Turkey and the Gulf Reconciliation | Situation and reflection

On January 4, the blockading countries signed with Qatar the statement of the Al-Ula summit in Saudi Arabia, which was promised to break the siege imposed on the latter, and a reference to a Gulf-Gulf reconciliation after years of crisis.

Turkey was at the forefront of the countries that welcomed the agreement, expressing its hope that it would turn into a full and comprehensive reconciliation, in a way that would benefit the Arab Gulf and the region, and open the way for it to return to its position with the various Gulf states.

Turkey and the Crisis

Ankara had friendly relations, especially commercially, that brought Ankara together with various countries in the region, including the Arab Gulf states, during the first years of the rule of justice and development.

However, its positions on the Arab revolutions led to a clear chill with each other, especially after the coup in Egypt in 2013.

In the crisis of the blockade of Qatar, Turkey rushed to a position in support of Qatar, economically, commercially, politically and even militarily, as it built an air bridge with it, accelerated the steps of opening the Al-Rayyan base and stood by it in international forums.

Despite this clear stand by Doha, Ankara has not adopted its position on the basis of antagonizing other parties, especially Riyadh.

Rather, Erdogan's statements in that period focused on the fact that Saudi Arabia is the "big brother" in the Gulf, which has the responsibility to heal the rift, and he visited Riyadh more than Doha at the beginning of the crisis.

Turkey’s intervention in this way in the crisis, specifically its military base, contributed, among other factors, to preventing the chaos of things, and the development of events into catastrophic scenarios, in addition to that Ankara has always supported mediation efforts, especially those led by the State of Kuwait.

Finally, the Turkish-Qatari relations, especially the Al-Rayyan base, were among the demands of the siege countries to restore relations and break the siege, which put Ankara at the heart of the crisis, even if it was not a party to it in the first place.

Reconciliation is a Turkish interest

For all the previous considerations, Ankara's vision of the agreement bears special importance, as reconciliation - or its precursors to accuracy - in the form in which a pure Turkish interest has been accomplished in many aspects.

In the first place, it is a step that defused a crisis open to many possibilities and harmful to a vital region for years, and thus avoided worse scenarios, and this is in the fundamental interest of the region and Turkey.

It also included a break of the blockade and an easing of pressure on an ally country, which is Qatar, especially as it was carried out without concessions from the latter, or in response to the demands that the blockading countries had set as a condition for breaking it.

On the third side, and with regard to Turkey directly, the Al-Ula summit statement did not include any negative reference to the latter or demands and conditions on Qatar regarding the relationship with it, unlike Iran, for example, which is a very positive indicator for Ankara.

However, the Gulf crisis is still in its early steps;

However, it opens a new page in the region at the level of Gulf-Gulf relations, and the same can be said about Turkish-Gulf relations, albeit out of possibility and possibility, and this is supported by a number of evidence.

Also, the solution in its current form opens the door to the possibility of improving Ankara's relations with a number of parties to the crisis, especially Riyadh and Cairo, including developing economic relations and increasing investment in Turkey, which is of great importance in light of the Corona pandemic and the reality of the Turkish economy.

This improvement in relations, if it takes place, even as much as easing tension and temporarily rotating the corners of the dispute, would reduce the pressure on Turkey and disturb the cohesion of alliances and alignments that oppose it relatively in the region.

It would also open horizons for possible solutions - acceptable for Turkey - for a number of regional files, foremost of which is the Libyan issue, where the visions of Turkey and some of these countries are facing each other.

This possibility is enhanced by the conviction of the various parties that the chances for a military solution have diminished, which has prompted some of them to modify their position on the Government of National Accord.

Reflections

Although the Gulf crisis is still in its early steps;

However, it opens a new page in the region at the level of Gulf-Gulf relations, and the same can be said about Turkish-Gulf relations, albeit out of possibility and possibility, and this is supported by a number of evidence.

There are those who saw that the recent agreement reduces Qatar's need for Turkey, and makes it more keen on satisfying its neighbors, which will push the level of relations between the two countries to decline over time.

However, we expect the exact opposite, that is, rootedness, strengthening and development.

That is because Doha realizes the importance of the role that Turkey played in bringing it to the moment of reconciliation without concessions from it, which it cannot risk losing in the future, especially as it - along with Turkey and the rest of the parties - realizes that reconciliation is still fragile, and that what has happened under the bridge since 2017 is difficult to overcome. A stroke of a pen on the statement of Al-Ula

Doha acted out of a feeling of loyalty and gratitude with Ankara in several stages, especially in terms of trade and investment, as well as political stances.

It also does not seem obliged to make concessions to its neighbors in terms of relations with Turkey, as it did not result in a weak or forced reconciliation on the one hand, and the neighbors' relations with Ankara are likely to improve on the other hand.

At the forefront of these comes the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which Turkey has been keen to keep its relationship with at the best possible level even in light of crises, and at the forefront of which is the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Over recent weeks, especially after Biden's election, and foreseeing the features of the new phase with him, Riyadh has made many hinting signals of its desire to improve relations with Ankara.

Of course, this is a matter that the latter is likely to respond positively to, especially if Riyadh’s relations with Doha continue to improve, and the latter seeks to mediate between them, as mentioned by some reports.

The other regional power that Ankara wishes to develop relations with is Egypt, according to the statements of Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşolu, which confirmed that the two countries are in a new stage of intra-relations, the basis of which is to avoid escalation and harm each other's interests.

This possibility is increased by the presence of real interests that bring the two countries together in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean (maritime border demarcation), as well as Cairo's annoyance over the decline of its regional role in light of some of the developments taking place;

This includes the path of Arab normalization with "Israel".

Against all this, the UAE appears to be an exception in this context until now.

Not only because Ankara did not initiate positive statements or steps towards it, similar to Saudi Arabia and Egypt;

But also because the statements of the UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash, in which he valued the trade relations between the two sides, and denied his country's pride in the dispute with Turkey, remained without a response or official comment.

This is because the differences between Ankara and Abu Dhabi exceeded the limits of regional competition, or what some parties see as Turkey's support for Arab opposition, especially Islamic ones.

The first accuses the second of seeking to harm its national security in the last few years, by financing some internal moves, including the failed coup, supporting separatist militias in northern Syria, and inciting them in the United States of America.

In conclusion, the Gulf reconciliation in its current form and its steps that have been taken so far represented Turkey's interest, especially as it came without concessions from or from Qatar, which is an addition to its record in 2020, which included important breakthroughs in the Libyan file and the conflict in the Caucasus and even the relatively eastern Mediterranean.

Reconciliation maximizes the possibility of improving Ankara's relations with a number of regional powers, especially Riyadh and Cairo, which is consistent with its vision and its endeavor to turn around the corners of the dispute, activate diplomacy, and avoid escalation in the next stage.

Finally, reconciliation is still in its first steps, and it will need many confidence-building steps, and it will pass many testing stages. Therefore, time alone will reveal the extent of its cohesion and its reflection on regional alignments.

But it can be said that Turkey - and with it Qatar - is neither under pressure nor in a hurry, and is awaiting the transformation of signals and statements into convictions and policies, realizing that the policies of many countries are based on alliances and preconceived positions more than strategic interests and visions.

This leads to not raising the ceiling of optimism and expectations for a radical change in the region's alliances.

It is a calming stage then, at the level of statements and positions at the very least, as for its transformation into strategies and policies that depend on political will, the coming weeks and months will prove whether it is in place, or it will be just a maneuver to pass Biden’s entry to the White House, and the repercussions of that on some countries.