Air crash in India: Why did the previous "opportunity" fail to be a lesson for the later "opportunity"
■ Observer
An airport with "inherent deficiency" and low safety factor has long served as a hub airport for India Express.
On the evening of August 7, a Boeing 737NG passenger plane belonging to Indian Express Airways, when it landed at Calicut Airport in Kerala, southwestern India, dashed off the runway and broke into two in the valley. Two pilots and at least 15 passengers on board were killed, and dozens of others were injured. There were 184 people on board at that time, most of them were Indian nationals who were stranded in the UAE and returned randomly because of the new crown epidemic.
In this regard, Indian Civil Aviation Minister Puri pointed out that due to the excessive rainfall and poor visibility at the time, the airliner’s first attempt to land was unsuccessful. Fortunately, no fire or explosion occurred, otherwise the casualties would be even worse. Some local commentators in India also blamed the weather for the accident: On August 7, the Meteorological Administration of India issued a red warning for heavy rainfall in some local areas.
But more people pointed out that the Calicut Airport itself has serious flaws. Related news pointed out that Calicut Airport is a rare "platform airport" in southeastern India. Its runway is built on a low "flat-topped mountain" surrounded by valleys, and requires harsh landing technology and conditions.
The southern tip of the Indian peninsula is a rare area in the world with monsoon climate on the east and west coasts. Monsoons, heavy rainfall and strong convection weather occur from May to September every year, causing serious damage and hidden dangers of air disasters. Mangalore Airport in Karnataka, also on the west coast, had three civil aviation accidents during the monsoon season. Among them, the air crash on May 22, 2010 caused the death of 152 passengers and 6 crew members on board. The cause of the accident was almost the same. However, the overthrow of the former "machine" does not seem to be a lesson for the latter.
The Calicut Airport in the accident was also a "terrace-type airport". It was reported that "experts issued safety warnings at least 9 years ago." However, it is such an airport with “inherent deficiency” and low safety factor. It has long served as the hub airport of Indian Express Airways and the key airport of airlines such as Air India and Indigo Airlines. It has become India’s 11th in cargo throughput and passenger throughput. The 12th civil aviation airport by volume.
As early as 2016, the Indian media repeatedly exposed the problems of the airport, but at that time only realized that it was "inconvenient for wide-body passenger aircraft to take off and land" and urgently needed to be expanded. At that time, Jarad Hannan, the person in charge of the airport, believed that “the length of the runway should be extended at least (from the existing 2,700 meters) to 3,150 meters.” However, the state government assessed that this alone would require an additional 156 hectares of land. This means that 1,500 nearby families need to be demolished, which requires high compensation costs and difficult projects.
For this reason, the "Second Phase Expansion of the Airport" declared "successfully completed" in 2017 merely increased the "prevention of running out of the runway safety zone" at the end of the "platform" runway from the original 60 meters to 240 meters, and "expansion" Later, it increased flights significantly on this ground. This tragic air crash shows that such a "shrinking and expansion" seems "how fast and saves", but in fact it is self-defeating, and the gains outweigh the gains.
The lesson of blood once again warns that one hundred percent or even 120 percent must be "remedied" for potential safety hazards. The fluke psychology of "eight-point replenishment" and "nine-point replenishment" will only be regrettable due to small losses.
□Tao Short House (Columnist)