) .

He has just won the first edition of the

Asteroid Books Non-Fiction Award

with

Bad sleep

, to be published in September.

Did the crisis of 2017 change Spain or did it accentuate the deficiencies that the system was already dragging?

It acts as a before and after.

The reign of Felipe VI, for example, is still marked by his 3-O speech.

That year generated an expansive wave that encompassed the division of the center-right, the polarization of Pedro Sánchez's years as president after accepting the pro-independence votes and the corrosive effects on the institutions.

One of Sánchez's main mistakes is trying to return to

status quo

prior to the separatist process.

What we will see in the February 14 elections is that this is impossible.

You cannot return to the previous world.

Is the détente with the nationalists, which took shape in cooperation with Pujolismo, an extinct political framework?

There is an innocence of democratic Spain and the State of Autonomies that is already irretrievable.

The destruction of 2017 operates on that plane: it liquidates previous beliefs that become irretrievable.

Even if the PSOE wanted to form a new tripartite with ERC and the Commons, it would have to take into account that the Esquerra of today is not the same with which Maragall and Montilla ruled.

Different recipes would have to be tried.

For example, make constitutionalism the axis of governance.

Is it necessary to change the electoral law?

No. A change of chip between the PP and the PSOE would be enough to avoid their inability to form a grand coalition.

Excluding the separatists as partners as long as they do not defend constitutional legality would help them abandon their rupturing.

That sanitary cordon in front of the sovereignists would not contribute, precisely, to feed their victimhood?

I know it's a tautology, but 2017 has already happened.

The strategy of integrating them so as not to push them to extremes has already become clear that it has not worked.

After the Statute with Zapatero and the immobility of Rajoy, secessionism goes from 15% of the votes to 48%.

Why did the State not react until 2017?

Zapatero believed in the cathartic power of a statutory reform to solve territorial problems forever.

Rajoy believed that the separatists would never dare to cross the red lines.

Both show the failure of constitutionalism when it comes to measuring the delegitimization effects caused by the independence movement.

This cannot be understood without knowing what happens first.

Pujol dragged Catalan society for decades, instilling ideas such as an ontological difference between Catalonia and the rest of Spain or invoking a constant grievance, and Artur Mas crosses the Rubicon.

Why does the pro-independence bloc still have the possibility of reaching an absolute majority on F-14?

He suffered a huge defeat in 2017. If three and a half years later nothing has changed, it shows that he has managed to transform the discourse, nothing will stop us from being victimized by the alleged repression.

It also shows the lack of an ambitious plan of constitutionalism beyond the electoral carambola of placing Salvador Illa at the head of the PSC list.

Even if I win, I don't think anything of substance will change after the 14-F elections.

If we are really going to federalism, it would have to be based on the protection of the particular and the delimitation of the common.

And it is just the common that is not clearly defined or defended, at least in the development of the autonomies.

The relationship with the nationalist parties should also be reviewed.

For all this, a constitutional reform is not necessary.

Does Sánchez's ibuprofen policy, to use Borrell's expression, keep the independence movement alive or contain?

From the moment that Junqueras is admitted as a partner without ERC renouncing its rupturism, secessionism is being legitimized.

Sánchez's strategy obeys more to the partisan interests of the PSOE to stay in power than to change things in the Catalan crisis, which extends to the rest of the country.

He describes Casado's leadership as "erratic and ineffective."

You cannot understand what happened to the PP without the crisis of 2017. It is already very difficult to achieve what Casado originally proposed: reabsorb Vox voters and swallow Ciudadanos.

It is another example that there is no return to the situation prior to the process.

The right-wing electorate hopes that Casado does not try to be a new Rajoy.

Neither is a new Aznar.

To continue reading for free

Sign inSign up

Or

subscribe to Premium

and you will have access to all the web content of El Mundo

According to the criteria of The Trust Project

Know more