Dr. Khaled Al-Khater *

The blockade countries failed, and the blockade failed and led to counterproductive results. The goal of the blockade countries was to curb the rise of Qatar and limit its independence and place it under Saudi tutelage and the guardianship of the blockading countries. Diameter.

To achieve this, Qatar's economic strength had to be broken, whether it was:

- Through the economic war on Qatar and attempts to strike the currency and destabilize the country’s financial and economic stability, then to destabilize the regime and bring it down.

Or, through the blockade in its broader form, by destroying everything that nourishes the rise of Qatar from resources and symbolizes it as manifestations of solid or soft power, economic were the natural wealth of Qatar, its foreign investments, Qatar Airways, or media such as Al-Jazeera satellite channel, sports or symbolic as an organization Qatar's World Cup football championship, which is the most important at the international level for the first time in the Middle East, including the indications of Qatar's financial and organizational capabilities, its global impact and the level of confidence it gained.

Economic strength enhances political independence.
Economic power has political power and independence in the sovereign decision. Examples abound, for example, between Qatar and Bahrain. Bahrain is deemed sovereign and does not come out of Saudi Arabia and much of it due to economic weakness and need.

But what happened in the case of Qatar was the opposite. Rather than the blockade weakening the Qatari economy, it strengthened it by relying more on itself, limiting exposure to the blockading countries, diversifying production and economic partners, strengthening the country's geo-economic relations, and moving forward on building a strong and isolating economy For neighbors who cannot be trusted to avoid future shocks and economic instability.

Anti-blockade policies
For further clarification, Qatar has adopted two types of anti-blockade policies.

First: Policies in the short term to face the impact of the shock and enhance the stability of the import sector and the financial sector through support and direct intervention and the conversion of lines and sources of supply to alternative destinations. Exiting capital and enhancing currency stability and financial stability.

Second: Policies in the medium and long term, focused on diversification of import and production and strengthening Qatar's economic and geo-economic relations. In the real and external sectors, for example, Qatar has adopted a set of policies to support agricultural and animal production and light industries, attract tourism and investment, and diversify economic partners.

It continues in infrastructure and World Cup programs, in accumulating and diversifying foreign investments and increasing natural gas production to support reserves, confidence and growth, and linking Qatar's exports and investments to countries affecting the global economic and political arenas, to build relationships on common interests with these powers.

The transportation and tourism sectors remain the most affected by the blockade due to the geographic conditions, and Qatar has adopted policies in this regard to attract tourism and has entered into partnerships with some other international airlines.

These policies have resulted in the blockade of the embargo, more flexibility in import, more diversification in production, more exposure to the world and less to the blockading countries, and consequently to more economic power, then more political independence.

Was Qatar ready for this blockade?
We can say that Qatar was largely automatically prepared for two factors: the weak structural composition of the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the solidity of the Qatari economy in the face of the blockade.

First: The weak structural composition of the economies of the blockading countries does not provide these countries with the tools required to impose a successful economic blockade on Qatar. These economies are structurally weak, meaning that they are all specialized in extracting one resource, which is oil, and exporting it to the outside world, and in return importing what they need of consumer goods Capitalism and employment from abroad, overseas and open international skies.

Therefore, it does not have much to exchange with one another or what it can press on Qatar through the commercial blockade, and intra-regional trade in the GCC countries has remained at 10% for decades, so the failure of Gulf trade integration, and the failure of the Gulf economic integration in Most other areas - energy, industry, transportation, currency and others have not had the blockade countries an enabling economic environment to impose a meaningful economic blockade on Qatar, and reduce the cost of the blockade on both sides.

There are no unitary systems - such as a monetary union or an energy union - for example - that its collapse will lead to the loss of some gains, losses, or destabilization of the Gulf economic stability.

And perhaps harmful to Qatar, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thwarted Gulf economic integration in several areas - including building a bridge between Qatar and Bahrain, and connecting the countries of the region to a giant electric power plant and obstructing the marketing of Qatari gas at the Gulf level - that opened the horizon broadly for its global marketing. Qatar has become a giant in the energy, producer and first source of LNG in the world, supplying it with a third of its needs, so its stability has become important for the energy supply and stability of the global gas market, and growth in many countries and economic powers across the world.

Second: The solidity of the Qatari economy as a result of adopting sound policies that established productive, infrastructure and investment structures that formed arms for breaking the blockade. Qatar has early adopted sound macroeconomic policies to exploit huge natural resources and build a strong real economic and capable of absorbing shocks during two decades before the imposition of the blockade, by investing in:

- Construction of productive structures by establishing the largest infrastructure for the production and export of LNG in the world, and this formed a stable income source for Qatar to an acceptable level during previous crises and during this crisis.

- Modern and advanced infrastructures from a network of communications, transportation, ports and an airport that connects Qatar with the outside world and helps it bypass the blockade and access to original and alternative import sources.

- Investment structures to accumulate and invest the revenues of the hydrocarbon sector and distribute it geographically and economically (via financial and real assets, such as oil and industry, etc.) to be used to manage the economic cycle and promote economic stability in times of recession and crises, in addition to diversifying sources of income and preserving the rights of generations, strengthening Qatar's relations and linking its exports and investments with influential forces Worldwide.

- Adopt macro (conservative) precautionary policies that reflect the financial cycle to fortify the financial sector early with the start of high oil prices and the beginning of the financial cycle, during the years 2003 and 2004, and these policies fortified the financial sector against the shocks and past and current financial crises.

In sum, the economic policies adopted by Qatar can be classified into two types:

Sound economic policies before the imposition of the blockade.

Sound economic policies against the embargo after its imposition.

These policies and infrastructure are bearing fruit now, and they constitute tributaries to support the stability of the Qatari economy in the face of the blockade, as they have led to more strength and economic independence and thus more political independence.

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* Specializes in monetary policy and political economy at the Center for Macroeconomics and the Institute of New Economic Thought at the University of Cambridge.