“When Thursday was the second of Muharram [year 661 AH / 1263 CE], Sultan al-Malik al-Zahir Rukn al-Din Baybars (d. 676 AH / 1277 CE), his princes and the people of al-Hul and the people of al-Hul and al-Aqd were seated in the large iwan in the castle of the mountain, and the Caliph al-Hakim came to the order of God (d. He went down to the iwan, and it was placed next to the Sultan - and that was after his lineage was proven - and his lineage was read among the people, then King Zahir Baybars came to him and pledged allegiance to him and the people after him pledged allegiance to him, and it was a memorable day.
Cairo Al-Mahrousa then corrected that day on this event that Imam Ibn Katheer (d. 774 AH / 1372 AD) portrayed for us - with these words - in “The Beginning and the End”: A new declaration of the establishment of the Abbasid Caliphate at the hands of Zahir Baybars;
It is not a return to a caliph who says "rain wherever you want", but rather to the Caliph of Qureshi Abbasi describing the Turkish Mamluk Sultan as "the sultan, the king, the apparent master, the just scholar, the mujahid, the supporter of the world and religion !!
However, this new form of government or what could be called the constitutional succession - in which the caliph became a symbol that prevails and does not rule - had older jurisprudential constitutional foundations, which in some way paved the way for the establishment of this type of government.
Jurisprudence made a kind of displacement for the traditional political jurisprudence, and tried to install a new approach based on the political imagination of a situation of collapse to which the Muslim political group would devolve, and then lay down some general rules for dealing with this dangerous situation expected.
This article does not present the book 'Al-Ghayathi', in which Al-Juwaini addressed his theory on the state of the institutional political vacuum.
Rather, it tries to provide a historical sociological extrapolation of the book’s role in the political reform processes that took place in the fifth century AH, and a contextual contextual circumstantial reading that places the author’s jurisprudential statement within the framework of his time and its circumstances and not fragmented and dispersed, as well as showing a comparison to political theories that coincided with it, at the forefront of which is the theory of Imam Abi Al-Hassan Al-Mawardi 450 AH / 1059 CE), then concludes with the influence of al-Juwayni’s contribution to imams who came after him and formulated reform visions of the political situations in the countries of their era.
An anomaly,
evidence suggests that al-Juwayni composed al-Ghayathi around the year 470 AH / 1078 CE, during a period that witnessed the rise of a fighting revival force, the Seljuk state, who tried - in the presence of their great minister Nizam al-Mulk (he assumed the ministry between 455 and 485 AH / 1064 and 1092 CE) - to establish a status A new political and legal one, contrary to a long and bitter period in which the Buyids (Mu'tazilite Shiites, most likely to say,) took control of the Abbasid Caliphate, where the caliph fell into the position of a prisoner of their sultans, chastened of will, paralyzed opinion, and stolen position.
And before the control of the Buyids, who were originally military leaders;
The caliphate’s submission to the domination of the Turkish military began when they killed Caliph al-Mutawakkil in 247 AH / 861 CE, but this submission reached its peak from the beginning of the fourth century, especially after the death of the al-Muqtadir caliph in 320 AH / 932 CE. From then on, the rule became that “the caliph has no rule.”
As the historian Ibn al-Atheer (d.630 AH / 1233 CE) says in al-Kamil.
Thus, military commanders had the right to appointment and dismissal in all state functions, including the position of the caliphate, and then the abuse of the caliphate reached its extent in the era of the Buyids (from 334 to 447 AH / 945-958AD).
Caliph Al-Mustikfi (d. 334 AH / 944 AD), for example, was thrown to the ground and dragged with his turban.
This is what made the historian Ibn Katheer describe - in 'the beginning and the end' - this age by saying: “The matter of the caliphate was so weak that there was no order left for the caliph, no prohibition, or a minister.”
Add to that the siege of the Shiite geography of the Abbasid caliphate in that era.
The Fatimids took control of Egypt, the Levant and the Hijaz, but the capital, Baghdad, was divided in their days into Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods, whose sons were involved in endless societal fighting, in addition to insecurity, the prevalence of robbery, looting, and revolts of thieves and bullets.
However, with the beginning of the fifth century, the Fatimid state entered a phase of weakness and division, and the power of the Buyid state also declined following a series of fierce wars between the sons of the ruling house.
On the Fatimid front;
Their successor, Al-Hakim Bi Amr Allah, disappeared in the year 411 AH / 1021 AD from their capital, Cairo, in mysterious circumstances, and his fate was not known after that.
And on the poetic side;
One of their weak young men took power with no experience or qualifications.
Under these circumstances;
The psychological strength of the Abbasid Caliph al-Qadir Billah (d. 422 AH / 1032 CE), who assumed the caliphate position before that in the year 381 AH / 992 CE, and his inauguration at that time coincided with the expansion of the Fatimids regionally in the Levant and Hijaz, and internally in Iraq. He restored her grandmother and renewed her law. "
As Ibn al-Atheer says.
A transformative gesture,
the Caliph al-Qadir took two decisive stances: the first had a political background related to the external confrontation with the Fatimids;
It was represented in the issuance of a petition in 402 AH / 1012 CE that included the scholars ’testimonies of the invalidity of the Alawite lineage that the Fatimids possessed for themselves, by which they establish“ the legitimacy of the caliphate ”through belonging to the family of the house, and then linking to the Hashemite house that would unite them with the Abbasid caliphs. ;
According to Imam al-Dhahabi (d. 748 AH / 1347 CE).
This record was signed by the leading jurists and personalities of that era, including Shiite figures such as Sharif al-Radhi (d. 406 AH / 1016 CE).
As for the second position, it was related to the internal struggle with the Buyids over power and control.
It came in the form of a "fundamentalist reform" that aims to settle the verbal choices in the religious ideology that prevails in the Islamic community, especially the Sunni milieu, which is represented by two great wings that do not cease to struggle: the Ash'ari and Hanbalis (the people of hadith), in order to build a common "doctrinal" ground between them that allows leprosy Their ranks behind the palace of the caliphate to strengthen its strength in the face of the Buyids, and it is striking that this methodological choice of doctrines stipulated the disbelief of the Mu'tazila, who represented the original intellectual support of the Buyids.
This step - which took place in the year 420 AH / 1030 CE as Ibn al-Jawzi (d.597 AH / 1200 CE) says in al-Mu'tazim - was known as “al-Iqtid al-Qadiri,” and al-Khatib al-Baghdadi (d.463 AH / 1072 CE) - in the “History of Baghdad” - is attributed to al-Qadir personally Establish this belief;
He says, "And he used to write a book in the fundamentals in which he mentioned the virtues of the Companions."
There is no doubt that this compromise step succeeded - even temporarily - in achieving its goal, as "it was approved by the Sunnis sects."
As Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH / 1328 CE) says in “Daraa opposes transmission and reason”.
Therefore, it was decided to teach the "Qadiri belief" in the areas of the caliphate as "the belief of the Sunnis and the community."
With the death of al-Qadir in the year 422 AH / 1032 CE and the assumption of his son, al-Qa'im bi Amr Allah (d. 467 AH / 1074 CE) - who during his long reign repeatedly published the record of challenging the lineage of the Fatimids and the reading of the "Qadiri belief" - the laments of the reform project were completed.
This time, however, it was framed by a political jurisprudence that took place at the hands of the great Shafi’i jurist, who was working as a judge for the state's judges.
The reign of al-Qa'im spanned 45 years between the Buyid states and the Seljuks, and at the end of the Buyid era, the star of the Sunni minister and reformer scholar Abu al-Qasim Ibn al-Muslimah (d.450 AH / 1059 CE), who assumed the ministry in 437 AH / 1046 CE, sought help - in setting and implementing his political reforms - in Mawardi. He left the position of the judiciary and devoted himself to writing and authoring until he produced his books on political jurisprudence, the most important of which is 'Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah', which it is said that he dedicated to this minister;
Similar to what Imam Al-Juwayni (d. 478 AH / 1085 CE) will do next with the Seljuk minister and the Shafi’i scholar Nizam al-Mulk when he wrote the book “Al-Ghayathi” for him.
Saving Mawardi
Many writers - perhaps the first of whom was Juwayni himself - did not appreciate the project of Imam al-Mawardi, which he presented in 'Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya'.
The man was living in a delicate circumstance characterized by the imbalance of the balance of the struggle between the wings of power. The armed force in Baghdad was still in the hands of the Buyids, even though their state system was crumbling.
Therefore, Al-Mawardi did not - as some accused him - want to favor the Abbasid caliph, but he feared that the general "Sunni" caliphate would collapse in front of the "Shiite" military power of a Buyih that was Ovatimiya.
Al-Mawardi spoke as a jurist and a judge who works - or used to work - in the system and is aware of its fragility;
He had three realities: the realism of the jurist who preserves the legitimacy of religious principles, the realism of the constitutional judge who protects an existing political system, and the realism of the royal employee who is aware of the balance of power in state institutions.
This is in addition to the negotiating role that he sometimes played between the Sunni Abbasid Caliph al-Hanbali and the Shiite Shiite Sultan al-Mu'tazili, and it was more like a bridge of communication between them through: his jurisprudential Sunnah with the caliph, and his verbal isolation - if correct - with the Sultan.
The Mawardi project was intended to raise the level of the Sunni caliphate.
So he adhered to “that [the caliph] be from the Quraysh because the text was mentioned in it and consensus was convened on it,” which means that the Abbasids will remain in their position, assuming the “succession of prophethood in guarding the religion and the politics of the world,” so that they have no authority over this right.
As for Al-Juwayni - who came in a different context from the Mawardi context, the most prominent of which is the fall of the Buyids and the rise of the Seljuks - he hinted at the transformations that Islamic history is moving towards, and saw the need to liberate the supreme caliphate from prevailing conditions such as Quraysh, and to focus on stable political concepts as a condition for assuming the supreme position such as “sufficient And independence in the matter, "because" we "do not understand the need of the imamate in its status (= as an institution) to lineage" Al-Qurashi.
Al-Juwaini watched the new neurotic transformations based on the Turkish element and its oppressive military power represented by the Seljuks who had become the "sanctuary of the Sunnah", and thus he completely changed the political context and the conditions of his controlling power from the context in which Mawardi lived and wrote;
The Seljuks became more assured of the identity of the Sunni sect than the Abbasid Caliph, who lost the condition of independence.
Perhaps Ibn Khaldun (d. 808 AH / 1406 CE) noticed this shift - but in another context - by saying in 'Introduction': “Among those who say that the Qur’ashy’s condition is denied by Judge Abu Bakr al-Baqlani (d.403 AH / 1013 CE), when he realized about him the nervousness of Quraish from vanishing and decaying And the tyranny of the Persian kings of the caliphs, so the Quraish condition was dropped.
But al-Mawardi used to defend the Abbasid Qur’anic caliphate even if the caliph was lacking independence and paralyzed by will, so that “[the caliph] seizes him from among his assistants who tyrannizes the implementation of matters - without pretending in disobedience or openly with difficulty - does not prevent his imamate, nor insult to the validity of his mandate. ".
As for Al-Juwaini, he said, “If the obedience of the imam falls within us, his thorn is inherited (= weakened), and hearts are alienated from him ... as the face is styled as an 'obedient imam', even if the 'investigating imam' did as much as he could."
Juwayni’s review It
was not possible for Juwayni to present his new theory until after he breaks out of the old Mawardi theory, but the problem surrounding Juwayni’s criticism of Mawardi - the two Imams al-Shafi’i - is the neglect of the historical context that we alluded to.
Valgueni described Mawardi’s theory as “articles on ignorance and dire” without taking into account the critical circumstance in which it appeared.
Al-Juwaini paved his criticism of Mawardi with a cautious tinge of praise, saying that he is a “prestigious” figure, and that he was “well-arranged and tabulated” for his book “Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah”, then he mentioned that (= Juwayni) built his theory after contemplation. ”A book for some of the later (= al-Mawardi) translated (= entitled) By 'The Rulings of the Sultani', it includes the narration of doctrines and the narration of opinions and demands, without knowledge and guidance, and it shows to the perception of a purpose. ”
Al-Juwaini described Al-Mawardi’s proposal as an evocative statement because it was “the transmission of the notables of the past skilled and the writing of what the previous ones were tired of, with much confusion in transmission and confusion.” Then he accused him of not understanding the reality and “whoever was not in its composition and classification with insight, the suspects did not distinguish him from Known ".
Abu al-Maali Abd al-Malik al-Juwaini “grew up in a house of knowledge and religion. His father was one of the well-known scholars in Nishapur (today it is located in northeastern Iran). When Juwayni reached the age of nineteen, he occupied a teaching position in one of the Shafi’i schools in his city, and then he continued to navigate knowledge. Until he became “the great imam, the sheikh of the Shafi’is, the imam of the Two Holy Sanctuaries,” in the words of al-Dhahabi in “The Life of the Flags of the Nobles.” According to al-Subki (d. 771 AH / 1369 CE) - in the ‘Tabaqat al-Shafi’i’ - he “does not doubt that he was the most knowledgeable of the people of the earth. In words, principles, jurisprudence and the most investigated.
Al-Juwayni lived through the great sectarian strife that erupted in Nishapur in the year 444 AH / 1053 CE, under the fueling of the Seljuk minister Abu Nasr al-Kandari (d. 456 AH / 1065 CE), and this minister was “a Mu'tazili ... hurting the Shafi’is and exaggerating the victory of the Abu Hanifa doctrine.”
According to al-Dhahabi in al-Sirah.
A reform coalition
forced many Ash'aris at their vanguard to emigrate from Khurasan, until the ordeal ended with the killing of al-Kandari and the assumption of Sultan Alp Arslan (d.465 AH / 1073 CE), who had settled Nizam al-Malik.
The new minister of Ash'ari and Shafi’iism won and built for them the schools known by his name, including the “Nizamiyya” in Nisapur, to which al-Juwayni returned in the year 455 AH / 1064 CE, fulfilling the minister's call, the king’s order to teach in it and live under the care of the minister, and he used to sit between his hands every day about three hundred men Imams and students ";
Sobky says.
And with insight;
Ibn Taymiyyah noticed - in Majmoo 'al-Fatwas - this coordination and clear link between the minister Nizam al-Malik and Imam al-Juwayni and his relationship with the Sunni revival at the hands of the Seljuks, who in their “time were ministers like Nizam al-Malik and scholars like Abu al-Maali al-Juwayni, so they became - with what they establish from the Sunnah And they return it from a heresy ..- They have the status of the ummah according to that. "
Al-Juwayni may have been a link in an important series of renewal by scholars of the fifth century AH, such as al-Qushayri (d. 465 AH / 1073 CE), al-Ghazali (d. 505 AH / 1111 CE), a student of al-Juwayni.
However, the truth is that the relationship that arose between the “sword and the pen” - or the system of al-Malik and Juwayni - is the key to the reformist political theory presented by Abu Al-Maali and simplified in the book Al-Ghayathi.
It is clear to the reader of the book to note that the first person addressed in it is the new force surrounding the Abbasid Caliph Al-Muqtada bi Amr Allah (d. 487 AH / 1094 AD), who was appointed caliph in 467 AH / 1074 AD before completing twenty years.
By that power I mean the young Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah (d. 485 AH / 1092 CE) and his powerful minister Nizam al-Mulk, as they were the alternative force that dominated the eastern flank of the geography of the Abbasid caliphate.
When browsing Al-Ghayathi;
We find that revered view of the Seljuks, especially after the battle of Malakkid with the Romans in 463 AH / 1071 AD.
"With them the infidels are confined to the far reaches of the homeland, and with them the clauses of religion fail over the two, and with them the call of truth was established in the Two Holy Sanctuaries, and the Milla Brigades were established in the East and the West," and they were the ones who fought the great wars with the opposing forces. "And they made [them] the great tribute and the worldly ... And the prestige of Islam spread over distant lands.
A new proposal
also talked about their role in pushing back internal strife: “Did they not uproot the Qarmatian base from their homes? And eradicate the effects of the traces of the people of help and the clothes of the successors of the Banu al-Abbas? They lowered the necks of heretics and every rogue class of horse-smiths, and their terror ended where the night ended, so it was not left in The plan of Islam pretending to be heresy would have become a terrified plague. "
Moreover, he granted them what Al-Mawardi had granted to the caliph before;
On the authority of the Seljuks, he said, "They were followers of the religion of Islam and ministers of Sharia."
And a link between the end of Islam and the defeat of those forces, if the Seljuks were broken, "the mosques were destroyed ..., the congregations and the call to prayer were cut off, the bells and crosses became famous ... and the plan of Islam became a sea full of blatant disbelief ...; would these people burden the people of Islam with a lot of debris and they are strength and order ?!"
What did Juwayni want then?
He wanted this power - represented by its minister Nizam al-Mulk, who was the center of the Seljuk power at the time, due to the young Sultan Malik Shah, who was striking in Juwayni's neglect of his mention - to advance not to take the position of caliphate.
But to build an alliance - according to new constitutional rules - between the rulers of the pen, who are the scholars, and the masters of the sword, who are the Seljuks, and their world minister Nizam al-Mulk.
This alliance will result in the caliphate remaining a ceremonial position closer to the concept of a "constitutional monarchy" in our time.
He transferred the powers of the imam to the Seljuk authority and its powerful minister, so that the rule is that “whatever is entrusted to the imams (= caliphs) ... is entrusted to the opinion of Sadr al-Din (= the system of the monarch)", and therefore his decisions are not subject to the legal or political approval of the caliph;
Then the task of guarding religion is entrusted to scholars, as Al-Juwaini theorized, and we will deal with it later.
With this vision, we can understand the theory of Imam Al-Juwayni, and this is the entrance to understanding the man’s project and the context in which it can be realistically explained and dissected.
This Seljuk force was dominant over most of the land of the caliphate, and its symbol was the regime of the king, "his condition and his decency were greater than that of the caliphs."
As Sobky said.
Between Fahmin
says researcher d.
Wael Hallaq in his article entitled 'The Caliphs, the Jurists and the Seljuks in Juwayni’s Political Thought': “Al-Juwayni left the readers of his book Al-Ghayathi to doubt that he is ready to completely overthrow the Abbasid caliphate in favor of a dominant sultan who could manage the affairs of the ummah efficiently and competently.”
Is this real talk?
The reality is that Al-Juwayni - like all jurists - does not see the removal of the caliph except with an apparent justification that affects his mental, physical and religious competence. “What requires dislocation (= resignation) is an apparent reason that is not hidden and keeps the prospect of its demise ... such as insanity that removes the assignment if it becomes strong." Its degree is lower than dislocation and isolation.
But what is the ruling of the chastised imam like the Abbasid Caliph in his days?
Al-Juwaini answers us by saying: “The imam’s falling into captivity, and if he was cut off by him, I do not see him as necessitating a release.”
But what should we do if it is proven to us that the imam is not independent in managing the affairs of governance and has fallen into disuse?
Abu Al-Maali answered: “If the obedience of the Imam falls in us ... and hearts are alienated from him without a reason that requires him (= the legal reasons that require isolation), and he was in this on an insightful thought and a correct opinion ..., but the supporters let him down ..; [P] the face is eroded An imam who is obedient, even if the verifying imam did his best. "
Consequently, the obligations to dismiss the Imam according to Al-Juwayni remain constant as they are among the jurists. However, the solution that he proposed is the preservation of the legitimacy of the “verified imam,” but with the transfer of political powers to the “obedient imam,” and by this he means a force that can enforce the affairs of government legitimately and smoothly.
It is a perception similar to the status of a constitutional monarchy.
In fact, Al-Juwayni was hopeless in the existing political system, and he wanted to conduct a deep structural reform within the political establishment, and for the ruling to devolve to the authority of reality or the new sectarianism after the dissolution of the Abbasid sectarianism, but with the presence of the Caliph.
And he aspired in this book to anticipate the collapse of his expectation of the caliphate so that the caliph would remain a religious symbol that prevails and does not rule.
Events surprisingly confirmed Juwayni's predictions.
About two centuries later, the Abbasid caliphate fell completely at the hands of the Tatars in 656 AH / 1258 CE, and the Mamluk Sultan Al Zahir Baybars "revived" this caliphate in the manner proposed by Al-Juwayni to the king's regime, when he called him to intervene decisively to take over the matter: It is strange that Mawlana - the cave of the nations who uses the sword and pen - initiates the look ..., and the waving may obviate the statement, and the symbols and metaphors may obviate the revealing of the utmost goals.
What a nod to him d.
Barber - was preceded by the late Sheikh Dr.
Abd al-Azim al-Deeb, the investigator of al-Ghayathi - that al-Juwaini may have wanted a coup against the Abbasid caliphate, which is not accurate.
Perhaps the closest to reality is what Al-Sabki reported - in 'Tabaqat' - of words suggesting that Juwayni may have been inciting the king’s regime to seize the position of the sultanate from the Seljuks, and not to the position of caliphate, as Hallaq and others see it.
This is because the minister Nizam al-Mulk really “used to venerate the caliph’s order ... and whenever the Seljuk Sultan wanted to remove the caliph, the regime forbade him and sent to the Sultan - in the interior - to alert him.” As for the Sultan, Malak Shah, what “it was .. for the caliph with him is the name”
As golden says.
Perhaps Juwayni was pushing the minister to turn against the Seljuk Sultan, meaning that he wanted him "Baybarsa" before Baybars appeared !!
Not just a minister.
Why Al-Ghayathi?
Given the structure of the book 'Al-Ghayathi', in which he presented his project to review many of the axioms of political jurisprudence;
We find that he is interested in the issues of colleges that are rare in Islamic jurisprudence in general, especially the political aspect of it, which al-Juwayni takes on the jurists to neglect him.
In "The End of the Matlab", he shows the importance of "the rulings of the ayat (= states), as Sharia is in need of them, and the jurists do not take care of them."
The book 'Al-Ghayathi' looks at the provisions of the political Sharia as being applied to the group and institutions and not within the domain of the individual.
It is a book "On the topics of meanings, he knew the rules and the buildings, and he rose to a great degree from the colleges that the retired wani does not realize."
Also, the idea of the book is based on developing perceptions of crises that Al-Juwaini was looking forward to, because "the mabahith does not refine except by imposing estimates before they occur and containing their sentences and their sum."
He had expected that the caliphate would collapse and that the Muslims would alienate from the Sharia, with the weakness and collapse of the political and scientific institutions he lived with, and the Muslims would not find anyone to help them and provide them with the thinking that would guarantee facing this "state of emergency".
Al-Juwaini therefore called for the establishment of a new jurisprudence that copes with the paradoxical situation, and for this his book provides a recipe for dealing with the emptiness when the expected moment arrives.
The book is called 'Ghayath al-Ummah fi al-Thawl al-Dhuqm,' and it is known as an abbreviation of al-Ghayathi, and its name comes from the “relief” associated with calls for help in times of distress and distress, a meaning that was intended by al-Juwaini who says: “So I collected these chapters and hoped that copies of them would spread in countries And the cities, if the people of time found them, they would almost understand them because they are partitions, then I hoped that they would take it as their refuge and refuge, so they would surround themselves with the costs they owe in their time.
Here Juwayni lays an important rule in political thought.
It is that his rulings are subject to the totality - not formalities and circumstantial concessions - even if the result of thinking is contrary to what the previous ones put it, and therefore he says with confidence: “I do not [be careful] to prove a judgment that the jurists have not written down and the scholars have not been exposed to, because most of the content of this book is not written down. In a book ..; but I do not invent or invent anything. Rather, I notice the status of the Sharia and evoke a meaning that is appropriate to what I see and be investigating. This is the way to act in new events in which the answers of scholars are not prepared. "
In the second chapter of the book - which is about the emptiness of the imams / caliphs - confusion may arise on the reader;
Sometimes he addresses his current situation with his authoritarian triad: the Abbasid Caliph, the Seljuk Sultan, and the Minister Nizam al-Mulk, and sometimes he addresses an exceptional situation that may happen in the future.
Hence, some people may be problematic about the rotation of judgments and how they are conducted, and this means that the reader is important to understand Juwayni’s terminology, and his Maqasid approach to judge any part of it in ambiguity, as happened to some when he understood that he wanted to finish off the Abbasid caliphate.
The book consists of three chapters: The first is about the Imamate and its conditions by which the extent of its fulfillment or absence is known;
The second is in assessing the absence of time for the Imams / Caliphs;
And the third in estimating the extinction of the Sharia campaign.
He believes that the first chapter is just a "preface" to the other two chapters, which are the purpose of the book to discuss the features of "the jurisprudence of the void."
Employing a Shiite It
is well known that the Ja`fari Shiite jurisprudence entered the time of the "great backbiting" with the entry of Imam Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Askari into the basement around the year 264 AH / 878 CE;
According to the Shiite belief.
And from then on;
Ja`fari political theories froze until Sheikh Al-Jazini (d. 876 AH / 1471 AD) came to his speech - in the book “The Damascene Glow” - about “the deputy of the expected imam,” and his attribution of this representation to the class of Shiite jurists.
Then the idea of the Shiite "guardianship of the jurist" was practically embodied - for the first time in the history of the Ja`fari Imamate - by Sheikh Karaki al-Amili (d. 940 AH / 1533 CE), whose religious role in establishing the Safavid state is equivalent to that of Judge Abu Hanifa al-Nu'man al-Tamimi (d.363 AH / 974 CE) in Establishment of the Fatimid state;
Then the jurisprudential establishment of the theory of "Wilayat al-Faqih" developed through the writings of Sheikh Ahmad An-Naraqi (d. 1245 AH / 1830 CE) and Mirza al-Naini (d. 1355 AH / 1935 CE), to be permanently entrenched in the institutional and constitutional model of the Iranian revolution in 1399 AH / 1979 CE). .
But Al-Juwaini provided a pre-emptive reading of all this, starting from the state of institutional existence to thinking about a situation of emptiness in which “the country's scholars are the rulers of the servants”;
Whereas the Shiite jurists - those who followed his era - reflected his theory, so they set out from the void of the long "imamist backbiting" to furnish the political scene with a scholarly presence, through the temporary "guardianship of the jurist" theory of the "Hidden Imam";
One of the differences between the two approaches remains that al-Juwaini spoke of what might be called the “wilayat al-faqih” rather than the one “wilayat al-faqih”.
And in his proactive endeavor,
Al-Juwaini employed his theoretical political imagination - using his methodological equipment of a fundamentalist and verbal paradigm - to provide a theoretical response to the coming state of emptiness, so he decided a general rule that “every matter that the imam deals with in the funds delegated to the imams, if the time falls short of the imam and is devoid of a ruler of succor, adequacy and know-how Matters are entrusted to scholars, and creatures of all classes have the right to refer to their scholars and issue all states' issues according to their opinion. If they do that, they are guided to the straight path, and the country's scholars have become the rulers of the servants.
Rather, Al-Juwaini went far in his imagination when he assumed the empty space of scholars and princes together.
He said, explaining the purpose of his authoring 'Al-Ghayathi': “I put [this] book for a great matter, because I imagined the dissolution of Sharia and the extinction of its campaign, and the people's desire to seek it, and the creation strike against interest in it, and in my era I witnessed the imams (= the hardworking scholars) becoming extinct and not being left behind, and the distinguished ones. By request (= students of knowledge) .. they persuade the parties, and the purpose of their demand is controversial issues that they boast about, or fabricated chapters and words in sermons that appeal to the hearts of the common people ... I learned that if the matter went too far in this way, the scholars of Shari’a would soon become extinct, and only classifications would leave them behind And books. "
The hierarchy of emptiness
Al-Juwaini built his theory on the conception of four levels of societal void, each level containing a set of "ranks and degrees," as he put it;
Which is: the absence of time from the rulers of affairs and heads of authority.
Then it was free from the imams of the diligent scholars.
Then it is free from the imitated scholars from the "transfer of doctrines".
Then it was devoid of the law itself by its implantation.
After that, he proceeded to answer and analyze the circumstances and context of the fall of these four departments, by stating the procedures that should be taken to deal with the state of the executive and legislative vacuum.
The truth is that time is devoid of rulers and scholars can be imagined.
But is it conceivable that the times are devoid of the law itself?
Al-Juwaini says: "Sects of our scholars have gone that this does not happen, because the principles of Sharia remain preserved on the passage of ages to the puff of images, and they cling to God Almighty saying: (We have revealed the remembrance, and unto him we preserve).
Then he responds to this objection by saying: “This method is not satisfactory, and the verse in memorizing the Qur’an is about distortion, alteration and disposition, and there have been news about the convergence of the Sharia, the blurring of the laws of Islam, and the erosion of the features of rulings by the arrest of scholars.” Therefore, “There is no need for these estimates, even if they affect them. Time does not go away in the repellent of custom, the pervertedness of the Sharia in the first place until it is taught completely. "
It is a shocking answer, but it is completely realistic and in line with possible possibilities in history.
Al-Juwaini brings us closer to what is going on in his political imagination - from his conception of the great void in the life of the nation of Islam - by assuming the existence of a people separated on an isolated island from the world, which is a representation of the utmost levels of emptiness: there is no state, scholars, or Sharia.
“The inhabitants of the island revealed to them the significance of prophethood, so they recognized monotheism and prophethood, and they did not stand on any of the principles of rulings, and they were not able to [march] to scholars of Sharia…. They are only obliged to believe in monotheism and the prophethood of the dispatched Prophet, and settle the soul to reach it in The future of time, regardless of the causes of the possibility ..., and we do not rule that God’s judgment over them [is] the obligation of their minds ..., [P] - if you study the branches and origins of the Sharia, the costs are cut off from the servants, and their conditions are joined by those who did not reach them with a call and were not subject to Sharia.
Thus, Al-Juwaini decides that the two origins of “monotheism” and “prophethood” are the origin of the ummah's roots, and since these two origins remain, the ummah will remain even if the legitimate costs fall from it.
Then he adds a third principle, which is the innate morals that compel their owners “to abstain [from] the requirements of apostasy,” with his assertion that this is not a binding legislative source. “Minds - according to the doctrines of the righteous people - do not require prohibition and analysis, and they do not, in the perception of the assignment issues, rely.” .
A political imagination,
therefore, Al-Juwaini was strongly supportive of the idea of the nation’s consensus, and he denies it the possibility of collectively apostasy even if the assets are absent from it, so he decided that “it does not break with the faith, clothed in the blindness of ignorance, so the content of this article is the notification of the safety of the ummah from those who turn into disbelief and apostasy, even if it extends to it. Duration. "
It is the same idea of the nation’s infallibility, which his student Al-Ghazali spoke about - in the study of consensus in his book Al-Mustasfi - by saying: “Rather, it is permissible to make a mistake in the ijtihad that is unique to the Ones. As for the ijtihad of the“ Infallible Ummah ”it is not possible to make mistakes as the endeavor of the Messenger of God (PBUH) and its measurement, Because it is not permissible to disagree with him because his infallibility is proven, so is the “infallibility of the nation” without a difference.
Perhaps in these constitutional levels lies the value of the political imagination presented by Al-Juwaini, to be a model for Islamic scholars to emulate the jurisprudential and political thinking in moments of emptiness, and how life can be resumed in emergencies and natural disasters.
One of the main and important ideas that came in the book was his talk about the independence of authority - or the imamate / caliphate - from subordination to any external or internal force, and he meant that of course the deviant powers, because he always demands the imam’s review of the authority of Sharia and scholars.
And the condition of independence contained in the book is close to its meaning in modern political thought;
Al-Juwaini believes that subordination, the attachment of the will, and falling into the arms of foreign powers loses the legitimacy of the authority, and "independence" has a kind of competence or competence that enables the imam to carry out his religious and worldly duties. "The adequacy that is observed means independence by performing the righteous law in the matters entrusted to the imam."
It expands the concept of "independence" to include religious and worldly affairs;
If the imamate is the leadership of religion and the world, and he must be independent himself in the management of worldly matters, then he must also be independent by himself in religious matters, so that he does not fall under the influence of the dispersion of opinions of scholars and sects. If the imam was not independent with the knowledge of Sharia, he would need to review scholars in details The facts, and that distracts his opinion and takes it away from the rank of independence. "
But it is necessary here to recall that Al-Juwaini speaks within the framework of a state that has formally made - although this seems often formal - its supreme reference is the rulings and teachings of Islam, regardless of the direction of diligence in deriving these rulings.
Juristic authority
establishes the book 'Al-Ghayathi' - clearly and categorically - to demarcate the authority of the jurists, and it seems that he wants religious powers - in the position of the caliphate in which the caliph becomes a symbol of government and the sultan or minister possesses his executive powers - to the jurists as a form of legislative oversight over the executive body ( The sultan and the minister);
Because if “there was no prophet in the era, then the scholars [are] heirs of the Sharia, and those responsible for ending it are the shrine of the prophets.” Therefore, “if the authority of time did not reach the level of ijtihad, then the followers [are] the scholars, and the authority is their help, their strength and their strength.”
The new Seljuk forces and their political symbols and scholars must make this partnership, and accept this situation. The world of time - in the intent that we are trying and the purpose that we pursue - is like the prophet of the time, and the Sultan is with the world as a king in the time of the Prophet, he is commanded to end what the Prophet ends to him, and that the author of tyranny It is not safe to deviate from the Sunnahs of payment, and according to the scholars' science, it is free to deviate (= success), and the necessity of the path of economics. "
Al-Ghayathi seems to be a forward-looking book in this regard.
Where the compositional trend began that synthesized between the ideological fundamentalist, sub-juristic and ethical doctrines of Sufism, so Ash'ari became a cross-doctrine and even Sufism, and then this crystallized into major social forces during the fifth century, especially with the networks of schools and endowment institutions, which made the medieval era the era of scholarly authority.
Al-Juwayni believed that the executive authority should respect its limits, restricting the imam’s consideration of worldly matters.
Therefore, the Sultan has nothing to do with the community of scholars and their jurisprudential differences, "The imam should not be exposed to the jurists of Islam regarding the details of rulings in which they dispute." Rather, he must "acknowledge each imam and his followers on their doctrine and not prevent them from their behavior and demand."
Establishing this strict principle of separation of power and knowledge;
Al-Juwayni recalls the bitter experience of the Caliph al-Ma'mun (d.218 AH / 833 CE), when he entered biased by the opinion of the Mu'tazila sect and tried to impose it with power over the rest of the sects and sects. .
But Juwayni - at the same time - requires the state to commit itself to protecting the Sunni sect - as it is the doctrine of the majority - without imposing it on the followers of other schools.
Rather, he addresses the minister, Nizam al-Mulk, saying that the essence of real power is in the hands of the jurists alone, given their legislative powers, which confer legitimacy on the actions of the executive authority.
He says: “From what I delivered to the High Council (= Minister Nizam al-Mulk): It is necessary to review scholars about what comes and weathers.
Later Influences
Perhaps the greatest influences of Al-Juwayni's treatises on political jurisprudence are Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Khaldun;
The first is the author of the book “Legal Politics in Reforming the Shepherd and the Parish” (It should be noted that we find in al-Juwayni the expression “Reclamation of the Shepherd and the Parish”) whose authoring idea is close to the idea of al-Ghayathi, as he theorizes how to codify the status of strength and courage represented by the new ruling class at the time ( Mamelukes), and at the same time being directed towards political and societal reform.
Realizing both matters means accepting the reality of the Mamluk and its companions of military glory, as long as this reality will reform itself and reform society, and he will be satisfied with the scholars being partners in power as long as "the rulers of the matter are of two types: the princes and the scholars."
Moreover, this book did not discuss the idea of Quraysh al-salad that al-Juwayni had toppled, rather, most of its content was about de facto authority and not about the caliphate.
As for Ibn Khaldun:
Al-Juwayni’s influence on him appears to be evident in the pattern of his exploration of power shifts, noting the shifting of the state and ruling sectarianism from the Arabs to the Persians, who were the Seljuks in the era of Juwayni and the Mamluks of his time.
Therefore, Ibn Khaldun held a chapter in his great history, 'Al-Abr', entitled “Al-Khabar on the State of the Turk (= the Mamluks) who were in charge of the Abbasid state in Egypt and the Levant from after the Bani Ayyub and to this era and the principles of their affairs and their conditions,” affirming that they have “the merit and merit for what God bestowed upon them of the enormity of The king and the state honored the glorified mosques and the service of the Two Holy Mosques. "
The influence also appears in describing the source of legitimacy for the then-existing caliphate system.
When Al-Juwayni ruled that "the caliphate after the extinct (of the four adult caliphs) was marred by the defects of conquest and supremacy, and the pure right to imamate became rejected, and the imamate became a biting king."
We find Ibn Khaldun saying - in the 'Introduction' - following him: “You have seen how the matter became to the king and the meanings of the caliphate remained .. Then the meanings of the caliphate were gone and only its name remained, and the matter became a pure property and the nature of conquest proceeded to its goal.”
So is the shark condition;
Al-Juwaini said that her condition of the caliph is not in the text, but rather, "consensus ... is the approved .. in his regard", and he justified this with realistic and persistent reasons that made it a historical tradition.
He said: “The point is to prove what we are trying to do about that (= the Qur’ashy condition) that the two past are still promising (= declaring) the competence of this position in Quraysh, and no one other than Quraysh has ever been seen to lead the imamate.” Therefore, “the lineage proved a condition in honor of the Messenger of God’s tree.” (PBUH) [only], as none of the aims of the imamate depends on condolences to lineage.
With Juwayni's agreement,
Ibn Khaldun says - in the 'Introduction' - indicating the document of the saying of the Qur’an’s stipulation in the Caliph: “As for the Qur’ashi’s lineage, it is the consensus of the Companions on the day of the shed.” Then he came with the same realistic justification: “That is that Quraysh were a group of mischief and their origin and the people of the conquest of them .. and honor. The Arabs admit that to them, and they are relieved to defeat them. If the matter were made to others, then the separation of the word would be expected. "
Indeed, this concept of Asabiyyah al-Khalduni was previously related to al-Juwayni's report and linked the success of religious invitations to his existence, as Ibn Khaldun did later in 'Introduction'.
Al-Juwayni says: “God did not send a prophet in the previous nations until he supported and strengthened him with a power of equipment and help, and among the messengers - peace be upon them - who had prophecy met .. and strength…. And when God sealed the message in the world with the master of Adam's son, he supported him with a white argument .., and strengthened With the sword, he buttoned him ... and made him the imam of religion and the world. "
Thus, we find that Al-Juwaini - may God have mercy on him - was not just a jurist, but a method of genius and luminaries walking on earth!