Why is Turkey positioning itself on a very offensive regional activism?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

REUTERS / Umit Bekta

Text by: Arnaud Jouve Follow

18 min

Whether in Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece and Cyprus or with Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Turkey is making its voice heard with force.

A look at Turkey's regional activism with specialist Jean Marcou, as the head of Turkish diplomacy reiterated his support for Azerbaijan on Tuesday, October 6, during his trip to Baku.

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Jean Marcou holds the Mediterranean and Middle East chair at Science Po Grenoble.

RFI: Turkey is very active on many regional issues, as we can still see today with its positions in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

How to interpret this very offensive foreign policy?

Jean Marcou:

To understand this Turkish foreign policy, it is necessary to situate it in a larger scope, which is ultimately Turkey's position after the Cold War.

The Cold War was a turning point in Turkish foreign policy, because after the Kemalist period what predominated was national independence.

Turkey, which did not really participate in World War II, returned to the Western bloc and was an important and strategic ally due to its positioning, as it was the only country with Norway to have a common border with The soviet union.

After the Cold War, there was a problem of repositioning Turkey in relation to its Western allies but also with that which had been its big neighbor and its main problem during the last two centuries of the Ottoman Empire, namely the Russia.

In the 1990s, there was a new policy which consisted in opening up, in diversifying its relationship mainly turned towards the West, towards its regional environment.

This was accentuated more dramatically more than ten years ago with the policy of "zero problems with our neighbors".

This policy appeared spectacular, because this Turkey which seemed turned towards the West, suddenly became a country of the Middle East and it started at the same time to forge links with all its neighbors, including understood with those with whom she had an extremely difficult relationship like Syria.

But this policy failed.

From 2015, 2016, a new much less idealistic policy appeared, based on the defense of the narrow interests of Turkey, which proved to be much more offensive on the regional level.

Permanent representatives of the Arab League attend an emergency meeting to discuss Turkey's plans to send military troops to Libya, at the League's headquarters in Cairo, Egypt, December 31, 2019. REUTERS / Mohamed Abd El Ghany

How did this change in Ankara's foreign policy come about?

We are starting to see this new policy at work, especially in 2016, 2017 with Turkey's further estrangement from the Arab world, especially during the Qatari crisis.

It came up against, alongside Iran, Saudi Arabia and its allies.

From 2013, 2014, there was a quarrel with Egypt after the expulsion of the Turkish ambassador to Cairo and in particular the denunciation by Turkey of the coup d'etat of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (July 3 2013 against Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi) and extremely conflictual relations were formed during this time.

We have also seen it in Syria where Turkey was finally kicked out of the Syrian conflict a little, precisely because of its refusal to support the Kurds in this conflict and to have, at one time, maintained ambiguous relations with the movements. jihadists and in particular with Daesh, because this allowed him to oppose the Kurds.

We also saw Turkey come back brilliantly to this Syrian conflict in 2016 by launching a first military operation in which it will position itself.

Four operations will follow.

Turkey will come closer in the Syrian conflict to Syria and Iran to, in a way, expel the West from attempts to settle this conflict.

So I would say that this policy was formed between 2013-2014 and 2017 and, since then, it has manifested itself even more visibly on the grounds of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Caucasus.

The "Oruç Reis", a Turkish seismic prospecting vessel, on the waters of the Bosphorus in Istanbul.

Photo dated October 3, 2018. REUTERS / Yoruk Isik

Has this shift in Turkish foreign policy involved changes in alliances?

There have been troubles in existing alliances, rapprochements and conflicts in established alliances, but at the same time fundamentally Turkey has failed to change alliances.

I think that's kind of his problem and that's what makes his policy hard to read.

Because indeed, it is still a member of NATO, even if it has questioned this alliance.

On the strategic level in the Syrian conflict, she opposed Barak Obama's United States by refusing to support the Kurds, to the point that Barak Obama put Turkey a little out of the debate in 2013-2014 .

Therefore, it has moved away from its Western allies by its strategic positions and all the more so when it has approached Russia and Iran.

It has gone so far as to buy Russian defense missiles, which has placed it outside NATO defense protocols and poses a problem.

As a result, it was excluded from a program to acquire new generation combat aircraft of which it was a part.

In a way, it has placed itself a little on the margins of NATO and its organization and at the same time it has not broken with NATO.

For Russia, Turkey's main interest is precisely that it is part of NATO and that it is a means of exerting pressure, of hampering or of dividing NATO.

Likewise, we can clearly see that Turkey, when it finds itself facing a test of strength vis-à-vis Russia, and that it finds itself alone, in a situation of weakness, tends to return in NATO.

We saw it at the start of the year in Syria in the Idleb affair, when Russia and the Syrian regime tried to expel Turkish troops from Idleb: she ultimately relied on her relationship with the United States in order to maintain itself.

Turkey has therefore not really changed its alliances, but is trying to arrange them in a certain way.

I think what she is trying to do is to acquire a kind of autonomy vis-à-vis NATO which, sometimes indeed, borders on withdrawal, abandonment, but at the same time the come, she knows how to return to NATO.

When we look at the speeches of Turkish leaders such as the Minister of Defense, General Hulusi Akar, former Chief of Staff, when he recently said in a

Turkish

the opposite of Emmanuel Macron: “

”.

In a way, in saying this, Turkey supports the American position and ultimately opposes European defense.

European defense which would lead Turkey to be out of the game and therefore in this case, on the contrary, it defends NATO.

We saw this in particular in the conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean where Turkey has constantly said: " 

 ".

And NATO has put in place de-escalation mechanisms between Turkey and Greece.

This is proof of a fairly complicated game, which effectively consists of trying to gain autonomy in NATO in order to have its own regional policy, or even its own international approaches, without however finding itself completely isolated, particularly in the face of the Russia, the Arab world and other countries.

It is a policy made up of tactical blows by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Syrian fighters, backed by Turkey, drive a tank in the town of Saraqib, in the eastern part of Idleb province, in northwestern Syria, on February 27, 2020. Bakr ALKASEM / AFP

Has this "piecemeal" policy benefited Turkey?

The problem with this policy of tactical strikes is that while it feels like successive victories for Turkey and some sort of empowerment of Turkey, at the end of the day - and we have measured these last days in the Eastern Mediterranean affair - Turkey finds itself extremely alone.

She is cut off from the Arab world, in any case she once again has a complicated relationship with the Arab world, she is ultimately in a situation of mistrust with the European Union and even in a certain way with NATO.

It also did not reverse its alliances and it did not enter into an alliance with Russia.

Moreover, when it tried to fit more deeply into the block of the Shanghai group, when it tried to join, or in any case to be associated with the members of the Shanghai group (6 countries of 'Central Asia and Russia), we can see that it has not succeeded in doing so, because it is perceived by the countries of the Shanghai group as a NATO country, as a country allied to the countries westerners.

So the problem is still somewhat the same: Turkey is struggling to position itself on the international scene, even if this policy has been somewhat updated by the evolution of the context.

What is the goal ?

Is this a vital issue for Turkey economically or is it a desire for expansion?

There is indeed the economic aspect.

Turkey's problem, economically, is that it is a developing country which, despite the crisis it is going through, continues to have a number of advantages in this area.

But its problem in terms of alliances is that it tries to open up to the contemporary world, to find new markets in Asia, Africa, Russia, but at the same time, it continues to be heavily dependent on Europe, whether in terms of imports or especially exports.

Europe has been essential in boosting Turkish international trade, in adapting it to international trade standards and practices.

So the relationship with Europe remains absolutely fundamental from this point of view.

And at the same time, its problem is to diversify its markets, to intervene in other areas.

We find this hesitation between maintaining old alliances and then looking for new alliances.

In addition, I believe that we must also link this policy, and in particular this conflict with the West to domestic politics and to a regime which, in the end, has asserted itself as very nationalist, and perhaps much more. nationalists than Islamist, in any case Islamo-nationalist.

This foreign policy also makes it possible to exalt a kind of new Turkey, a kind of Turkey which would be back.

We can see this clearly at the present time with this affair in the Eastern Mediterranean which gave rise to very nationalist developments and rhetoric inside the country, and at the same time from the moment when this issue has tended to stabilize, there was a revival to feed this nationalist rhetoric a little.

And there, we finally find another field which is that of the Caucasus and relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

What has changed a lot in domestic politics in recent years is that to halt the erosion of his electoral base, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has entered into an alliance with the far right, with the nationalist movement party of Devlep Marcheri. .

All these postures, whether in Syria with the Kurds, whether in the Eastern Mediterranean towards the Greeks, the Cypriots, whether in the Caucasus towards Armenia, all these postures well Obviously, the ally of the AKP (Justice and Development Party), the party of the nationalist movement, like a lot, and are therefore often supported by this party and by its ideology.

Clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh, September 28, 2020. Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan / Handout via REUTERS

The situation continues to worsen in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The head of Turkish diplomacy, Mevlut Cavusoglu, was traveling to Baku where he reiterated Turkey's support for Azerbaijan.

How is Turkey playing in this area?

We must not lose sight of the domestic dimension first.

It has been observed in Turkey that the AKP and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan are on an election campaign all the time and are now observing 2023, which will be the next election.

We still feel them in activity: barely a file calms down that a new file is relighted to somehow feed the topicality of the polemics and nationalist conflagrations.

It is a bit characteristic of populist governments like the AKP.

So we are filling a void, because the eastern Mediterranean seems to be stabilizing: we are in a certain way feeding this void with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

There was a cease-fire in 1994 (between Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh) and since then, there have been regular reactivations of this conflict.

All we can do is achieve precarious stabilization.

So, it is quite easy to reactivate this conflict when needed for national or international reasons.

In this conflict, of course, there is the affirmation of solidarity with Azerbaijan.

Qatar is one of the only Arab countries with which Turkey has close relations and Turkey is currently quite isolated: it does not have many strong allies, firm allies.

When we see the ceremonies organized by Recep Tayyip Erdogan for (the transformation into a mosque of) Hagia Sophia for example, or for his enthronement as President of the Republic after 2018, we observe that he invites a lot of people but these are finally a little the same prominent countries which are in the first row.

Among these, of course, there is Qatar, now there is the Libyan government, the Venezuelan government and then indeed Azerbaijan.

So this relationship with Azerbaijan has been quite strong since the end of the former USSR.

It is perhaps the only country in Central Asia and the Caucasus with which Turkey has managed to nurture a close relationship.

It is a relationship that is not only political and even mythologized with the slogan: “Two States, one people”;

There are also historical reasons since there was this episode after the First World War of the Caucasian army.

A few weeks ago, Recep Tayyip Erdogan once again celebrated the capture of Baku at the end of the First World War (this atypical counter-attack made by the Ottoman armies in the Caucasus).

So there are lots of historical, ideological reasons.

On the other hand, it is more difficult to say on religious questions, because indeed the Azeris are mainly Shiites, with in addition a very secularized approach to religion.

In addition, there is also a very economic and energy dimension, because Azerbaijan is one of Turkey's gas supplier countries.

A Turkey in demand for energy, which needs to diversify both its sources of gas supply, in particular to reduce its dependence on Russia and, at the same time, to also diversify its energy sources, but that is another matter.

Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan during his address to the nation in Istanbul, August 21, 2020. Murat Cetinmuhurdar / PPO / Handout via REUTERS

What is the international scope of this positioning of Turkey?

This is the third reason in the Azerbaijan case.

There is a strong element of Recep Tayyip Erdogan's rhetoric in his emerging foreign diplomacy policy that he constantly denounces: it is the carelessness of international society.

What he also denounces is the Minsk group, this trio (Russia, France, United States) invested by international society, by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE, to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.

Turkey, as it is currently denouncing the international UN system, and the Security Council, says: " 

 ”.

Turkey puts its feet in the dish to contest a situation that it denounces as contrary to international law which is this self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh and which is theoretically in Azerbaijani territory.

The fact also that part of the Azerbaijani territory is occupied by Armenia makes Turkey denounce an international disturbance and at the same time it says: " 

 '.

So Turkey is positioning itself in a way as an emerging country with emerging diplomacy in world affairs.

It is a strategy of Recep Tayyip Erdogan which consists in saying: " 

 ”.

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