The reformists failed to change
The Revolutionary Guards are ready to seize power in Iran
The Revolutionary Guards receive instructions from the Supreme Leader.
À archive
picture
There is a new saying spreading in Iran that power is being absorbed from head to toe, that is, from men who wear turbans to men who wear military boots.
Iran's new parliament provides the latest evidence. Its speaker, Muhammad Baqir Qalibaf, is a former brigadier general in the Revolutionary Guard.
And two-thirds of the members of the Parliament's Board of Directors are either former or still members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and its auxiliary organizations.
Many in Iran and the United States have long expected the Revolutionary Guards to take over the Iranian government.
The next step toward this outcome will be the election of a candidate affiliated with the Guard, as president in 2021.
Iran is a divided country, with elected institutions running the day-to-day affairs of the state under the authority of the supreme leader, who is the most influential, and who gives instructions to security organizations, including the Revolutionary Guard.
For more than two decades, reformists within the Iranian political establishment have struggled to consolidate the power of elected institutions against the power of the parallel state.
Now, they come to terms with the failure of that project, and prepare for the leaders of the parallel state to invade elected bodies and consolidate power for themselves.
The fact that an Iranian government will be run by the military is not an imposed outcome, but it appears to be the most likely.
Iranians are frustrated with partisan tensions and mounting crises.
US sanctions have depleted the country's economic lifeline, and purchasing power has fallen to two-thirds of what it was 10 years ago.
And President Hassan Rouhani, unable to fulfill his promises in domestic or foreign policy, appears to have succumbed to reality, as his recent management of the epidemic indicates.
He was reluctant, until it was too late, to admit that the Corona virus was a national threat.
His contradictory messages on the subject confused the audience and even came under fire from the Supreme Leader.
In comparison, the Revolutionary Guards have a sturdy, stronger arm.
But the nature of his merits, in and of themselves, may prevent him from becoming a guardian of the state.
Focus of attention
The Revolutionary Guard has become the focus of national and international attention since the late 1990s, when political reformers assumed the reins of the elected Iranian government.
And reformist media began monitoring and criticizing this military establishment.
In response, the Guard began building its own media company, which sought to control public discourse and project a greatly exaggerated image of itself.
The IRGC presents itself as a remedy for Iranian national anxiety, but it is, in fact, a major contributor to the problem.
Under US sanctions, the Guard has expanded an underground economy, led by a new corrupt elite of "smuggled entrepreneurs."
The Revolutionary Guard prevents the government from employing experts it deems politically inappropriate, and it derails government policies and projects as it pleases.
All the time, propaganda is released insisting that the politicians and bureaucrats are responsible.
Frustrated officers
The IRGC has many advantages while competing for power, but it is not as tough as it can be faced.
In spite of the large economic share that the guards possess, now, the executive authority still governs the economy in all vital areas.
The government sets fiscal and monetary policy, controls oil and gas resources, and manages state treasury.
The government also dominates the social welfare and humanitarian aid, which the Revolutionary Guard increasingly relies on to build its patronage networks.
Moreover, this military establishment is more fractured on the inside, and less disciplined than is usually assumed.
Tensions have been present from the start, when conflicts arose between leaders during the Iran-Iraq War.
The frustrated officers who left the Revolutionary Guard during the 1980s became prominent advocates of political reform.
Some left the institution in the early 1990s.
Others left in the early 2000s.
Today, experts have documented generational gaps within the guard, and the younger generation is also divided between them.
Media affiliated with the Revolutionary Guard reflects these differences.
For example, the Foundation's Awj Art and Media organization, for example, finally stopped portraying the opponents in its films as ugly and funny enemies.
At the same time, another media branch of the Revolutionary Guard produced a TV program, called "Gando," which justified the arrest of the "Washington Post" correspondent, Jason Rezaian.
Tensions between these two young media groups sometimes reach audiences.
In February, the second group strongly criticized the "AWJ" method of filmmaking, accusing it of "wasting the regime's money and resources, to harm the system."
Weak opponents
For now, the IRGC's greatest political strength may be the weakness of its opponents. Rouhani won elections in 2013 and 2017, promising to restore hope to the Iranian people.
His term expires, now, amid widespread despair.
Nationwide protests erupted in 2018 and 2019, and were crushed by the Revolutionary Guards.
The administration, now, lacks the credibility to mobilize its social base against the guards, in the polls, or at the street level.
However, the Revolutionary Guards' desire to run the government, indeed, remains a complex question.
The political and economic resources that the government maintains are certainly attractive, but experience has shown that whoever holds executive authority, regardless of his political affiliation, is likely to become a thorn in the side of the guard.
Even former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who came with the full support of the guards, quickly became a rogue.
Back liners
It is widely expected that the upcoming Iranian presidential elections will herald the return of militants to power.
The reformists lost most of their social capital and their position in Iran.
But 2021 will not mark the end of politics in Iran.
Conversely, it would only add a new chapter to an open-ended book.
Conflict among Iranian political elites has existed since the founding of the republic, and it will continue to produce opportunities for change.
Including the change that may not appeal to the opposition, nor the ruling elites.
The IRGC may crave control, but it may not be happy with the outcome.
The IRGC has many advantages while competing for power, but it is not as tough as it can be faced. In spite of the large economic share that the guards possess, now, the executive authority still governs the economy in all vital areas.
The IRGC presents itself as a remedy for Iranian national anxiety, but it is, in fact, a major contributor to the problem.
Follow our latest local and sports news, and the latest political and economic developments via Google news