Since Haftar appeared in the Libyan scene, Egypt has maintained a dual, if not discontinuous, role in Libya. On the official level, Egypt has been calling for a peaceful solution to the conflict and bringing all parties to the negotiating table, but at the informal level, it has contributed to fueling the civil conflict by aligning it with retired general Khalifa Hifter. These contradictions in the Egyptian position led to a complex political situation that ultimately leads to Egypt's military intervention in Libya. In the next report, we see the details of this security paradox, that is, how a contradiction in security attitudes through the desire to settle in Libya, in conjunction with fueling polarization and armed conflict, leads to a scene that ultimately provides the appropriate excuses for Egypt's military intervention in Libya, at a time when the government faces Egyptian domestic crises are more urgent, such as the "Covid-19" pandemic and the Renaissance Dam Dam, in addition to the crisis of the inflated Egyptian public debt.
Since it is a neighboring country, the lack of security in Libya has become a direct security threat to Egypt, and it is self-evident that Egypt benefits from a stable Libya that has a central government, but on the other hand, Cairo provides support to certain militias and political elements, such as retired general Khalifa Hifter, as it clashes with the efforts of the United Nations-backed unity, to extend the Libyan conflict. The report then seeks to assess the causes of the Egyptian intervention in its current form in Libya, and its effects on the Libyan conflict against the background of the position of non-governmental armed actors in Libya.
The report focuses on Egypt's policy towards Libya through the main question: "How can Egypt's contradictory policy towards Libya be explained? What is its impact on the Libyan conflict?", The paper presents the current situation in Libya and the main actors, then Egypt's multiple interests in Libya are evaluated and used to explain Egypt's policy in Libya and its impact on the Libyan conflict.
Security measures are rarely black and white; It descends from a complex network of multiple interests and interrelated factors that influence each other. This complexity can lead to scenarios in which a party or a state implements security measures that serve some interests but harm other interests. We call this phenomenon here "security paradox." This term expresses situations in which current procedures conflict with the desired result in the long term, and the actor is forced to act in a certain way to ensure the provision of security and protection from immediate threats for a short period of time, but it leads to negative situations. Hold him back from achieving his goals.
As for the security dilemma, it is different from the security paradox, as it consists of "both sides failing to perceive the problem", and without "realizing that each side generates apprehensions on the other side." While the security dilemma focuses on the dynamics between two or more actors, the security paradox occurs from the point of view of one actor, and therefore an actor can be fully aware of the situation and contradict his actions, however, he lacks a better alternative and feels obliged to act in a specific way, and therefore The situation in Libya cannot be classified in terms of Egypt as a security dilemma, but rather a security paradox.
We find the best example of security paradox in nuclear security, and it is usually referred to as security paradox and lack of it, where small countries in particular seek to acquire nuclear weapons to increase their security by deterring conventional attacks. Usually obtaining nuclear weapons increases stability, but at the same time increases the possibility of using nuclear weapons, which reduces nuclear stability. However, nuclear war with its devastating consequences is not the best solution for everyone. For countries with conventional energy resources, a comprehensive denuclearization may be the ideal theoretical solution in the long run. However, as long as there is only one country in possession of nuclear weapons, states are obliged to keep their nuclear weapons to protect themselves and confirm their negotiating power and maintain the balance of power in general as a direct result, which in turn makes the prospect of nuclear disarmament in the long run unlikely.
Security paradoxes can occur in different scenarios. With regard to the conflict in Libya, it can be considered that the Egyptian government faces a security paradox in its policy towards Libya. Whereas, the best long-term solution for Egypt will be a stable nation-state in Libya for possible border protection and increased trade. However, Egypt supports specific parties in eastern Libya, which in turn leads to placing obstacles in the way of the formation of the Libyan state. In the following lines, we assess Egypt's security paradox in more detail.
Since 2011, Libya has been widely recognized as a country of collapse, and the collapse of the central government, state institutions, and law and order has fostered the emergence of various local actors. Today, Libya is experiencing a maximum degree of decentralized and horizontal division of power between the various tribes, militias, ethnic groups, neighborhoods, cities, and villages. Political orders were issued at the subnational level based on local interests, as the eastern, western and southern conflict environments offer various incentives and lead to the splitting of armed groups, making Libya a country subject to frantic conflicts. Instead of strengthening one central authority, armed groups compete for the gestures of local leadership.
The ease of access to weapons and increased criminal activity negatively affect the option of social cohesion; The political ambitions of the militias and the transition from a comprehensive policy to accepting the authority of some and excluding others exacerbate the Libyan division, while the fragmentation of armed groups reinforces the escalation of the conflict to the extent that the monopoly of power and authority prevents the achievement of effective centralization.
Since 2016, the country has been divided into two major camps based on two major "governments". On the one hand, there is the United Nations-backed government of national reconciliation, based in Tripoli, which has the support of revolutionary militias in western cities, Islamic militias in the neighborhoods of Tripoli, southern tribes, and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the international community as the official government. On the other hand, Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the so-called Libyan National Army, claims that his military administration in eastern Libya is the legitimate government. Haftar is supported by large sectors of the army, eastern tribes, and individual armed groups in the west and south. Also, by announcing the fight against the Muslim Brotherhood, Haftar gained external support from Egypt and the Emirates. At a meeting in Paris in 2017, Haftar gained more international legitimacy from the French government to combat it against the Islamic State.
From this perspective, non-governmental groups can be viewed as helping the government to maintain law and order. On the other hand, however, these armed groups maintain a high degree of independence, lack of accountability and violation of human rights, which impedes the state’s responsibility to provide social services and protect its citizens. Thus, Libyans are obliged to address parties below the state level to provide for basic needs, as formal state structures are eroded and ineffective, even if they see official institutions as the most legitimate. Armed groups are widely seen as a major obstacle to the establishment of a unified state and the greatest security threat in the provinces.
Given the size of its influence, these militias must be incorporated into any political settlement and brought to the negotiating table. But its local interests, its influence in the region, and its external support not only further divide the country, but also prevents it from joining any unification efforts.
External interference and regional maneuvers impose internal chaos in Libya. Since it is a neighboring country to Libya, it is no wonder that Egypt is one of the main players in the ongoing conflict. Thus, Egypt's policy towards Libya is driven by multiple interests ranging from the necessary security concerns to economic considerations to ideological goals and the fight against political Islam.
The absence of stability in Libya directly affects the Egyptian national security and stability. There is also an enormous security challenge represented by 1150 km of the common border. Since the fall of Gaddafi, violence along the border has increased significantly. Given the absence of stability in the Libyan interior and on the border, ensuring full border security is an impossible task for the Egyptian side. Despite the presence of tens of thousands of Egyptian forces in the Western Desert, landmines along the border and military fighters in the sky, the border remains a major center for the smuggling of weapons, drugs and individuals, including extremists and militants. Also, the smuggling of weapons and their access to Islamist fighters has increased in the Sinai region, where Egypt is fighting a battle against ISIS operatives there. Egyptian fears of the indirect consequences of jihadist militias and criminals on its soil are also on the rise.
But besides security concerns, economic interests play a major role in Egypt's policy toward Libya. Before 2011, about 1.5 million Egyptians lived and worked in Libya, resulting in remittances of up to $ 33 million annually. But by 2015, the number of Egyptian migrant workers in Libya had halved, with remittances declining, which has had severe consequences for the Egyptian economy. Libya was also a major trading partner for Egypt in the past, but the ongoing civil war in Libya cast a shadow over the volume of trade exchange between the two countries, as Egyptian exports to Libya decreased by 75%. The Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that the Libyan government will double its investments in the Egyptian market, and that it will increase the volume of economic cooperation and restore the volume of trade exchange to what it was before the revolution in addition to supporting Egyptian companies in rebuilding Libya once the country is stable. Closely related to Egypt's economic interests, Cairo hoped to secure its energy interests in Libya, as Egypt is currently importing its energy fully, and its debts have accumulated more than three billion dollars with foreign energy companies; This means that a stable and oil-rich Libya can allow Egypt to import Libyan energy sources at low prices.
Egypt's third primary concern is its ideological project to eliminate political Islam. The main objective of Cairo is to limit the Muslim Brotherhood at home and abroad, which includes addressing the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya. Egyptian countermeasures are especially important given the support of other regional powers, such as Turkey or Qatar, for the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya. With regard to Egypt's most pressing interests, a stable Libya with a central government capable of securing its borders, dealing with internal Islamic and jihadist threats, and engaging in bilateral trade with Egypt appears to be the best scenario in the long run. While Egypt officially supports the efforts of the United Nations unit, on the other hand it supports the tribes and eastern militias in Libya and the government of Haftar that is blocking the negotiation process supported by the United Nations. Therefore, Egypt's multiple interests and security considerations help in understanding its contradictory policy in Libya.
The main dilemma for Egypt is the lack of Libyan stability, and thus Cairo is participating in the efforts of international diplomacy to establish a political settlement. On the official level, Egypt declares that constructive national dialogue is the only way to achieve political reconciliation. Therefore, Cairo supported the United Nations-led mediation and hosted the meetings of the Egyptian National Committee on Libya to build consensus between the Libyan parties and encourage the unification of military and other state institutions. But this comes in conjunction with Cairo blaming the international community for the slow political transition in Libya. Sisi's accusations are based on the international ouster of Gaddafi and the failure to "finish the job." On the official level, then, Egypt formally calls on the international community to "reform what it has corrupted" by promoting institution building, reconstruction and a central government agreed upon in Libya, and this confirms Egypt's pursuit of stability and unity in Libya.
However, Egypt has multiple interests with regard to its neighbor. Besides long-term stability, the main aspect of Libya’s current policy in Cairo is its security-centered approach; The volatile frontiers and the need to deal with Islamists as one of the main security risks compels Cairo to cooperate with tribal leaders in the Egyptian-Libyan border region. It has been customary for marriage and descent to combine the tribes of eastern Libya and the Egyptian Western Sahara, which could provide fertile ground for intelligence and mediation of skirmishes at the border. Hence, Egypt concluded agreements with tribes in the border region, such as the influential "Awlad Ali tribe" and many "Matruh tribes", as a short-term solution to combat cross-border trafficking and arms smuggling. However, this selective cooperation of tribal elites fails to address basic grievances in the region and lacks long-term solutions to current border issues.
In Haftar, Egypt also found a major ally who headed a coalition of federal militias, eastern tribes, and military units in eastern Libya. Cairo supports Haftar and allied militias by providing intelligence, logistical support, and the supply of weapons, thus violating the United Nations' arms embargo. For Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, Hifter combines various security interests; He affirms, for example, that Egypt supports Hifter the importance of stabilizing Egypt's borders, as he shares the fight against jihadists and Islamists, and has a clear stance against the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya. Another important similarity between Egyptian President Sisi and Haftar is the shared belief that a strong military base is necessary to stabilize and strengthen national identity. Egypt's framing of Libya with a framework of its security concerns allows legitimizing its security approach towards Libya and its interference in it. By portraying Haftar as a strongman who will help restore stability and fight Islamic domination, the Egyptian government shows a clear position toward Libya.
However, Haftar and his Libyan national army are opposed to the United Nations-backed National Accord government, and the tough anti-Islamist stance is attracting the country. Islamic militias are forced to join a single coalition that is undermining more practical Islamist factions, which is pushing external sponsors of Islamists like Qatar to expand support, while Haftar lacks the capabilities to expand his force and send troops to Tripoli. Therefore, instead of promoting unity and stability, experts claim that Egypt's unilateral support for Haftar is causing further division in Libya. The ongoing clashes between the two rival sides and armed groups have already threatened to hold elections at the end of 2018. The close association with Haftar impedes Egypt's efforts to act as a neutral mediator for achieving unity.
Egypt's conflicting policy in Libya shows a security paradox; From a security standpoint, support for Haftar prevents a vacuum in eastern Libya as fertile ground for jihadists and Islamists, and thus is like an immediate logical security measure. Nevertheless, Egypt's policy towards Libya prolongs the conflict and impedes settlement opportunities between the warring Libyan parties. In this way, the long-term goal of a stable Libya for better security and economic cooperation with Egypt is hampered. As long as Libya is unstable and there are other external powers that support the Islamic militias and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt supports some militias and Haftar to secure its own interests in Libya and avoid hostile repercussions, even if that means prolonging the conflict.
Militias and local armed groups in Libya have wide influence with the two main governing sides depending on their security support and provision. Even the United Nations has relied on militias to provide security for official institutions and United Nations facilities instead of removing them from government roles, by following their own agendas, and competing with each other rather than uniting Power and challenge the legitimacy of the central government in Libya. However, armed groups are a major factor in prolonging and complicating the political transition process. Consequently, unilateral external support for the armed groups involved further divides Libya, hampering unity efforts.
Given Egypt's efforts, the government faces a security paradox. On the one hand, Egypt desperately needs a stable Libya, led by a unified central government to boost mutual trade and security. On the other hand, Cairo is competing with other regional powers over influence in Libya, such as Qatar and Turkey, which support the Al-Wefaq government and some Islamist groups, while Egypt attaches importance to containing the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. Given the urgent security concerns, such as the troubled Libyan-Egyptian border and the threat of jihadist or Islamist coups against Egypt, it is pushing Cairo to support its militias and grant unilateral support to Haftar in eastern Libya, although this contradicts the efforts of the United Nations unit.
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This report is taken from E-International Relations and does not necessarily represent Meedan.