Lumumba: how the West made an enemy

Lumumba, an enemy of the West?

© FMM Graphic Studio

Text by: Laurent Correau Follow

18 min

On January 17, 1961, the deposed Prime Minister of Congo, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated in Katanga with his two co-detainees Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito.

Sixty years later, the decision-making game that led to this fatal outcome is still the subject of debate among historians.

One thing is certain, however: this killing came after several months of plots and intrigue.

Over the course of 1960, the Western camp convinced itself that Lumumba was a dangerous man and convinced itself that he had to be politically neutralized or even assassinated.

Publicity

Read more

Brussels, January 27, 1960. The Belgo-Congolese round table has been open for a week.

It is now a question of determining the date of independence.

The atmosphere was electrified with the arrival, in the ranks of the Congolese delegation of a young politician who focuses attention, Patrice Lumumba, just released from his cell in Stanleyville.

He still wears bandages around his wrists.

At the end of the session, this Wednesday, the spokesman of the Congolese Front Jean Bolikango tries everything for everything: " 

The date of independence will be June 30, 1960

".

Placed at the foot of the wall, the Belgian authorities accept.

The end of the afternoon is festive.

In a few hours, Kabasele and African Jazz will be performing their new creation “

Independence Chacha

 ”

for the first time on stage 

during a “ 

Independence Ball

 ” at the Hotel Plazza in Brussels, where the African delegation attended. been installed.

For the time being, African delegates have called a press conference in the basements of a large hotel in the square.

Patrice Lumumba is the one who speaks first.

It is also the one who closes the conference.

The days of work that will follow will confirm this positioning at the heart of the debates.

“ 

With the round table, Lumumba's prestige has increased considerably.

He appeared as a strategist,

 ”explain the researchers Jean Omasombo and Benoît Verhaegen1.

 Lumumba

,” add the two authors, “

joined the Brussels conference, which has just started without him, and he will make all his demands come to fruition.

More radical than most of the other Congolese delegates, he refuses to allow the metropolitan government to reserve any power, he strongly rejects the hypothesis of the King of the Belgians or of his father Léopold III at the head of the independent Congo, he demands that all the cogs of the country are in the hands of the Congolese 

”.

Patrice Lumumba welcomed at Brussels airport in January 1960 of 1960 © AFP / Archives

From February, the Belgian will to dismiss Lumumba

The first part of the round table ends on February 20, 1960. A week later, the office of Belgian Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens considers that one of the first objectives to be achieved is to bring about the emergence of a moderate government in the Congo "

 fundamentally willing. to collaborate with Belgium

 ", and avoiding"

 having in its ranks, at least in a preeminent position, personalities such as Kasa-Vubu (strictly regional interest)

 "or Patrice Lumumba who would risk playing"

 the game of 'East 

' 2.

One of the members of this cabinet will not leave us until the death of Lumumba: his name is Harold d'Aspremont Lynden.

This man, from the nobility of Namur, was then deputy chief of staff of Eyskens.

On March 1, this collaborator of the Prime Minister has a new working session, this time with Professor Arthur Doucy, an adviser on African issues.

The two men are considering an overall plan for the management of the Congo in the coming months.

"

 The man to be eliminated is Lumumba

 " agree the two officials who make two recommendations: "

 As far as possible to promote his contacts with abroad 

" and regroup the political forces which are opposed to him3.

► To read also: Life and death of Lumumba: assassinated anti-colonialism

On March 10, d'Aspremont Lynden wrote a letter this time to Paul de Woot de Trixhe, the deputy administrator of State Security, in which he asked " 

that we can collect in a summary all the elements that we have on contacts with the East and the Communist Party of Lumumba and his entourage

 ”.

The security note which was given to him and which he transmitted on the 16th to Minister Raymond Scheyven was, however, not very inspired by the Congolese leader's links with international communism.

The Congolese elections of May 1960 allow the emergence of a majority led by the MNC-L, the wing of the MNC which follows Lumumba.

Despite everything, it took several weeks of negotiations and political tensions to arrive, a week before the proclamation of independence, with the inauguration of the government led by Patrice Lumumba.

When on June 30, 1960, Patrice Lumumba speaks during the independence ceremony and delivers the historic speech which will anger King Baudouin, he is therefore already perceived by the Belgians as a troublesome political leader.

The young Congo to the test

Less than a week after independence, on July 5, African soldiers of the Force Publique mutinied in Thysville, the current Mbanza Ngungu, and Léopoldville, the current Kinshasa.

Panic spreads to the white community which begins to flee the country.

Belgian nationals are victims of abuses.

And on the 10th, the Brussels authorities launched a military intervention.

On the 11th, Katanga proclaimed its independence.

On the 14th, the Congo broke off diplomatic relations with Belgium.

Kasa-Vubu and Lumumba send a telegram to the Soviet leader, Khrushchev in which they state: " 

Faced with the threat to the neutrality of the Republic of Congo coming from Belgium and certain Western countries which support Belgium's plot against our independence, we ask you to constantly follow the development of the situation in the Congo.

We may be forced to ask for the intervention of the Soviet Union if the Western camp does not put an end to the aggression against the sovereignty of the Republic of Congo

 ”4.

On the same July 14, d'Aspremont Lynden wrote a note for the Belgian Prime Minister, in which he reaffirmed the thesis of a pro-Soviet

Lumumba

: “ 

Lumumba personally is only the agent of execution of a gigantic plot. engineered by the East;

Western solidarity must play as much as possible in this area.

The USA must be warned, but must not, it seems to me, intervene directly in the game

 ”5.

Congo-Léopoldville, or Republic of Congo, in June 1960. © Studio Graphique FMM

Americans ?

They are already following what is happening in Congo.

According to Belgian and American historians Emmanuel Gerard and Bruce Kuklick, three anti-Communist voices will influence the orientation of American policy vis-à-vis the Congo6: Allen Dulles, head of the CIA;

Ambassador William Burden in Belgium and the recently installed CIA post chief in Leopoldville, Larry Devlin.

The two historians speak of three " 

scheming, but ill-informed 

" men.

These officials were telling themselves and to others that Lumumba was going to lead Africa to communism and that they had to derail it 

."

On July 15, before the National Security Council (NSC), Dulles thus describes Lumumba as a “

 particularly anti-Western

 ” character.

Less than a week later, he argues before the same Council that the United States is facing the Congo in a situation "

 similar to that of Castro or worse 

".

On July 19, it was Ambassador Burden who advised the State Department to “ 

destroy

 ” the Lumumba government and encourage a confederal Congo.

For Gerard and Kuklick, these three men plaster over the Congo a scenario observed elsewhere, that of “

 from chaos to communism

 ”, a theory describing the way in which the USSR manipulates personalities and unstable situations to succeed in provoking the revolution.

The political configuration deteriorates again in mid-August.

The Congolese Prime Minister was infuriated by the trip of the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to the Katangese secessionists in Elisabethville.

The government and the people of Congo, he said on August 15, " 

have lost their confidence in the Secretary General of the United Nations

 ".

This questioning of the United Nations worries Washington, because a UN withdrawal from the Congo would pave the way for a large Soviet deployment.

UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold greeted at Elisabethville airport by Moïse Tshombe on August 15, 1960. AFP

On the evening of August 16, US Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge informed the State Department that, according to the UN Secretary General, “ 

the United Nations effort cannot continue as long as Lumumba is in operation. post.

One of the two should go [would have to go].

 »Remove Lumumba?

The idea is not new, but this time will take shape within the American state apparatus.

On the 17th, the United States Ambassador to Congo Clare Timberlake recommended to the State Department that the opponents of Lumumba be encouraged, that they remove him from power as quickly as possible.

Larry Devlin, for his part, proposes an operation whose objective would be to replace Lumumba by a pro-Western group7.

Americans clarify option of assassination

On August 18, the United States National Security Council meets again.

Under Secretary of State Clarence Douglas Dillon explains to officials gathered around President Eisenhower that it is essential to prevent Lumumba from driving the United Nations out of the Congo.

Lumumba, he says, works to serve the objectives of the

Soviets

.

Dulles goes further: “ 

Lumumba is in the pay of the Soviets

[in Soviet pay]” Eisenhower then intervenes: it is “ 

simply inconceivable

 ” that the UN should be driven out of the Congo.

And the United States must do everything to ensure that the United Nations remains, " 

even if such action were to be used by the

Soviets

as a starting point for a conflict

[as the basis for starting a fight]".

Does Eisenhower ask, at this meeting, the physical elimination of Lumumba?

The question continues to be debated, historians questioning the memories of Robert Johnson, one of the members of the NSC, before the Church commission8: “ 

At one point during the discussions, explained the former official, President Eisenhower. said something - I can't remember the exact words he used - which struck me as an order for the assassination of Lumumba, at the heart of the political conflict and controversy in the Congo.

There was no discussion;

the meeting just continued

.

The day after the meeting, in any case, the headquarters of the CIA gave the green light to Leopoldville to launch the operation to replace Lumumba.

A week later, on August 25, the Congolese case was again discussed in Washington within the framework of the “ 

Special Group

 ”, a sub-committee of the NSC in charge of secret operations.

Five men participate in the meeting.

Thomas Parott of the CIA takes stock of the actions carried out by the agency “ 

to mount an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo

 ”, through certain professional groups and a draft vote of no confidence against Lumumba in the Congolese Senate.

"

A high priority of our secret action

 "

Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, speaks.

The formula he uses seeks to protect Eisenhower, but the message is clear: a "conviction 

extremely strong 

" was expressed on the need for a " 

very direct action 

[very straightforward]."

Are the plans that have been presented sufficient?

Dulles, the director of the CIA intervenes in his turn: he has taken into account "

 seriously 

" what has been asked of him and has every intention of implementing things "

 as vigorously as the situation will allow or require.

 ".

Obviously under pressure, the director of the agency himself cables from August 26 to Devlin new instructions: "

 In high places here, we come to the clear conclusion that if Lumumba continues to hold important functions, the inevitable result at best, chaos and at worst the opening of the way to a communist takeover of power in the Congo, with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the United Nations and for the interests of the free world in general.

Therefore, we came to the conclusion that its

removal

should be an urgent and priority objective and that under the current conditions it should be a high priority of our covert action

 ”.

The director authorizes the office manager to consider spending up to $ 100,000 to carry out any programs that may be necessary and for which he would not have the opportunity to seek authorization.

For his part, Richard Bissell, one of the deputy directors of the CIA, asks Bronson Tweedy, the head of the agency's African division, to explore the idea of ​​an assassination of Lumumba with the station chief. of Léopoldville.

Bissell also asks his special assistant for scientific problems, Dr Sidney Gottlieb, to prepare the biological material necessary to be able to assassinate an unspecified African leader9.

Allen W. Dulles, Director of the CIA in his office in Washington.

© AP

"

 Operation L. 

" and kidnapping project

The Belgians, meanwhile, are making their own plans.

It was the time when a document entitled “

Operation L. Suggestions

 ” was

born on the keyboard of a typewriter 

.

Its author is unknown, certainly a former Belgian-Congolese security officer, who writes from Brussels.

The author indicates in this note that he has not yet been able to obtain a plan of Lumumba's house, but cites people who may be engaged to provide information or participate in the action.

He also suggests how the operation could be carried out: to rely on " 

the interest of the interested party for women

 ", but also "to

 consider contact with his political opponents

 " and exploit the fact that a certain number of European collaborators of the person concerned “

 now feel committed beyond what they would have liked

 ”.

Finally, the note proposes that we proceed by drug substitution, which says a lot about the purpose of this project10.

Another project: at the end of August beginning of September, a former member of the Public Force back in Brussels, Colonel Dedeken receives from General Charles Paul de Cumont, the Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army, the order to "

 kidnap Lumumba and bring him to Brazzaville

 ”.

Dedeken must contact Consul General Dupret in Brazzaville, but also meet with an agent of the SDECE (the French services) placed in the entourage of President Youlou of Congo-Brazzaville, Antoine Hazoumé (whom he surprisingly presents as the "

 Prime Minister 

").

Hazoumé, for his part, provides Youlou's support in terms of river transport, possible accommodation for his men, weapons, hiding places ...

The lack of Belgian consistency

In a written testimony he left, Dedeken explains that he is going to Élisabethville to train his team.

 The candidates

,” he wrote, “

are handpicked and begin their commando training in the surrounding woods.

 But three weeks later, when Dedeken returns to Brazzaville, he realizes that the operation has made a lot of talk about her.

His name is even associated with a liquidation operation of Lumumba, called Barracuda.

In full confusion about his role and his mission, Dedeken returned to Élisabethville, where he received from Baron Rothschild, the head of the Belgian technical mission, the order not to deal with Operation Barracuda ... and to redeploy to South Kasai 11.

For the expert historians of the Belgian parliamentary commission12, these projects without a future show the absence of Belgian coherence in the organization of an operation to physically eliminate Lumumba.

“ 

If the desire for murder was there for some,

explain the authors

, it was too diffuse, too cumbersome for serious means to be given to intermediaries to take action.

In fact, in the fall of 1960 in Belgium, no one wanted to take responsibility for a process leading to the physical elimination of Lumumba, so this process did not start

13

.

 "

►Also listen: La marche du monde - Assassinated leaders, from Lumumba to Um Nyobe - Special independence DRC

1 OMASOMOBO Jean and VERHAEGEN Benoît,

Patrice Lumumba Political actor.

From prison to the gates of power.

July 1956- February 1960.

L'Harmattan, Paris, 2005

2 Royal Museum for Central Africa (RMCA).

Note "Congolese policy" on headed paper of the "Prime Minister's office", stamped "Very secret" and dated from Brussels, February 27, 1960 cited by GIJS Anne Sophie,

A political ascension tinted with red.

Authorities, State security and large companies facing the "Lumumba danger" before the independence of the Congo (1956-1960)

, Journal of Belgian History XLII, 2012, 1, pp.

11-58.

3 RMCA, Frédéric Vandewalle Collection containing private documents of H.

d'Aspremont Lynden.

Note to the Prime Minister, Conversation with Monsieur Doucy - March 1, 1960. Quoted by GIJS Anne Sophie,

op.

cit.

4 The content of the telegram was relayed in the days that followed by the Tass agency and published by the newspaper

Le Monde

in its edition of July 18, 1960.

5 Note from H. d'Aspremont Lynden to Prime Minister Eyskens, July 14, 1960 4:45 pm;

PVDW cited by DE VOS, GERARD, LIBOIS and RAXHON, 

The secrets of the Lumumba affair

, Brussels, Editions Racine, 2005, p 48.

6 GERARD Emmanuel and KUKLICK Bruce,

Death in the Congo.

Murdering Patrice Lumumba

, Harvard University Press, 2015.

7 KALB Madeleine,

The Congo cables.

The cold war in Africa - From Eisenhower to Kennedy

, New York, Macmillan Publishing, 1982, pp 51-53

8 Commission formed in 1975 in the wake of the Watergate scandal to investigate illegal, irregular or unethical activities that may have been carried out by an agency of the US federal government.

9 On these different episodes, see KALB Madeleine (1982),

op.

cit.

, pp 53-55 and pp 63-67

10 This document is presented in DE VOS Luc, GERARD Emmanuel, GERARD-LIBOIS Jules and RAXHON Philippe, 

op.

cit.,

pp 141-142

11 Dedeken's written testimony is reproduced in DE VOS Luc, GERARD Emmanuel, GERARD-LIBOIS Jules and RAXHON Philippe op.

cit., pp 215-217

12 Commission created after the publication of Ludo De Witte's book “The Assassination of Lumumba”, which points to the responsibility of the Belgian authorities at the time in the death of Patrice Lumumba.

This commission of inquiry was set up by the Belgian House of Representatives on March 23, 2000 and worked until October 31, 2001.

13 DE VOS Luc, GERARD Emmanuel, GERARD-LIBOIS Jules and RAXHON Philippe, 2005, op.

cit., p 209

Newsletter

Receive all the international news directly in your mailbox

I subscribe

Follow all the international news by downloading the RFI application

google-play-badge_FR

  • Lumumba, an assassinated independence

  • DRC

  • History