It would also be in Finland's interest for Europe and the rest of the world to recover from the coronary recession as soon as possible, there is no doubt about that.
It is also known that the international economy, even without a corona, is a complex and sensitive entity where everything affects everything - and where it is difficult to keep up with the carts.
And even that can be understood that Parliament has more important issues pending at all times than the representatives have the time and ability to get acquainted with them, and that therefore, delving into the issues can sometimes remain superficial.
But none of these reasons can explain why the EU's stimulus package must be marketed to Parliament - and to the public - in part, even with completely absurd Huuhaa claims.
Taloussanomat compiled and combined six key arguments from the speeches in last week's parliamentary debate - and in some places drafted objections challenging the infinite reasoning.
This listing is not in itself intended to oppose the EU or even the corona recovery package, but to challenge the package's rationale.
If the package is really good and to Finland's advantage, perhaps it could be described and marketed on other grounds than fairy tales and stories.
1) Contradictory basic statement:
The EU stimulus package, with its grants to EU countries, is in Finland's interest and an effective way to revive the Finnish economy as well, so persuading the package's grants and duration less than proposed was a good negotiating victory for Finland - especially when the project pays for itself.
The statement reflects the political difficulty of the issue and seeks to strike a balance between the compromise solution called for by the EU and the national interest.
The company stumbles into a circle of reasoning between two conflicting "interests."
If the EU's debt relief project were really and undeniably beneficial to Finland as a whole, the size and duration of the project should have been increased rather than reduced.
Finland in particular would have thought that it would demand an increase in a favorable project, as a "self-paying" debt fund would also be a cheaper gift from heaven for Finland, which finances its own debts with zero and negative interest rates.
But if reducing and shortening the package to what was originally available was still Finland's goal, perhaps the whole package is basically a reluctant project for Finland.
2) Irrelevant export claim:
A common EU recovery makes sense, as the benefits of each country's own recovery would flow to other countries as an increase in imports, but together, the benefits will also be shared by everyone - and Finnish exports in particular.
The imports of some countries are the exports of some other countries, so they are recovering or not recovering at exactly the same pace, and it is not even possible for either one to even revive the other without recovering at the same time.
If Finland's goal is to make its own exports work, and if for some reason that goal is to be pursued by reviving the economies of Finland's exporting countries, then Finland's explicit goal is to get the recovery benefits from other countries' imports in favor of Finnish exports.
Finland's goal is therefore not to prevent "resuscitation runoff" but, on the contrary, to bring it about.
Otherwise, it would be pointless to market the entire package with export demand reflected in Finland.
From the point of view of that goal expressed in Finland, "this will be of great benefit to our exports", it is exactly the same whether it is a matter of each country's own or the EU's joint recovery measures.
The only significant difference arises from who pays for the revitalization in any country.
3) Misunderstanding of exports:
The EU's stimulus package is an advantage for export-dependent Finland, although most of the money goes to countries like Italy, as Germany is Finland's largest export country and the German economy is strongly linked to the Italian economy.
The export dependence of the Finnish and especially the German economy is true, but following the interdependencies of the international economy and the cross-connections of different economies only to the EU countries is an artificial delimitation.
Together and separately, EU countries trade very briskly - and, above all, the world's largest surplus - with the rest of the world.
Current account surpluses and deficits in different countries and regions are a reliable indication of the starting and ending points of supply and demand.
Germany's current account surplus crystallizes the EU's large dependence not only on demand from other EU countries but from the rest of the world outside the EU.
And there is not as natural a counterpart to that German surplus in the whole globe as the terrible current account deficit in the United States.
It follows from the capital and trade flows of the international economy that if it really made sense for Finland and other EU countries to start reviving their most important export markets, unnecessary bends should be pulled straight and all stimulus packages should be shipped immediately to stimulate US consumer demand.
Of course, there would be no point in such an export revival either, but if the intention is to strengthen the German export countries and thus Finland's German exports, then only all the recovery bins across the Atlantic.
4) Threat of collapse:
The EU's stimulus package is a vital lifeline for Finland's exports, economy and employment, and a necessary way to avoid a recession escalating into a complete collapse.
With intimidation, intimidation is a traditional way to market politically difficult solutions, but in this case, the collapse story makes less sense than usual.
The full € 750 billion of the EU's stimulus package represents about 5% of the region's total one-year output, but even with moderate certainty, just over half will go, ie within three years and more likely to replace than complement other cash flows.
The probable stimulus effect per year is likely to be 1% or less of the value of the GDP generated, and in addition a large part of the stimulus funds will be directed to countries and sectors other than Finland's main export markets.
In any case, the key demand for Finnish exports will arise - and recover - in any case due to the stimulus measures of Germany's and the world's largest economies, such as the United States and China.
If, on the other hand, the real threat of collapse arises from the possible threat of a difference in Italy's euro, which must now be avoided by a common stimulus, it would also be appropriate to say it out loud rather than come up with half-hearted excuses.
5) Market peace claim:
The EU's stimulus package is also a measure valued by the financial markets, the benefits of which are reflected in the strengthening of the euro and other favorable market reactions since the agreement was reached.
Had no agreement been reached on the package, market reactions would certainly have been harsh.
Finland and many other EU countries have been talking about "market discipline" for years, but so far it has meant market pressure that encourages member states to pursue economic discipline and not to please the market at any cost.
Interest rates in the most indebted countries fell, but not because of the package's general or especially special benefits for Finland, but because the financial markets interpret the stimulus package as shifting financial pressure - and credit risk - to the EU, ie the strongest member states such as Finland.
The euro also strengthened as the EU's long-standing peak in financial markets - and the outlook for Eurobonds - opened up, while reducing the risk of the euro collapsing, with the EU and the strongest countries virtually assuming the debts of all member states.
It is probably no coincidence that, following the package, the Finnish state's market interest rates are now slightly higher than, say, six months ago.
The strengthening of the euro is also mainly detrimental to Finland, as it weakens the international competitive position of Finnish companies.
6) Debt deductible:
The funds in the recovery package will be allocated to well-defined targets that are unanimously approved and monitored by all EU countries, and in no case will the package redeem any Member State's own liabilities.
Each member state is still responsible for its own debts.
This can be relied on, as it has been agreed.
The EU will not redeem or otherwise take direct responsibility for the old debts of any country, but co-ordination can be interpreted as an indirect circumvention of the no bailout ban.
When EU recovery funds are diverted to uses and purposes for which Member States would otherwise have used - or should have used - their own (debt) funding, the public funds of the recipient countries will be freed up in the same way as recovery aid for other uses, such as old debts.
The need to ease the financial position of the most indebted countries is evident, for example, in the documents underpinning the EU Commission's stimulus proposal and, for example, in the Bank of Finland's expert opinion submitted to Parliament.
According to them, some member states faced an interest rate crisis in debt that was already so heavy that there would not have been enough money for a revival of interest rates on their own, and that it is therefore necessary to finance the necessary stimulus measures with common debt.
This is what the whole stimulus package is all about - not whether it will be revived or not, but who will pay for it.
And when it comes to keeping contracts, perhaps contracts should not be given much weight in a package that is essentially based on imaginative circumvention of contracts.