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On September 2, 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan succeeded in shining the spotlight on him after his appearance at an official ceremony organized by the National Defense University in Istanbul and behind him an unconventional map that wrote the name “Blue homeland”, marking the coasts that Turkey considers it the possession of it in the Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea, and the map showed the "blue homeland of Turkey" extending up to the middle line of the Aegean Sea surrounded by a group of Greek islands, also showed Turkey's control of a large area of the eastern Mediterranean coast extending to the eastern shore of the Greek island of Crete, the fifth largest The islands in the strategic sea connecting the continents of the ancient world.
This was not the first indication by Turkey of its blue homeland in any case. In his famous book, "Strategic Depth" issued in 2001, former Turkish Prime Minister "Ahmet Davutoglu" talked about the importance of controlling the seas for his country, reminding that the beginning of the end of the Ottoman Empire was Because of its loss of control over the seas, but the idea of a "blue homeland" in its current form is often attributed to Admiral "Ramadan C. Gordeniz" who first brought up the idea during a seminar at the Turkish Naval Command Center in June 2006, and included a vision to impose Turkey's sovereignty over Large areas of the Mediterranean, Aegean and Black Sea.
From Gordeniz’s point of view, Turkey suffered a great injustice in dividing its land borders after the Treaty of Sever in the 1920s, which divided the legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the aftermath of World War I, and is currently exposed to a second Sever Treaty at sea, where opponents seek Ankara in Greece, Cyprus and, more recently, Israel and Egypt to reduce Ankara's maritime influence and confine it to a narrow strip of water around its coasts.
Although the idea of the blue homeland is considered relatively old, it was not present on the Turkish foreign policy agenda until recently, as major gas discoveries in the Mediterranean sparked sharp differences between the countries of the eastern sea over the determination of exclusive economic regions and the sharing of marine resources, and Turkey was suffering from Severe energy poverty and an urgent need for new marine gas resources; It has begun to amend its maritime strategy and summoned the idea of a "blue homeland" in order to impose its control on an area of 462 thousand km of marine lands in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean.
The start was actually in February 2019, when the Turkish navy carried out a military maneuver in the name of the “blue homeland” also in the designated areas, before the Turkish Defense Minister, Khulusi Akar, referred to the same concept again during the Victory Day celebrations on August 30 of the year. The same, while the last mention came as we mentioned from Erdogan himself in September, before the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations on November 13, 2019 submitted Turkey's claims to the exclusive economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean that are compatible with the concept of "blue homeland" In an official message of the international organization.
Ankara's efforts did not stop there. By the 27th of the same month, Turkey seemed to have decided to transfer its vision to the blue homeland for actual implementation, as it had signed an agreement to demarcate the maritime borders with the internationally recognized Libyan National Accord government and its president, Fayez al-Sarraj, which increased Ankara. Of its special economic zones and continental coasts in the Eastern Mediterranean by 30%, before issuing a new unofficial map showing the new economic areas for them which were approved under the agreement.
However, the Libyan-Turkish agreement elicited a violent reaction (1) by Greece, Cyprus and Egypt, where the three countries claimed that Ankara was trying to obtain concessions that were not entitled to violate international maritime laws, describing the agreement as "illegal" because it affects the interests of third parties, Because it was concluded by a "unauthorized" Libyan government, as described, Greece went further and expelled the Libyan government’s ambassador to Athens in protest against the agreement, and announced that it would rally support from NATO against Turkish actions, but Ankara was not shaken by any condition, and Erdogan received Al-Sarraj for the second time in just three weeks, confirming the continuation of the agreement, and Turkey's readiness to intervene militarily and send a rapid reaction force to Tripoli if the Libyan side formally requests it.
At first glance, it seemed that the new agreement pushed the political waters in the eastern Mediterranean to a boil, before this was confirmed by the statements of the Egyptian President with a military background, "Abdel Fattah El-Sisi" at the Youth Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh when he said directly that the government of national reconciliation "is a prisoner of armed and terrorist militias in the capital." Tripoli, "which is the highest record of statements between the parties involved in Libya since the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011, and a degree of intensity between Cairo and Ankara in particular that the Mediterranean has not seen before, which could make the military clash in Libya a possibility.
Turkey’s interest in the eastern Mediterranean dates back centuries before the founding of the modern republic, specifically to the time of the Ottoman Empire, which dominated most of the seashore as its internal territory, and the modern Turkish Republic inherited this interest in dependence even though it lost many of its coasts on the sea after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the arrival of many From the Ottoman provinces prior to its independence.
Initially, the interest of the modern Turkish state in the Mediterranean was closely related to the Cyprus issue since Ankara decided in 1974 to intervene militarily in Cyprus against a military coup supported by Greece on the island, an intervention that actually ended by dividing the island into two parts: a northern part that is actually controlled by Turkey and not Its independence is recognized by any other country in the world, and a southern part linked to Greece and is recognized internationally and is a member of the European Union.
The long-term Cyprus conflict has strengthened Turkey's interest in the Mediterranean, especially as it has increasing importance due to its role in oil transportation operations and being part of the wider influence struggle in the Middle East. This interest in the Mediterranean was one of the reasons that prompted Turkey to strengthen its relations with Israel during the periods of the eighties and nineties, especially in light of the deterioration of its relations with Syria, and consequently with Lebanon, which was under the domination of Damascus at the time, and they are the most prominent Arab powers in the eastern Mediterranean.
However, the signing of the Adana Agreement between Ankara and Damascus in 1998 transformed the situation in the region significantly, especially as it coincided with a general improvement in Turkey's relations with the Arab world following the rise of the Justice and Development Party to power in 2002, and Turkey's efforts to rapprochement with Greece and find a peaceful solution to the Cyprus issue. This gave a glimmer of hope to establish cooperative relations between the various powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, but this hope soon collapsed at the end of the past decade due to the complexities of the Cyprus issue, which has strained the atmosphere between Ankara and Athens again, and by the tense relations between Turkey and Israel since 2008, and they were The most prominent consequence of these developments is the establishment by Israel and Greece of closer ties with each other that included joint military exercises and exercises, and this rapprochement between Athens and Tel Aviv was primarily aimed at isolating Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean.
Things got worse in 2009 when international companies began exploring major gas reserves off the coast of Israel and Cyprus, which deepened the dispute between Turkey and Greek Cyprus over the areas of exploration, and as a result of this conflict, the Greek Cypriots signed agreements to demarcate their exclusive economic areas with Egypt, Greece and Israel, and in On the other hand, Turkey increased its military presence in the sea and established a special force for the Mediterranean in 2010, and announced that it would not allow international companies to drill in the economic areas that were designated by Cyprus, protesting the protection of the rights of Turkish Cypriots in the north, and for its part, issued its own version of the economic regions of Turkey and Northern Cyprus .
(2) Matters deteriorated further with regard to Ankara after Egypt joined the axis of "Israel - Greece - Cyprus" following the military coup in Cairo in mid-2013, and Cairo's position was mainly aimed at political punishment of Ankara for its condemnation of the new military government in the country, the position of Egypt's push in The end towards signing a new agreement to demarcate the maritime borders with Greece and Cyprus in 2014, which greatly expanded the Greek economic regions at the expense of Turkey's economic regions and boosted the fortunes of Greece and Cyprus in the resources of the Mediterranean.
In contrast to the historical memory that has long considered the Mediterranean an integral part of Turkish territory, it can be said that there are three main reasons for Turkey's interest in the Eastern Mediterranean region today, the first of which is that Turkey is an energy importing country, and it is estimated that Ankara imported hydrocarbon goods worth $ 45 billion in 2018 Alone, a figure that represents significant pressure on the public budget, especially in light of the fluctuation of the value of the Turkish lira against the dollar, otherwise, the figure appears to increase as the Turkish economy continues to grow and increase the country's population. As a result, Ankara sees the large energy reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean as a vital opportunity to explore its own resources and reduce dependence on foreign energy, especially since most of these energy imports come from geopolitical competitors of Ankara such as Russia and Iran.
In the same context, (3) Turkey has an ambitious plan to transform itself into a major center for energy transfer between East and West, from the hydrocarbon producing countries in the Middle East and Asia to the consuming countries in Europe, and it has a number of promising projects to achieve this goal, headed by a pipeline. Through the Adriatic "TAP" and pipeline across Anatolia "TANAP", which aims to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to the old continent.
Likewise, Ankara also has its own plans to transform into a center for the transfer of new energy in the eastern Mediterranean to European markets, but regional competitors, led by Greece, Israel and Egypt, are seeking to undermine their efforts in this regard by establishing a gas export pipeline called "East Med" with a length of 2000 km that extends From the Cypriot and Israeli fields through Greece to Italy, bypassing Turkey, although the large cost of the project has caused major companies to refrain from financing it until now, as well as the technological difficulties facing it in the depths of the sea.
The second reason relates to regional geopolitical competition and intense energy hub games. As we have already mentioned, Turkey faces major competition in the Mediterranean by the "Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt" bloc, which is a more institutionalized nature at the beginning of this year with the establishment of the so-called "East Mediterranean Gas Forum" with the participation of 7 countries, namely Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel Italy, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority, a bloc that appears to have been primarily designed to exclude Turkey and isolate it from political and economic developments in the region.
Finally, the Eastern Mediterranean region is considered an important region for Turkey from the perspective of national security, as it has been the scene of military activities for many countries in the past years, not only by (4) Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel (Egypt and Greece have been conducting joint air exercises since 2015), but Also by actors such as the United States, France, Russia, and China, whose presence has clearly increased in the region, therefore, Turkey no longer thinks in the eastern Mediterranean on the basis of being a historical sphere of influence and potential economic opportunity only, but also as a strategic area that can serve Ankara's security needs Patriotism and defense in the face of threats that may come from the sea.
Specifically, it can be said that there are three vital security dimensions to the Turkish presence in the Mediterranean, the first relates to the challenges faced by Turkey by Greece and Europe over the areas of Turkish maritime jurisdiction, and the second relates to Northern Cyprus (Turkish) and the future of the Cyprus issue in general, with regard to The third is the file of the Kurds, where Turkey fears the possibility of an independent Kurdish state that has freedom to reach the Mediterranean, and as a result, it appears that Turkey has come to regard the Mediterranean as a red line in its foreign policy, and it does not care about the successive threats of sanctions, whether by the European Union or the United States. .
In principle, the signing of an agreement between Ankara and the Libyan National Accord government is not surprising, as Ankara is currently the most prominent supporter of the internationally recognized reconciliation government, in the face of a bloc of countries supporting the so-called "Libyan National Army" led by "Khalifa Haftar" , A bloc that includes Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and France, and has apparently implicit support from the Trump administration.
Turkish support, including military support (5), was the main reason for the ability of the National Accord government to withstand the fierce military campaign of Haftar and his supporters to seize the capital, Tripoli, which has been continuing since April 2019, and with news of pro-Haftar states strengthening In support of the Libyan "Prince of War", the Al-Wefaq government was expected to go to Ankara in search of military support, which culminated in the signing of a defense agreement between the two parties, in addition to a memorandum of understanding on the demarcation of the borders in the Mediterranean Sea between southwestern Turkey and northwestern Libya. Accordingly, Ankara granted the rights to explore the Libyan coastal areas, along with allowing an expanded Turkish presence in the Libyan ports.
If we look at it from the perspective of the National Accord government, The search for such an agreement is understandable and self-evident, apart from legalizing Turkish military support to the government and placing it within a formal framework that allows for its strengthening, including perhaps establishing a naval base for Turkey in western Libya; Signing a border demarcation agreement is in itself a step aimed at demonstrating the political qualifications of the Al-Wefaq government, which it views as being threatened by powerful illegal militias backed by key regional players and some strong international players, unlike future opportunities to obtain lucrative contracts to prospect for oil and gas off the coast. Libyan support for the economy, which has been stuck due to the civil war and political and military conflict that has persisted since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime.
On the other hand, the benefits to the Turkish side are more clear, the first of which is that Ankara has a strong and direct interest in supporting the reconciliation government and helping it extend its legal control over the country, with the direct economic benefits that this means to Ankara, not least the restoration of approximately $ 19 billion in construction and building contracts. Turkish pending since the Qaddafi era, as well as the geopolitical benefits related to the power struggle that Turkey is waging against the countries that support Haftar, especially Saudi Arabia, the Emirates and Egypt, and yet, the most important benefit for Turkey remains that this agreement will greatly enhance its shares in the long-term struggle over the division of marine blocks and exploration rights In the Eastern Mediterranean, where the agreement is likely to undermine all attempts by Greece to demarcate its maritime borders with Egypt, Israel and Cyprus because of its water coverage around Crete, otherwise the agreement is to help Turkey extend its control over the marine areas during which the East Med pipeline is to extend. "What threatens any attempts to build and operate the pipeline, and finally the agreement will give Turkey a strategic depth that extends from North Africa to the Aegean Sea to the Gulf of Antalya with Increasing the area of its sovereign maritime borders.
To achieve these benefits, Ankara adopted a two-pronged strategy (6). First, and knowing that she could not stand alone against her opponents' attempts to impose isolation on her, she sought to search for new partners in the region even if they were relatively weak like the government of Northern Cyprus and the Libyan National Accord government (and perhaps Syria in the future), and secondly, Ankara sought to formulate a historical narrative confirming Its historical rights in the region by calling the idea of a blue homeland that caresses the dreams of the political glory of the Ottoman Empire, and in any case, the ultimate goal of Turkey's moves remains to impose permanent Turkish influence in the region and send a message to its opponents about its willingness to defend this influence despite any threats or blocs .
In light of all this, and at a time when the international community interprets Turkey's activity in the Mediterranean as a "hostile activity"; Turkey defines its naval strategy as a pre-emptive defense plan (7), and based on its own vision of its marine coasts is based on an unconventional interpretation of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which Ankara has not signed to date for fear that it imposes restrictions on its marine activities or makes it bound by interpretations. Countries that sign the agreement.
According to the UN agreement, coastal states have the right to obtain 200 nautical miles from the areas corresponding to their coasts to establish an exclusive economic zone in which the state has all the political and economic sovereign rights, but due to the concave shape of the Mediterranean coasts, there are significant overlaps between the regions to which each overlooking country is entitled to claim With them, and therefore most countries could not create exclusive economic zones without demarcating the borders with the rest of their neighbors. Otherwise, (8) Turkey also opposes the normative interpretation of these laws, claiming that the islands cannot have a continental shelf under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and only have a limited economic zone of 12 km in width, and Turkey argues that giving the islands equal continental coasts to states It could turn the Mediterranean into a large lake controlled by Greece, due to the large number of Greek islands scattered in the sea.
The same applies to Cyprus for Ankara, since Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Southern (Greek) as an independent state, it does not see that it is entitled to obtain exclusive economic zones unless the Cyprus issue is resolved, and it considers that most of the areas that claim to be entitled to Cyprus Back to the Turkish Cypriots, supported by Turkey, the North, so Ankara conducts maritime patrols and surveying and exploration activities in areas theoretically under Cypriot control, stressing that it will not allow any activities in the Cypriot marine areas before settling the Cyprus conflict first.
Likewise, Turkey relied on its own interpretation of maritime law in the recent border demarcation agreement with Libya, as the agreement ignored the continental shelves of a number of Greek islands of Rhodes, Castelorizo, Karpathos, Cassos, and the eastern part of Crete, and Ankara protested that these islands were not entitled to economic areas with a width of 200 A mile (i.e. an area several times the size of the islands itself in some cases) and its presence should not be invoked in any negotiations to demarcate the sea border.
But Greece, backed by the European Union and the international community, sees otherwise, and it holds that maritime law gives the islands full, exclusive economic zones such as states, and that many of the coastal areas that Turkey claims ownership are in fact the property of Greece. Like Turkey, Greece's concerns about the Red Sea about economic regions and energy sources are not only related, as Athens fears that Ankara will use the agreement with Libya to establish a permanent naval presence in the region, and the deployment of the Turkish armed forces around the Greek islands, which is a catastrophic situation (9) for Greece from Military perspective.
The geopolitical dimensions of the Turkish-Libyan agreement go beyond the internal differences between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, especially with Athens inviting the European Union and the United States to intervene and condemn Turkish moves, and waving them to raise the issue within the corridors of NATO, seemingly taking advantage of the apparent deterioration in Ankara's relations with Washington and Europe despite the fact that Turkey is the other Member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
In fact, it seems that all these forces are significantly biased (10) to the Cyprus and Greek vision of the Mediterranean Sea at the expense of Turkey, as the European Union previously imposed sanctions on Turkey in June 2019 due to the first activities in gas exploration off the coast of Cyprus, as indicated Union to impose new sanctions after Turkey's recent moves, and it seems that the Americans are adopting a similar position, unlike its traditional military presence in Crete; In December of the same year, Washington strengthened its security ties with Greece, and in April 2019 the US Congress discussed the Security and Energy Partnership Act in the Eastern Mediterranean, which stipulates that Washington provides military assistance of up to $ 5 million annually to Greece and Cyprus, On the other hand, the Congress has hinted on more than one occasion to impose sanctions on Turkey for its Mediterranean activities.
Not only in Washington, where France appears to adopt a similar approach in support of Cypriots and Greeks at the expense of Turkey. In January of 2019, a French frigate conducted exercises with Cypriot ships off the coast of Cyprus, and on May 16, Paris signed an agreement with Cyprus French warships were granted the right to dock at the Marie Cypriot naval base, which is being expanded to accommodate warships of the French Navy.
Many economic and geopolitical reasons explain the bias of NATO countries, led by the United States and France, in favor of Greece and Cyprus. On the one hand, American energy companies such as Exxon Mobil and French such as Total stand out as the largest beneficiaries of gas exploration projects off the coast of Cyprus, and they hope to do the same with Greece. On the other hand, the White House appears to support "Cypriot - Israeli - Egyptian" plans for joint energy exploration, and believes that it could ultimately contribute to reducing Europe's dependence on Russian gas.
This strict containment policy provides NATO with another perspective (11) to explain Turkey's moves in the Mediterranean. For Ankara, this western position is an extension of a long list of positions during which NATO countries have failed to understand Turkey's security concerns and regional interests, led by the Western position critical of Turkish intervention against the Kurds. The Syrians, the United States and NATO refused to support Turkey's proposal for the safe area in Syria, which prompted Turkey to hint at obstructing the NATO defense plan in the Baltic and Poland (approval of the plan requires unanimous voting from NATO countries) as well as reiterating its traditional threat to allow the flow of migrants to the European Union, and in light of this The Libyan agreement can be considered a new Turkish card in the traditional hit-and-run game within NATO, and a special way that Ankara has chosen to protest against its interests being neglected by NATO and pressure from another angle.
Ankara is well aware that it will not be able to impose full military control on the new marine areas that it gained under its agreement with Libya without risking a wider military conflict with Greece and within NATO, so Turkey's strategy is likely aimed at creating a new virtual reality aimed at preventing the stability of power balances at sea The Mediterranean is in a way that violates Turkey's long-term interests, and gives Ankara additional advantages in any negotiations related to the demarcation of maritime borders and the designation of special economic zones in the future.
But Turkey’s strategy to rely on the National Accord government is not without risks, especially in light of Haftar’s control of the greater part of the country, including the coastal areas included in the Turkish-Libyan agreement, which will create logistical difficulties in implementing the agreement and may threaten to drop it altogether if Haftar succeeds in controlling On Tripoli.
Otherwise, the agreement is likely to contribute to the exacerbation of external interventions in the Libyan civil war, and while Ankara will double its support for the government of national reconciliation, the opponents of Turkey, led by Egypt, will intensify their support for Haftar, and the agreement is also likely to push the Greeks and Cypriots to throw their weight in the war In an effort to support Haftar and reap the gains if the Libyan conflict ended with his victory, in addition to that Italy, one of the theoretical supporters of the reconciliation government, may decide to review its positions as well because of the agreement.
This means that the Al-Wefaq government, in turn, will face quite a few challenges as a result of the recent agreement, and since the government relies entirely on its political legitimacy on international recognition of its authority in light of its declining political and military influence and weak organizational structures; The agreement could weaken the government, which may lose international recognition in the future from some eastern Mediterranean countries, but it seems that the reconciliation government decided that its need for direct Turkish military and financial support in order to avoid its overthrow exceeds its need for symbolic legitimacy at the present time, just as Turkey decided to show The force on the ground and the imposition of the status quo policy are the shortest way to take care of its interests, and they are perhaps the only two ways of this.