As a result of the presence of 20 million Azeris and is facing a bad economic situation
Iran is concerned about the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict
A picture distributed by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense of workers removing debris from the rubble of their homes that were bombed in the Nagorno Karabakh region yesterday.
Reuters
Rouhani stressed that Armenia must get out from the Azerbaijani lands it has occupied since 1994. AFP
picture
The fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan came at a very bad time for Iran.
On the domestic level, Iran is facing a very bad economic situation, as a result of the US sanctions.
On the external level, it is involved in many unfinished adventures in the Arab year from Iraq, Syria, and others, as it has invested a lot for that in recent years.
Although it may wish to implicate itself in this conflict in the South Caucasus, where it previously played the mediating role, Tehran's ability to do so is now much smaller than its proximity to the conflict suggests.
But the bad thing is that Tehran does not enjoy the diplomatic independence it was in at the beginning of the 1990s, when the conflict broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh region, and when the Iranians could act as a mediator between the two parties.
Retreat
Iran now had to step back and make room for Russia, Turkey and the Western countries, the forces that shape the course of the conflict.
Nevertheless, thanks to the large Azerbaijani minority in Iran, which reaches about 20 million people, there is a real possibility that the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict could escalate and pose a great threat to Iran's internal security.
And Tehran does not want to lose this conflict, but it does not have sufficient strength to intervene.
After the outbreak of hostilities between Armenia (which has a Christian majority) and Azerbaijan (which has a Muslim majority), on September 27, it took Iran three days to accept that this new conflict differs in quality from its previous skirmishes.
In spite of the signing of a ceasefire at the end of the previous war, which lasted between 1988 and 1994, the two neighboring countries have engaged in many hostilities during the ensuing years until now, including the recent conflict that is taking place now.
After four days of fighting, and after Tehran realized that the fighting would not stop quickly, as is usually the case, Tehran suddenly switched from its diplomatic rhetoric, which focused on neutrality and willingness to play the role of mediator between Yerevan and Baku, to declaring that it supported Azerbaijan.
On October 1, the political representative of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, in four of the northwestern regions, which are home to large numbers of ethnic Azeris, made a joint statement in support of Azerbaijan.
The statement declared that "there is no doubt" that "Nagorny Karabakh" belongs to Azerbaijan.
But the statement coincided with the emergence of reports saying that Tehran had opened its airspace to Russian planes, which were transporting military supplies to Armenia.
Then the protests erupted, not in the Iranian region east of Azerbaijan, but in Tehran itself, and slogans appeared saying: "Karabakh is ours ... and it will remain ours."
Passage
The mere mention of the possibility that Iran would play the role of a corridor, to deliver weapons to Armenia, was considered explosive news, and Iran would immediately prompt to deny and reject it.
And this is exactly what happened.
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Muhammad Javad Zarif, and Khamenei's chief advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati, reiterated the position that Armenia should exit from the Azerbaijani territories it has occupied since 1994. In addition, the cleric backed by the Iranian government Hossein Nuri Hamidani, using religious terms when he said: “Karabagh is part of the Islamic world, and it must return to the Islamic countries, and it must be liberated.” The popular momentum behind the full support for Baku became so great that Tehran did not allow Azerbaijan's strong relations with Israel To reduce it.
Put simply, Iran is not in a position to act against its Azerbaijani minority.
Unlike in the early 1990s, when the collapse of the Soviet Union opened the way for Iranian Azerbaijanis to reconnect with their brothers in the north, who had been under Russian / Soviet rule since the beginning of the 1800s. The Azerbaijani minority became in Iran. These days, I am more aware of the causes of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, and more enthusiastic to support Baku.
This would be a great concern for Tehran, as it is in the end a multi-ethnic country, and Tehran is completely unprepared to deal with any uprising that occurs between members of other minorities, which feels injustice in Iran, as a result of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
These days, the frequent skirmishes between security forces and militias of ethnic groups appears to be a fact of life in Iran.
In the southeast, on the border with Pakistan, the "Army of Sunday" group, which has a Baluchi ethnicity, and is said to be linked to "Al Qaeda," continues to target Iranian security forces.
Likewise, in western Iran, where the border is with Iraq, the Kurds' targeting the Iranian security forces is a normal part of life.
Exaggerate
Although it is an exaggeration to say that Iran is, now, on a powder keg that could explode at any moment, it is misleading, too, to claim that unrest among ethnic minorities is not the reason that prompted Iran to suddenly change its rhetoric in order to support Baku. .
Iran's position could become clearer, based on developments in this round of conflict.
Although Tehran has maintained friendly relations with Yerevan, since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, it has established strong relations with Baku, in recent years, including increased trade, tourism, military cooperation, and even the possibility of exporting arms to Azerbaijan.
Turkey is at the center of Iran's calculations, as it is the third player in this conflict, so Tehran is watching it with great interest.
Iran accused Ankara of fueling the conflict by urging Azerbaijan to seize the largest possible area of its occupied lands, before any ceasefire and diplomatic negotiations are agreed upon.
There are two main issues driving Iran's thinking here: The first is that Turkey, which many Iranian commentators see as intent on establishing its tutelage over all Turkish peoples, is able to respond easily to Iran.
Ankara could try to incite some of the large pockets of ethnic Turks in Iran against Tehran's policies.
Second: Despite the doubts that the two parties have against each other, Turkey remains an important neighbor and an important partner for Iran.
But given Tehran's isolationism, it does not want Ankara to join the long chain of overt enemies it has.
Regardless of how cautious the Iranians are in playing their cards in this recent conflict in the South Caucasus, the simple fact remains that Tehran has weakened its hand in the region than it was in the early 1990s.
Currently, no one views the Iranian mediation as a serious suggestion.
As Tehran, as a result of the ongoing confrontation between it and Washington, and its preoccupation with other conflicts in the Arab countries, it was never beholden to Moscow as it is now, or that it was afraid of an escalation with Turkey in the southern Caucasus.
While Iran is watching with concern Russia and Turkey, as they act as the main foreign engine of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it above all wants a quick end to this round of fighting, which, if escalated, could drag Iran into a new region of war, which it cannot bear. .
• These days, the frequent skirmishes between security forces and militias of ethnic groups seem to be one of the facts of life in Iran. In the southeast, on the border with Pakistan, the "Army of Sunday" group, which has a Baluchi ethnicity, and is said to be linked to "Al Qaeda," continues to target Iranian security forces. Likewise, in western Iran, where the border is with Iraq, the Kurds' targeting the Iranian security forces is a normal part of life.
Turkey is at the center of Iran's calculations, as it is the third player in this conflict, so Tehran is watching it with great interest. Iran accused Ankara of fueling the conflict, by urging Azerbaijan to seize the largest possible area of its occupied lands, before any ceasefire and diplomatic negotiations are agreed upon.
Alex Vatanka is director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute in Washington
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