The Egyptian army knows its true potential, and fully realizes the danger of interfering with its forces in Libya over the political system in Cairo. And the Egyptians began with hundreds of soldiers only in Yemen, and the situation ended with more than 25 thousand dead in the rugged mountains of Yemen, and these losses were a prelude to the humiliating loss in the setback of 67 and the preparation for the absence of Abdel Nasser.
The Egyptians are also aware of the attempts to drag the Egyptian army to a war outside the country, which are similar to the involvement of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, which has cost the Kingdom many security problems and economic imbalances that will show its repercussions successively, without achieving any victories to mention them.
The Egyptian regime has failed to manage the Renaissance Dam file with Ethiopia, which is a complex file that affects water and national security very directly, and Egypt runs it in a bad way, amid Ethiopian superiority backed by soft and invisible Israeli diplomacy, and thus this file turns into an additional burden on Egypt that may constitute a danger The current system, which is leaning on its survival in the face of repression and targeted media, is economically deteriorating, with its desirable policy of frequent borrowing from the World Bank, and the other is to borrow an amount of $ 5 billion early this month.
The Egyptians know that the allies in the axis of the counter-revolutions may favor the idea of weakening the Egyptian army and plunging it into side wars, and that the UAE in particular will never fail to entangle Egypt abroad, and drag it into a very costly clash with Turkey, which is ready to enter the 10 largest economies.
On the other hand, and from another point of view, the occupying state knows that the Palestinian issue is present in the Egyptian conscience even with its absence among senior army leaders, and they know that the Egyptian presence in eastern Libya will be followed by harnessing the region's large resources in favor of Egypt in the medium term, which is reflected in the improvement of the situation The Egyptian economist greatly, and this may finally enable them to break the old equation designed for Egypt, which is "a people looking for a living in a military shadow that rules and controls the rhythm with Israel's general trends."
And if this improvement in the economic and financial situation coincides with the arrival of an elected president, this will open the door on many Egyptian priorities and foreign policies, the first of which is to review the conditions of normalization with Israel, or stop identifying with its policies, at least, and this is a threat to Israeli national security. Of course, so from this perspective I think it is highly unlikely that Egyptians will be allowed to uniquely wear-out gently.
Egyptian intervention may mean excluding the Russians, and this is very difficult for the Egyptians unless it is with the help of the Americans, and here Egyptian diplomacy will face the hardship of restoring relations with Russia.
The talk about the recruitment of the sons of tribes of Libyan origin appears as an unthinkable entrance to the intervention, and it is a very sensitive file that I do not think that the Egyptians are serious about arming them, because that threatens the Egyptian regime itself with a possible internal rebellion in light of the suffering that the regions of these tribes in Egypt suffer from Marginalizing and mortgaging its vast hectares of investments by Gulf and Egyptian businessmen from the Nile Valley regions.
In addition, this file will raise the concerns of the Saadi tribes in Cyrenaica, especially the slaves, and it will contribute to summoning the old conflict between these tribes (Awlad Ali / Obeidat, al-Jawazi / Al-Aqwir), and their reaction cannot be predicted over time, even if the general mood tends with Egyptian political behaviors are currently being celebrated.
Also, Egyptian intervention may mean excluding the Russians, and this is very difficult for the Egyptians unless it is with the help of the Americans, and here Egyptian diplomacy will face the hardship of restoring relations with Russia, and this is very costly, or that Egyptian interference in Barqa will be a catalyst for more Russian intervention, and it will provide The Russians are the military base they are looking for, and this will make the Sisi regime vulnerable to American anger, something that Egypt has always avoided and never throughout its modern political history and in its days of stability. So, what about the current weak system that lives on American satisfaction with its role in the so-called war on terror?
Also, it is not possible to neglect the inflamed Sinai region, in which jihadist operations supported by a large part of the population will flourish as a result of the injustice done to them and the use of excessive force to suppress them, to embarrass the Egyptian army and demonstrate its inability to resolve this file that Sisi pledged to settle in 2015.
In general, the idea of a "broad" direct intervention appears difficult to implement, but it is not completely excluded and limited in areas such as Al-Jaghboub and beyond and others, and in light of the policy of forward escape practiced by Sisi to punish all the failures and disappointments his regime has faced since his coming to power.
And I believe - according to my humble understanding - that the Egyptian military ruler - after the overthrow of the monarchy - believes that the army is the broad address to reach the rule, but it is also a title for the exit from the basement.