In June 2011, American History Magazine dedicated a special issue on "Terrorism and the American Experience." In the midst of her comment on the state of academic research on this topic. Beverly Gage noticed, especially when it comes to the last decade of the Cold War, that a number of important questions remain unanswered, such as: First, “How did the US government identify groups that might be classified as terrorist organizations?”, And secondly, “How did America try to avoid Applying such attributes to their proxy wars?
In late November, President Donald Trump announced the return of North Korea to the State Department's list of "state sponsors of terrorism." North Korea was put on that list for the first time in 1988, before it was dropped from it in 2008.
The following analysis compares the way President Reagan spoke when he addressed the American public, the way that United States representatives spoke to the United Nations General Assembly, about the role North Korea and other countries have played in nurturing so-called "international terrorism." This comparison raises many interesting answers to Gage's questions and highlights the role played by elected officials, the press, and American "terrorism experts" in shaping the American narrative about "terrorism", as well as other issues that researchers interested in the concept of "terrorism" should study. .
Ronald Reagan was the first American president to place the war against "international terrorism" at the center of his foreign policy. Whenever he used to address the American people, that is, in a context in which he completely controlled his speech, Reagan used the term "terrorism" to refer to a very wide range of actions (attacks against civilians but even against military targets) and from actors (both states and non-states alike). whether). Reagan focused his rhetorical attention only on violence (and "terrorism") by the enemies of the United States, while he remained silent about the violence (and "terrorism") committed by his allies. Indeed, the central part of the American discourse on "terrorism" as formulated in the 1980s is that "terrorism" is a form of unethical political violence practiced by only "others". As the proponents of this new narrative insisted in the United States (and elsewhere, especially Israel) and continue to insist today, in their view “terrorism” constitutes a threat to only the “civilized western world”, and specifically represents what separates it from the “barbarians” or “ Other barbarians.
From the start, the so-called role of states in supporting "terrorism" was an essential part of Reagan's public discourse. From the moment he entered the White House, the President has claimed on countless occasions the existence of an "international terrorist network" controlled by Musk, and over the years, his first foreign minister, Alexander Haig, and his successor, George Schultz, repeatedly made similar public statements .
On October 9, 1983, bombs hidden in the roof of the martyr's tomb in Rangoon, Burma's capital, (Myanmar), killed 21 people, but its main target was South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan who survived the attack. A few weeks later, an investigation by Burmese police revealed that the perpetrators were officers in the North Korean army, and that they had acted on the orders of their government, as the explosives they used came from the North Korean embassy in Burma.
In the weeks after the Rangoon bombing, President Reagan repeatedly condemned the attack as a "terrorist" act. The US State Department also used the same language, describing the bombing in its annual report on "patterns of global terrorism" as "the fiercest terrorist attack in Asia in 1983", and the perpetrators were described as "North Korean government terrorists".
On October 23, 1983, booby-trapped trucks destroyed a number of US Marines and French paratroopers stationed in Beirut, killing 241 American soldiers, as well as 58 French soldiers in the attack. In its report on the bombing, the US Department of Defense indicated that "there are indications of Syrian and Iranian indirect involvement, at the very least, in this incident," and advised that "the Defense Department's definition of terrorism should be expanded to include countries that use terrorism either directly or through agents."
Reagan claimed that this attack showed that the United States was "not sufficiently equipped to deal with the new phenomenon of state-backed terrorism," thereby becoming the first US president to use the term "state-backed terrorism" or "state-sponsored terrorism." He also insisted that the problem of "terrorism" is not "unique" and exclusive to Lebanon, referring specifically to the "terrorist bombing in Rangoon", and called on "civilized countries" to work together to hold "those countries that sponsor terrorism and terrorist activity."
With the start of Reagan's second term, all the key elements of the narrative on "terrorism" that will reappear strongly after the September 11, 2001 attacks. In a famous speech in July 1985, for example, President Reagan denounced the dangers posed by what he called "The Confederation of Terrorist Countries" (such as Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua), describing it as an "international killing company ... unified by one simple criminal phenomenon which is its dogmatic hatred of the United States, our people, our way of life, and our international standing." These "terrorist" states, Reagan continued, "participated in war actions against the government and people of the United States," saying that this threat justifies the use of military force by the United States "under international law, as any country that finds itself a victim of acts of war has the right to Defend itself. "
On November 29, 1987, a bombing in the air killed 115 passengers on a Korean Airline flight No. 858, and a few days later, a man and a woman were arrested in Bahrain after their suspected involvement in the attack. On January 14, the woman admitted to being a North Korean agent and acknowledged her role in the bombing.
According to the US State Department, this attack constituted "North Korea's return to state terrorism for the first time since it bombed the martyr's monument in Rangoon four years ago." North Korea was immediately placed on the US list of "state sponsors of terrorism", joining Syria, Libya, Cuba, Iran, and the Republic of South Yemen.
A comprehensive analysis of the President's speeches (in addition to statements by Foreign Minister Haig and Schultz) on "terrorism" leads to one unparalleled answer to Beverly Gage's questions mentioned above. Reagan was able to select those who could be classified as "terrorists" while disregarding US (military) covert actions and not including them in defining terrorism, precisely because, when addressing the American public, he had full control over his narrative. In other words, Reagan, in his public speeches, did not have to clearly define what he meant by "terrorism". Instead, Reagan made accusations against America's enemies based on a broad (and implicit) definition of "terrorism", while remaining simply silent about the "possibility" that the methods used by the United States and its allies would be of a "terrorist" nature.
More importantly, Reagan's ability to manipulate his speech was a direct result of the failure of the press to ask the president to define this "terrorism" or to have him explain his decision to use the term to refer to certain entities and groups rather than others. In other words, the context in which Reagan expressed himself was not necessarily an easy or non-adversarial context in itself (that is, many could challenge the president's allegations about terrorism), but what happened was that various actors and influencers, most notably the press, systematically failed to present What kind of challenge is the president using the term "terrorism" like this?
The second answer related to Gage's questions can be drawn by analyzing the ways in which US government representatives have spoken of "terrorism" in a very different, more adversarial context, that is, the United Nations General Assembly.
The issue of "international terrorism" was first discussed in the General Assembly in late 1972. As it became clear immediately, member states disagreed on the correct way to understand and define this concept, and therefore, about which entities and groups around the world deserve or not deserve to be called "terrorists" and that Condemned in this manner by the international community. Once discussions started, the countries argued that American practices in Vietnam constituted "terrorism by a state", and insisted that any definition of "terrorism" (and thus any condemnation of "terrorism" in General Assembly decisions) might focus only on the violence of small groups Or individuals while ignoring widespread violence by states will be unacceptable.
For the United States, the General Assembly has grown more adversarial during the Reagan years, specifically the years that saw the birth of the American narrative on "terrorism". Indeed, during the 1980s the United States was supporting many existing regimes around the world (in order to “contain” the Soviet Union), but also, for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, it was also supporting many non-state actors to topple pro-Soviet governments (for " Roll Back Communism ").
Indeed, a large number of UN member states accused the United States of "state terrorism" in the 1980s because of their actions in Nicaragua (support for contras gangs or planting mines in the country's ports by the CIA), Afghanistan (supporting the mujahideen there), and Cuba ( Operations carried out by anti-Castro exiles living in Florida who had alleged ties to the CIA), as well as direct use of military force (against Libya in 1986), or America’s support for countries such as South Africa and Israel (which a majority of members have repeatedly accused of involvement in "State terrorism").
In this context, representatives of the United States developed a narrative that fundamentally contradicted those developed by President Reagan in his public speeches at the time.
During the 1983 discussions, for example, most member states explicitly condemned the bombings in Burma as a "terrorist" act, and insisted that such an attack constituted a clear violation of international law and demonstrated the need for the international community to focus on the role that states play in "international terrorism". .
However, two countries completely violated this consensus. The first was North Korea, whose representative denied any involvement in the Rangoon bombings, and accused its enemy to the south of being involved in a "terrorist" campaign against his country instead.
And the second country was the United States, whose representative was the only representative who said that discussions about "international terrorism" were not actually the appropriate forum for discussing the Rangoon bombing, because this attack - as he claimed - stood behind him a country, and this means that his violation of international law was not It is in doubt, and therefore his interpretation as "terrorist" was not correct!
The representative of the United States at the time, Robert Rosenstock, stated that the focus of the General Assembly discussions "was on the terrorist act committed by individuals or groups, while other items on the agenda dealt with the behavior of states and the use of force by states." He then touched on the specific circumstances surrounding the Rangoon attacks, saying:
"On October 9, 1983, the world witnessed the Rangoon bombing that killed Burmese citizens and officials of the South Korean government, which at first glance seemed to be a nefarious attack of the kind that the commission was supposed to have taken care of under item 123. But what is striking here is that It has turned out that this sordid act was not just an act committed by individuals or criminal groups, but [...] an appalling example of state crime by North Korea. ”
For Rosenstock, the involvement of agents of a state, rather than agents of non-states, did not necessarily mean that the General Assembly should focus its attention on the role that states play in "international terrorism". Rosenstock said:
"Killings by a system of government threaten peace more than terrorist acts by individuals or groups. One wonders what the North Korean regime may be seeking to achieve: Can any regime believe that such behavior is its path to international recognition? In any case, the Rangoon bombing was an act of reprehensible force on the part of a State, thus placing it outside the scope of the agenda item under discussion. "
United States representatives to the General Assembly made similar arguments in the years 1985, 1987, 1989, and 1991. In fact, their rejection of the concept of "state terrorism" often went beyond mere claim, as in 1983, that the actions committed by state agents were state acts, and therefore not "terrorist" acts. In a context in which other member states insisted that American support for groups such as the Contra, the Afghan Mujahideen or the UNITA (Angolan) organization constituted a form of "state terrorism", US representatives repeatedly argued that acts committed by individuals or groups supported them A state, itself, is a state’s actions, and therefore should not be considered “terrorist” acts.
Thus, in 1991, US Representative Michael Scharf claimed that "it is unnecessary to characterize the behavior of the state as terrorism in order to demonstrate its illegality, as there is already a strong body of law" applicable to this type of act. The American representative could not imagine any behavior on the part of the state that could reasonably be called "terrorism", as it did not really constitute a violation of the law (that is, without the need to redefine it). He added that states' support for terrorist acts by individuals and groups was a clear violation of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. For him these were the actions of a State, and as a result, they were outside the scope of the General Assembly's discussions. The term "terrorism", as Scharf said, "is of great benefit when applied to acts of violence of a heinous nature, committed by individuals or groups, so that they are greater than ordinary crimes for personal gain but are too small to be acts of a state."
The United States was the only member state to defend such a stance.
What is remarkable is that this meant that throughout the years of President Reagan, the United States defended a position fundamentally contradicting the position of Israel, whose representatives have repeatedly insisted, since the beginning of these discussions, that any discussions about "international terrorism" should focus on the central role. Which countries such as Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran are playing in feeding this scourge.
Addressing American public opinion, President Reagan (and other senior members of his administration, especially his foreign ministers) managed to control his narratives completely without challenge, specifically, by denouncing America's "terrorism" without ever defining it, while Remain silent about the potential "terrorist" nature of some of the methods used by various US allies.
But while it was a stark contrast to their president’s narrative, US representatives at the United Nations spoke about the issue in a context where the issue of how to define “terrorism” was raised all the time, and where the definition of “terrorism” had immediate consequences. In the General Assembly, defending a broad definition such as that adopted by Reagan's public speeches also meant opening the door to countless accusations that certain uses of force by the United States and its allies might be like acts of "terrorism". Indeed, a number of member states have made clear reference to speeches in which Reagan accused his enemies of "state-backed terrorism" in order to say that the United States' support for the Contra or the Afghan Mujahideen, or the various covert actions by the CIA, was also a "terrorism" .
In a contested context like this, US representatives completely abandoned Reagan's narrative and demanded a very narrow definition of terrorism that excludes any state-related action, i.e. a definition that excludes what President Reagan, the Department of Defense, the State Department (and the list of "state sponsors of terrorism"), and Haig and Schultz (in public statements) Of their own) by repeatedly condemning him as "state-sponsored" or "state-backed" terrorism.
Indeed, reading the texts of the United Nations is almost a surreal experience, as the representatives of the United States have never referred to actions involving countries, and they have never accused countries such as Libya, Syria, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea or the Soviet Union to engage in or Supporting "terrorism", and they never defended the principle that states claim that they have a justification in using military force in self-defense against countries that have supported or sponsored "terrorism". In other words, these actors expressed themselves as if the narrative about "terrorism" adopted by the American President at the same time did not exist at all.
Consequently, the second answer to Gage's inquiry is that in adversarial contexts such as the United Nations context, Reagan administration representatives have ensured that US covert actions will not be defined as “terrorist” by defending a definition of “terrorism” that fundamentally contradicts the president’s narrative That I use when expressing himself in safe contexts (that is, contexts in which no one challenges him).
Once again, the press played an important role in building the concept of "terrorism" through its systematic failure to reveal the existence of these multiple narratives, and the apparent contradiction between them. As a result, these narratives remained separate from one another, which allowed their contradictions and inconsistencies to be kept completely hidden from view.
For example, in its coverage of the first General Assembly discussions on "international terrorism" in 1972, The New York Times profoundly misrepresented the nature of the differences surrounding the definition of "terrorism", between the positions advocated by non-aligned and Soviet bloc countries, and the position advocated by actors The Americans themselves. After 1972, The New York Times barely covered the General Assembly debate, and when it did, it completely misrepresented the nature of the disputes over the definition, with utter silence about the position advocated by US representatives there.
As a result, the American people have never been informed that countless countries around the world have considered (and condemned) various American actions as representing acts of "terrorism", and they have not been informed of the specific arguments that were made when making such accusations. More disturbingly, the American people were never told about the arguments their representatives made when they faced such accusations. Indeed, the American press never mentioned that the United States was the only Member State, throughout the 1980s, that argued that discussions about "international terrorism" should focus only on actions committed by groups and individuals without any implication of states.
Likewise, "terrorism experts" have shown little interest in these UN discussions, and in the rare cases in which they have shown some interest, their analyzes are not based on the texts of the discussions (i.e. original sources), but rather on the inaccurate media narration.
The American press has also failed to cover discussions about "terrorism" in other adversarial contexts such as the US Congress. As a result, readers of major American newspapers have never been told that, throughout the 1980s, Democrats and Republicans were in complete disagreement over how to define "terrorism" and define "terrorists" in conflicts such as Nicaragua, El Salvador, and South Africa.
Also, these discussions in Congress were completely absent from the writings of experts on "terrorism", as is the case with countless classified documents (documents now declassified) that explain how analysts from the State Department or the CIA repeatedly indicated, Since at least the sixties, to the forces allied with the United States in various countries of Central America and South America as "terrorist". This disregard is especially worrying because these "terrorist experts" tend, as a group, to accept the vulgar claim that the United States stands "against all kinds of terrorism" and that it is participating in a global war against "international terrorism".
In fact, the ways in which American politicians and the American people began to think and talk about "terrorism" in the 1980s, and have continued to think and speak on this issue since then, are primarily the result of a political and ideological process.
Over time, a series of actors, from politicians to "terrorism experts" to the media, managed to give meaning or even build the term "terrorism" from scratch, while they acted as if discussions had taken place in the United Nations or in Congress The American, that is, the discussions in the (private) forums were somewhat "illegal" and should not affect public discussions on the subject. At the same time, these entities highlighted President Reagan's narrative that he and his other powerful officials developed in safe, non-adversarial contexts, and marketed them as a clear, descriptive, and non-ideological narrative. These bodyguards, from politicians to experts and media outlets, organized the conditions for a general discussion on terrorism by selecting votes and specific views while excluding others, setting clear boundaries that the narrative was not allowed to cross, and thus they played a pivotal role in "building" the concept of terrorism as we know it today .
The narrative about "terrorism" today, as it has always been, is full of contradictions and inconsistencies. Her central normative claim that we (and our allies) are fundamentally opposed to, and never participate in, "terrorism" remains unacceptable today as it was in the 1980s. Meanwhile, it is being used repeatedly to strip the "other" of its humanity and legitimacy while legitimizing our use of violence against it.
In conclusion, the writer of these lines believes that more critical investigation about building the concept of "terrorism" can benefit greatly from developing a theoretical and methodological framework that documents and analyzes the history of the multiple American narratives on "terrorism" in relation to different contexts - whether these are safe or quarrelsome, Public, secret, political, or media - in which these narratives were produced.
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This report is translated from E-International Relations and does not necessarily reflect the location of Meedan.